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 In what ways do leaders help themselves to votes when they design and administer social policy? 
While political leaders acknowledge: “good policy, good votes” in social policy design and 
administration, the direction of redistributive targeting carries electoral implications, creating 
incentives to politicize distribution. This study utilizes a comparative framework to develop a 
theoretical model to explain targeted social policy choice in Latin American countries. It presents 
a systematic account of how programs are developed and politicized, and shows how they are a 
function of elements of horizontal accountability that affect how leaders pursue their agenda.  
To assess this theory, the project utilizes a mixed-method approach to examine cases in 
Brazil and Venezuela. To show the variation between programmatic and parochial social 
programs it examines expenditure patterns, program oversight, and tests of political and 
demographic determinants on program distribution to examine how programs with different 
levels of oversight are targeted. It then examines the effect of partisan powers on the design of 
programs, showing how horizontal accountability affects integration of reform elements that 
provide oversight and moderation of program design. To understand the electoral payoff of 
different targeted programs, it examines survey data to test effects of program participation on 
incumbent electoral support. 
This investigation reveals that leaders politicize targeted social programs by choosing 
distributional strategies, but are constrained in doing so by elements of horizontal accountability 
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 iv 
such as political competition and the institutionalization of the party system. The effects of these 
elements are shown in the cases and analysis of program distribution. Both programmatic and 
parochial distributive strategies have electoral effects, but the degree of effect varies. The quality 
of program outcomes varies too by distributive strategy. Better programs are the product of 
political interactions that affect the degree to which leaders can redistribute in a parochial 
manner. Evidence from Brazil and Venezuela shows variation in the politics, their outputs, the 
electoral effects, and program outcomes. The relationship of “good policy, good votes” is 
determined by “good politics” showing the effect of political institutions that constrain leaders 
from seeking “bad policy” and votes that follow. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
In what ways do leaders help themselves to votes when they design and administer social policy? 
While political leaders acknowledge: “good policy, good votes” in social policy design and 
administration, the direction of redistributive targeting carries electoral implications. The 
experience of targeted social programs in Latin America yields important lessons about the ways 
that leaders deliver policy to their constituencies. This project shows that the line between 
clientelism and good social policy is often a blurred distinction, as all social programs have vote-
winning aspects to them. This requires a deeper understanding about the direction of targeting 
redistributive policy. 
Leaders choose different means of targeting antipoverty programs to reach constituents. 
Variation in leadership redistributive choices reflects political strategy; politicization can achieve 
electoral support and ensure political survival. In some cases, leaders deliver to constituencies to 
hold them, while others seek to persuade voters. Still in other countries, leaders seek to increase 
participation broadly without discriminating among core supporters or the opposition. How they 
choose among these strategies is a determined by horizontal accountability in the relationship 
between executives and legislatures. Conventional wisdom on redistribution and democracy 
suggests that leaders have incentives to redistribute to constituents in democratic societies. 
Examining this variation provides detail into how political institutions influence distributive 
policy choice. 
 1 
1.1 PROBLEM 
Since the late 1970s, social program design has overwhelmingly shifted towards targeting — the 
identification and prioritization of certain beneficiaries over others — instead of universalistic 
policies pursued in the past (Besley and Kanbur 1990; Mkandawire 2005). Governments choose 
targeting over universalistic program design because they face political and financial limitations, 
as well as distributional coalitions that mobilize to protect programs that benefit them. The effects 
of globalization limit the expansiveness of social programs as limitations on deficit spending and 
existing entitlement commitment restrict the available amount of program funds, as governments 
pursue programs that reflect efficient distributions of resources. Leaders also must navigate 
existing political coalitions that lobby to protect the benefits they receive from legacy social 
programs. 
However, leaders are not without political tools to deliver policy and win supporters. 
Though targeted programs reach a limited set of constituents, they represent an opportunity to 
leaders to design programs in ways that benefit electoral chances. 
Leaders in Latin America faced similar opportunities among the informal sector to deliver 
benefits to the vast and growing sector of the population working informally within the countries. 
Figure 1 below shows an increase in the share of the informal sector as a percentage of 
employment in Latin America for nearly all countries where reliable data exists. 
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 Figure 1. Informal Economy Employment as a Percentage of Employment in Latin America 
1990-2000 
 
 
 
 3 
The informal sector emerged as a relevant political constituency following a sequence of 
social events in Latin American countries, where neoliberal economic transitions disrupted 
societal linkages between governments and social groups. (Coker 2001; Roberts 2007) These 
citizens were excluded from traditional social welfare policy and dissatisfied with their personal 
experience with neoliberal policy diffusion. The evidence from Brazil and Venezuela presented in 
Chapter 6 suggests that participation in this sort of program has a positive effect on electoral 
support for leaders. Promoting social inclusion and mobilizing political participation from this 
group are ways that leaders can capitalize electorally on the targeting of social policy. 
Despite having comparable elements to the social programs and similar opportunity 
among constituents to both deliver policy and gain electoral support, the electoral effect of the 
programs vary, revealed though examination of survey data for program recipient support in 
subsequent elections. Reviewing the electoral effects allows an investigation of whether voter 
allegiances changed in successive elections as the governments carried out the programs. 
Comparing electoral support for Chávez among recipients of the Misiones with that for Lula 
among the recipients of Bolsa Família suggests that the programs reflected different political 
strategies to win electoral support by targeting social spending. The programs had different 
effects on the voting behavior of citizens in each country, and this reflects how the leaders 
developed strategies to capture coalitions through targeting. Similar objectives that yielded 
different effects suggest that leaders varied strategies to reach the coalition. This variation 
requires investigation into the strategies employed by leaders to win votes when they design and 
administer social policy. 
In the past decade in Latin America, the influx of leftist leaders has drawn renewed 
attention to income inequality and redistribution, particularly within the informal poor population 
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within the countries. The difference in politicization is no starker than the comparison between 
the Misiones Sociales policies of Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and the Programa Bolsa Família of 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil. Upon entering office, Chávez and Lula each inherited similar 
opportunities to design policies to accommodate the informal poor.  
1.2 THE PROGRAMS 
Both Bolsa Família and the Misiones suggest that reaching a poor constituency was the goal of 
each country’s respective leadership. Both leaders initiated the policy changes at least two years 
after taking office. Both programs are intended to reach the informal poor within the countries. 
Both programs are intended to break the intergenerational cycles of poverty that persist 
particularly among the urban informal poor. Both were designed to complement the existing 
systems of social safety nets within the countries. Both have resulted in enormous political 
popularity among their leaders, as well as political polarization and claims of corruption and 
clientelism. 
Both the Bolsa Família and the education Misiónes include cash transfer elements. Bolsa 
Família subsidized family income by incentivizing parents to keep their children within school. 
Misiones Robinson, Ribas and Sucre subsidized individual incomes by providing scholarships 
(becas) in a targeted manner to individuals to attend adult remedial education. Despite their 
similarities in targeting the expanding informal sector in these countries and goals of poverty 
alleviation, the policies varied in their design and administration. This variation affected program 
reach, and the degree to which redistributive spending reflected programmatic or parochial 
targets.  
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1.2.1 Bolsa Família 
In 2003, Lula introduced Bolsa Família (Family Grant) a program that targeted the poorest sector 
of the population utilizing a registry and means test, including an interview process involving a 
social worker visiting the household that was set to receive the benefit. Bolsa Família itself was 
not entirely new. With Bolsa Família, the Lula government undertook a consolidation of many 
existing cash transfer programs. The program was designed to target informal sectors of the 
population with cash benefits to allow additional spending on family needs. While Bolsa Família 
consolidated existing programs, this change allowed a greater extension for program reach, 
allowing for new redistribution to Brazilian citizens. In this spirit, the country took up the slogan: 
“Um Pais de Todos” (A Country of All), extending its reach toward the marginalized.  
Bolsa Família offers a cash transfer to registered participants with the following 
conditions for parents to maintain the transfer: vaccination and regular health check-ups and 
enrollment and school attendance for children; and for mothers, maternal care and health and 
nutrition seminars, as well as maintaining contact with the school and local program coordinator 
if the child changes schools (Lindert, Linder, Hobbs, & Brière, 2007, 18). The transfer levels are 
based on a means test for family income, with ceilings for very poor: R$60 (US$30) and 
moderately poor: R$120 (US$ 60) per month.1 Benefits received for each level (depending on 
number of children per family range from R$15-45 to R$50-95 for the respective income 
categories (Lindert, Linder, Hobbs, & Brière, 2007, 17-8). A variable adolescent benefit was later 
added that allowed the maximum transfer to rise to R$172 (US$ 104) (Cunha, 2008, 8).   
1 Initially the figures were R$50-R$100 for the income categories, but these were revised upward in 2006  (Cunha, 
2008, 8). 
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The program was launched as a consolidation of existing CCT programs. It combined 
existing programs already performed by the government, including Bolsa Escola, a schooling 
program, and Bolsa Alimentação, an anti-hunger program, Programa de Eradicação do Trabalho 
Infantil (PETI), an anti-child labor program, Vale Gas, compensation offered by the government 
as it phased out cooking gas subsidies.  Bolsa Escola itself was a national-level rollout of a 
municipal-level Bolsa Escola-style program. The antecedent was a similar 1995 municipal-level 
program initiated in Campinas and Ribeirão Preto, São Paulo and in Brasilia (Coêlho 2009).  The 
Programa de Eradicação do Trabalho Infantil (PETI – Program to Eradicate Child Labor), begun 
in 1996, was a conditional cash transfer program that included conditions to ensure school 
attendance and prevent participation in the labor market (Britto & Soares, 2010, 6). In 1998, 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso launched a Programa Garantida Renda Minima (PGRM, 
Program for a Guaranteed Minimum Income), which provided transfers to municipalities that 
implemented CCTs (Lindert, Linder, Hobbs, & Brière, 2007, 12). 
Bolsa Família combined these programs in a way that ensured policy compliance among 
participating families – children’s attendance at school and their immunization – in order to 
receive the financial benefit. The process combined the functions for government agencies that 
were previously performed across numerous agencies with a managerial center in the Ministério 
do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (Ministry of Social Development and Combating 
Hunger - MDS). The consolidation of cash transfers reflected the diffusion earlier programs 
initiated at lower administrative levels, introduced by politicians from multiple political parties 
including members of the PT and the PSDB (Partido da Social Democraticia Brasileira). It 
promoted efficiency among administrative costs by improving the targeting system, establishing 
synergy among the health and education programs, strengthening monitoring and evaluation, and 
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promoting vertical integration among sub-national programs (Lindert, Linder, Hobbs, & Brière, 
2007, 14).  
In introducing the program, the PT politicians faced criticisms ranging from 
assistencialismo to idea theft from opposition parties. Debates over the identity of the program – 
whether it was a targeted social program or whether it should be changed to serve as a guaranteed 
minimum income – occurred during the first year following the program’s inception. This 
ultimately resulted in the strengthening of conditionality monitoring and institutional oversight to 
prevent the program from becoming a clientelist tool to improve the electoral chances of 
incumbent politicians. 
Program design and the attention to oversight and eligibility criteria are a function of 
politics, and how they developed over the course of the decade provide a way to understand 
whether and how Bolsa Família was targeted to generate electoral support for incumbents rather 
than (or in addition to) support the poor.  Later chapters will evaluate the electoral effect of the 
program, the politics of policy design in Brazil, and the degree to which Bolsa Família was 
targeted to generate electoral support.   
1.2.2 The Misiones  
Following the short-lived 2002 coup against him, Chávez initiated a new series of social 
programs, the Misiones Sociales, initiating a range of services complementary to existing 
government education, health and social welfare programs. These programs were wide-ranging, 
serving not simply the poorest, and only involved conducting means tests for certain aspects of 
the programs – those that included becas, or scholarships – but not for others, such as 
neighborhood medical care. The initial Misiones were: Barrio Adentro (Within the 
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Neighborhood; primary health care), Mercal (discount grocery), Robinson (basic literacy), Ribas 
(basic education), Sucre (postsecondary education), Habitat (housing), and Vuelvan Caras (About 
Face; cooperatively owned goods production businesses).  
This process of initiating these programs drew together new and somewhat extraordinary 
functions for government agencies, some of which were outside of their traditional responsibility. 
This reflected a decision by leadership on how to administer the tasks associated with a new 
social program. Misiones Robinson was administered by the Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y 
Deportes (MECD – Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports), and Misión Ribas was 
administered by the Ministerio de Energia y Minas (Ministry of Energy and Mines) after starting 
in 2003. Misión Sucre was administered by the Ministerio de Educación Superior (Ministry of 
Higher Education). Misión Barrio Adentro was administered by the Ministerio de Salud y 
Desarrollo Social (MSDS – Ministry of Health and Social Development). Misión Vuelvan Caras 
was administered by the Ministerio de Educación Superior, but soon after, the Ministerio de 
Economía Popular (MINEP- Ministry of People’s Economy). Misión Mercal was administered 
by the Ministerio de Agricultura y Tierras (MAT - Ministry of Agriculture and Land), but later 
the Ministerio de la Alimentación (MINAL – Ministry of Diet). Only two of the Misiones fell 
within the traditional responsibilities associated with their ministries: Barrio Adentro, and 
Robinson. For the others, these new responsibilities present issues of state capability as the 
government executes these extraordinary and remedial social programs. 
With the Misiones, the Chávez government undertook several core social program 
initiatives in a relatively short time span. Misiones Robinson, Ribas, and Sucre were begun as part 
of a wider social policy push that also consisted of Misión Barrio Adentro, Misión Habitat/ 
Vivienda, Misión Mercal and Misión Vuelvan Caras.  Of these, the education and health Misiones 
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were essentially remedial – programs begun by the government to accommodate the needs of 
individuals that had been underserved in traditional education and health systems within the 
country. These programs duplicated ongoing education and health functions of the federal 
government, but aimed offering these particular services to a larger constituent base than previous 
programs, consistent with the government slogan of: “Ahora es de Todos” – now it’s all of ours. 
Because the programs were targeted to remedy underservice to traditionally excluded populations, 
they represented a new form of redistribution to Venezuelan citizens.  
1.2.2.1 Misión Robinson 
Misión Robinson was initiated in 2003 with a goal of eradicating adult illiteracy, which was 
estimated at 1.2-1.5 million citizens2 (Ortega and Rodríguez n.d.). The government oversees 
administration of the program through the Comisión Nacional de Alfabetización (National 
Literacy Commission), though a series of agreements with the Cuban Government provided 
advice and training for facilitators, video educational materials for the courses, advice on 
methodological techniques, and communication of the experience in using media for mass 
education and cultural knowledge (D’Elia, 2006, 79-80). The instructional method the 
government uses consists of facilitators presenting videos to students with a Cuban technique 
called “Yo sí puedo” (Yes I can), which runs seven weeks long with an intensive focus  (D’Elia 
2006). By the end of the course, students are expected to have the ability to write a letter to 
demonstrate literacy (Ortega and Rodríguez n.d.). Graduates are then permitted access to 
Robinson II for basic education, which employed instruction techniques: “Yo sí puedo seguir” – 
Yes I can continue (D’Elia 2006; Ortega and Rodríguez n.d.). After the initial program push, 
2 The foundation bears the name of Simón Rodríguez, tutor and mentor to Simón Bolívar, and his pseudonym, 
Samuel Robinson. 
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facilitation of Robinson learning shifted to volunteer households, instead of in public spaces 
(Mundo 2009).  
1.2.2.2 Misión Ribas 
Misión Ribas was initiated in 2003 with a goal of providing adult secondary education to an 
estimated population of 5 million citizens that had not completed formal secondary education 
(bachilleres) within the country (D’Elia, 2006, 91).3 Like Robinson, the instructional method 
employs video lessons with classroom facilitators, though here it was based on a methodology 
developed by the MED in its Plan Nacional Educación para Todos (National Education Plan for 
Everyone). The curriculum consists of 15 hours per week over four semesters, totaling 225 
classroom hours for each term in the first level, and 300 classroom hours for each term in the 
second level. Instruction consists of the following subjects: mathematics, language, world and 
Venezuelan geography, English, science, Venezuelan history, world history and computing. The 
final element, Componente Comunitario y Sociolaboral (CCSL – Community and Social Work 
component), functions as a capstone project that involves an identification of a local community 
problem and solution, offering a way to lend critical thought and education to social betterment 
(D’Elia, 2006, 94). As in Robinson, facilitators are employed within this program to handle 
discussion, monitor and promote the program among participants to avoid attrition, as well as 
ensure learning among the students (D’Elia, 2006, 96). 
3 Its namesake, José Félix Ribas was an independence leader and is considered a hero of the Venezuelan revolution 
against Spain.  
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1.2.2.3 Misión Sucre   
Like its basic and secondary counterparts, Misión Sucre was founded in 2003.4 It began offering 
degree programs to individuals through the Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela (UBV) 
locations in Maracaibo, Ciudad Bolívar and Caracas, the Universidad Nacional Experimental de 
la Fuerza Armada (UNEFA) along with 28 other colleges and institutes across the country 
(D’Elia, 2006, 103-9). It initially offered the following programs, created between 2003-05: the 
University Initiation Program (PIU – a university preparation program), National Program for 
Trainers, the Program for the Incarcerated Population, and Community Medicine Program 
(D’Elia, 2006 103). The programs currently include: law, social studies, environmental studies, 
social and administrative communication, accounting, engineering, plastics, chemistry, and 
mechanics (D’Elia, 2006, 110). 
1.2.2.4 Becas and Participation 
Participation in programs includes a scholarship award for some participants. Becas of 160,000 
Bs ($100) were distributed for Misiones Robinson, Ribas, and Sucre. For Misión Robinson, the 
program offers the participants, known as “Patriots,” a beca, free medical care, and facilitated 
microcredit participation (D’Elia, 2006 84). For Misión Ribas, becas are awarded for low-income 
participants, particularly: single mothers, unemployed, or individuals in precarious situations, 
over 60 years of age, or family breadwinners. For Misión Sucre, each bachillier receives a beca 
awarded to the low-income program participants with the same categories as Ribas (D’Elia 2006, 
98; Lacruz 2006, 175). These were awarded within the classroom, not through a centralized 
administration of payouts (D’Elia, 2006, 98). 
4 Its namesake, Antonio José de Sucre was an independence leader and one of Simón Bolívar’s closest friends.  
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The extraordinary nature of the programs segmented the Misiones from the traditional 
education programs, ensuring that this separate set of program benefits reached a voting 
population that could in turn generate electoral success for its implementers. Over time, the 
Venezuelan government ensured that only voters – those aged over 18 – could receive the benefits 
of these remedial programs, as opposed to younger individuals who left the education system. In 
March 2008, the Ministerio de del Poder Popular para la Educación established the minimum 
age for adult education to at 18, raising it from 15 (Mundo, 2009, 36). As Mundo notes, recipients 
proceed through the Misiones in a tracked manner that does not permit the participants to leave 
the programs to integrate with the traditional education system. Because of this, progress is made 
only through the system, which limits the options available to participants, particularly as they 
reach the upper levels of the programs (Mundo 2009). In addition, enrollment rates are high, but 
Sucre students do not often take multiple courses at once. While this may suit nontraditional 
students taking courses, it also has the effect of maximizing the social program goods over many 
voters.   
At the time the Misiones were initiated, opposition groups argued instead for programs 
that complemented existing educational programs to draw upon the expertise of government 
ministries. The establishment of the Misión administration outside the ministries resulted in 
challenges for new program design and attention to oversight and eligibility criteria. As with 
Bolsa Família, these elements are a function of politics, and tracing these choices over the decade 
provide a way to understand whether and how the education Misiones were targeted to generate 
electoral support. Chapters 4-6 will evaluate this effect, the politics of policy design in Venezuela, 
and the degree to which the education Misiones were targeted to generate electoral support.  
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1.2.3 Comparing the Two Programs 
While Bolsa Família was targeted more narrowly, the programs were targeted broadly, to poor 
supporters and opponents alike. And though a larger share of the population participated in the 
Misiones than with Bolsa Família in Brazil, the Venezuelan programs divided constituencies by 
partisan dimensions of support. At times they favored supporters; during others, they courted the 
opposition.  
 
  Where Bolsa Família reflected a consolidation of existing program activity into one new 
unit, the Misiones were extraordinary in their scope, and extra-institutional in their administration. 
Both offered policies of social inclusion, a way to reach informal constituencies within their 
countries. Yet the way these programs were administered presents different possibilities for 
discretion in their administration. Choices to administer social programs in extraordinary ways 
can introduce spending outcomes broader in scope than originally intended. These are not merely 
issues of state capability; choices made by leaders to reach constituents in broad or narrow ways 
reflected the goals of electoral support.  
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 This dissertation asks how leaders politicize targeting of redistributive programs, and what 
political factors constrain these choices. Towards this end, it investigates a set of related 
questions, asking: how political institutions affect leadership strategy in distributing targeted 
antipoverty programs; whether elements of program design and administration – oversight, 
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spending, and distributions – reveal political strategies; how executive power impacts program 
design; and what (if any) electoral payoffs exist for variants of targeted social programs.  
Asking how leaders politicize targeting programs (or not) is interesting because the 
variation in targeting of social redistributive programs reveals lessons about leadership behavior 
and the rules that affect it. Different targeting strategies, revealed above and described in detail in 
Chapter 2, suggest that rationales vary for leadership decisions to accommodate political 
constituencies. These include the strategies pursued by politicians to link voters and goods. 
(Ansell and Mitchell 2011; Handlin 2012; H. Kitschelt and Kselman 2012; Herbert Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson 2007; Lyne 2008; Pribble 2013) Targeting can take on the role of “investment,” 
representing a means of accommodating core or undecided constituents if the policies are targeted 
toward them (Cox 2009; Luna and Mardones 2010; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007). 
The variation also reveals differences in the social construct of the political institutions present 
within the different polities. Investigating the different actions taken in comparable countries with 
similar political opportunities reveals the ways that societies create rules that constrain leadership 
behavior. 
The question is important because understanding how policy choices for redistributive 
programs reflect leadership political strategy provides answers to questions raised by scholars 
who connect democracy and redistribution (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Boix 2003; Taylor-
Robinson 2010). How policies are designed shows the ways that institutions constrain leadership 
decision making within countries. Political “institutional architectures” shape targeting and the 
goals politicians undertake while delivering policies to their constituencies (Luna and Mardones 
2010). The political institutions that constrain leadership behavior can be evaluated according to 
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the outcomes they create, allowing scholars to draw policy implications from particular 
institutional arrangements 
1.4 EXPLANATION 
In order to answer the question of how leaders politicize the targeting of social programs, this 
project builds a theory that offers a systematic account of the effect of democracy on 
redistributive choices. It does so by integrating perspectives from the politics of redistribution and 
executive-legislative relations to describe how horizontal accountability affects distributive 
strategies that characterize how programs are politicized – how they divide constituencies by 
partisan dimensions of support. It suggests that the horizontal accountability effects of executive-
legislative interactions determine redistributive policy choices. Program politicization is a 
function of the partisan powers of the executive, who attempts to pursue their own agenda but 
encounters legislatures that seek to control their ability to do so. Democratic systems, particularly 
those with legislative checks on presidential power, make leaders choose and administer policies 
that are targeted to generate support for incumbents in addition to the poor, while less democratic 
systems that lack these checks allow leaders to choose and administer policies that are targeted to 
generate support for incumbents rather than the poor. 
 This informs a set of hypotheses about how institutional conditions allow leaders to target 
constituencies by strategizing how they redistribute to them. Variation in antipoverty programs 
takes the form of programmatic or parochial distributive strategies, depending on the degree to 
which executives are constrained by competitiveness in the political system. More competitive 
systems limit the partisan power of the presidency, resulting in programmatic distribution 
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strategies. Less competitive systems allow more partisan power, resulting in parochial distributive 
strategies. Targeting choices are linked to each distributive strategy. Their electoral effect, the 
political interactions that bring them about, and evidence of the targeting choices are each tested 
in the empirical chapters. 
1.5 ASSUMPTIONS 
The primary assumptions of this investigation include rational choice and historical 
institutionalism. Actors are assumed to make rational decisions based on the availability of 
information to their standpoint.  To achieve their goals, leadership adopts a strategic approach 
based on the calculation of how existing institutions affect the costs and benefits of their activities 
as they seek to maximize the benefits accrued to them (Hall and Taylor 1996; 939).  These 
institutions constrain the behavior of leaders and constitute a framework to analyze the choices 
they make. 
Following from this, the project assumes that leaders treat club goods, such as targeted 
social programs, as a way to benefit their electoral chances, even though these exclude others 
from the policy. In doing so, leaders will find ideological or interest-based reasons to redistribute 
to build electoral support. This can be program-based (delivering on campaign promises) or 
clientelist in nature, reaching parochial distributive outcomes (attempting to trade programs for 
votes), but leaders are politicians and seek not only to govern, but to win future chances to do so. 
This project also assumes that for electoral purposes the actual benefit from the social 
program matters less than the income transfer. Voters witness and respond electorally to the 
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immediate effects of transfers before they react to actual program effects such as poverty 
reduction (or inflationary) outcomes that show over the long term.  
This investigation also assumes a degree of path dependence, that choices can rarely be 
easily reversed (P. Hall and Taylor 1996; Pierson 2000, 2004; Thelen 1999). This suggests that 
political institutions are path dependent: they are “unusually hard to change” since the timing and 
sequencing of activities can lead to inertia through increasing returns reinforcing the existence of 
institutions in a positive feedback cycle (Pierson 2000; 262-3). Leadership activity is constrained 
by institutions that result from the sequencing of social events that result in this feedback cycle 
(Pierson 2000, 2004). Due to this, over time certain policy avenues may become blocked, as 
behavior at one point in time can send policy off into certain tracks (Thelen 1999; 394).  
However, political change may occur if the mechanisms that reproduce and sustain institutions 
are disrupted (Thelen 1999 398-9). The theoretical assumption that a moment in time may have a 
lagged effect on institutional persistence (and policy outcomes) rests on understanding how the 
mechanisms function before they change. This in turn affects the rational behavior of individuals 
seeking to maximize their benefits. Identifying the mechanisms and their outcomes are crucial to 
the study of political behavior.  
1.6 METHODOLOGY 
This study draws on available literature to construct a causal model that connects the politics of 
social program design to targeting outcomes and electoral effect. Original research is conducted 
to gather data reflecting both the political context of policymaking in Brazil and Venezuela and 
the strategies employed in the design of social programs. To present a complete understanding of 
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the process of policy choice, this study employs a mixed methodology, drawing on semi-
structured research interviews conducted in the field and on quantitative data collected from 
governments, secondary sources including nongovernmental organization reports on programs, 
and the AmericasBarometer at the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt 
University.  
Through case study comparison, this dissertation compares the political factors that 
resulted in the latitude that allowed executives to design and administer the antipoverty policies 
under analysis. Evidence supporting the explanation is presented along with electoral data and 
secondary source accounts of political events. The analysis of opposition group preferences is 
conducted to analyze what policies could have been introduced, absent the effect that political 
institutions had on leadership policymaking and administration. 
This study employs statistical models to empirically examine both political and 
demographic determinants of program distribution (Chapter 4), and the electoral payoff – the 
effect of social program influence on vote choice (Chapter 6) – while controlling for other factors 
known to influence these behaviors. This allows both the assessment of targeting strategy and the 
operationalization of the effect by examining the electoral payoff of these choices. Statistical 
evidence is evaluated to examine theoretical claims made about the direction of social spending. 
The statistical and substantive results of the models are discussed.  
The first statistical model in this study replicates and extends previous analysis by Fried 
(2012), Hawkins, Rosas and Johnson (2011), Hawkins (2010), Penfold-Becerra (2008), Rocha-
Menocal (2001), Molinar and Weldon (1994) to assess political and program-relevant 
demographic factors that determine the distribution of resources for Bolsa Família and the 
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Misiones. This examines the degree to which program design reflected the political goals of 
leaders. Analysis is conducted though regression and marginal effects estimates in Chapter 4. 
The second statistical model is a replication and extension of a model previously 
published by Bohn (2011). This model examines the influence of social programs on vote choice 
over time. It includes other controls such as income, gender, age, education level and regional 
status. The dissertation builds on the Bohn model by replicating the analysis on vote choice of the 
influence of Bolsa Família in Brazil and extending it to analyze the influence of the Misiones in 
Venezuela. Doing so allows for the analysis of the effects the direction of targeted social program 
spending on voter behavior.  
Combined with the case studies, the results of the statistical tests support the thesis of the 
study, showing how partisan powers affect program choices, the differences in choices, and the 
effects of these decisions. The next section lays out the presentation of theory, methods, evidence, 
and conclusions. 
1.7 PLAN OF STUDY 
The study continues in Chapter 2 with a critical examination of existing theory and empirical 
research in social program targeting and democracy and redistribution. This literature is drawn 
together to propose a theory in the form of a causal model. The causal model connects 
competitiveness in the political system to the politicization of social policy. Competitive systems 
limit the partisan powers of the presidency in pursuit of a clientelist agenda. They lead to 
programmatic distributive strategies, while uncompetitive systems result in parochial ones. The 
chapter then explores logical outcomes of the model by examining targeted social programs in 
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Argentina (Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar) and Mexico (Progresa/ Oportunidades) as well as Bolsa 
Família and the Misiones. 
Chapter 3 presents an overview of research design, outlining the requirements for data 
collection, operationalization choices, and expectations of observed behavior. It details the 
choices made in the case studies and models.  
Chapter 4 examines the dependent variable, whether programs have parochial or 
programmatic characteristics, concluding that programs differ according to the classification 
presented in Chapter 2. It does so by providing a mixed method analysis of key details of program 
oversight and expenditure patterns for Bolsa Família and the education Misiones. It then presents 
a regression model that examines program targeting determinants including political and 
program-relevant demographic variables to compare the effects of each. Marginal effects analysis 
examines targeting trends over the course of the decade for the programs, revealing parochial 
distributive strategies in Venezuela and programmatic ones in Brazil. 
Chapter 5 examines the independent variable, asking why programs differ in Brazil and 
Venezuela. It presents a case study analysis on the politics of policy design of Bolsa Família and 
the education Misiones. It shows how institutionalized political competition constrains the 
constitutional and partisan powers of the president. The competitive legislature in Brazil limited 
the latitude of Lula to develop programmatic distributive strategies in Bolsa Família, while the 
uncompetitive legislature in Venezuela allowed the executive to develop parochial distributive 
strategies in the education Misiones. It evaluates the policy preferences of opposition actors to 
show what policies could have been introduced if the institutional constraints on executives (or 
latitude of the same) were not present.  
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Chapter 6 examines the electoral payoff from targeting, by presenting a probit model that 
analyzes of the effect of social program participation on vote choice. Marginal effects analyses 
are conducted to assess the effect of increasing levels of income and education on vote choice, 
holding other factors at their means. The outcome of the analysis – differences in the degree to 
which the education Misiones and Bolsa Família influence vote choice – shows that the electoral 
payoffs vary for programmatic and parochial distributive strategies, but that both yield benefits 
for leaders that create programs.  
Chapter 7 concludes with a hypothesis review, policy and theoretical implications of the 
findings, and agenda for future research. It examines the outcomes of the programs through 
secondary accounts to show that democracy determines the production of “good policies” even if 
they yield votes - “good votes.” This raises implications of the incentives to pursue programmatic 
strategies. An agenda for future research is presented at the conclusion of the document.   
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2.0  THEORY AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TARGETED SOCIAL 
PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA 
This chapter builds a theory that offers a systematic account of the politicization of targeted social 
policy. To do so, it integrates perspectives from the literature on the politics of redistribution and 
on executive-legislative relations to describe how horizontal accountability provides a theoretical 
foundation for distributive politics in Latin America. These perspectives inform a set of 
hypotheses about how institutional conditions allow leaders to target social programs to divide 
constituencies by partisan dimensions of support. These hypotheses are then examined in case 
studies that reflect the first empirical evaluation of the theory. 
This chapter first draws on perspectives in the literature to characterize how program 
design results in politicized distributional effects. Two types of programs are identified: 
programmatic, those that target based on program rules, or parochial, a kind of clientelistic 
program that targets based on political considerations. These types are identified by distributive 
strategies that include core, opposition, swing voter, and turnout boosting. 
 It then offers a theory of executive-legislative interactions to explain how some policies 
become programmatic and others parochial. The theory suggests that targeted program design in 
Latin America results from the institutional effects of executive-legislative interactions, as 
executives who attempt to pursue their own agenda encounter legislatures that seek to control 
their ability to do so. How programs are targeted is a function of the competitiveness in the 
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political system. This, in turn, determines the degree to which there is serious program oversight. 
The institutional interaction identified in the theory is then hypothesized to relate to these 
outcomes, and is contrasted with the alternative hypothesis that legislative oversight is not 
important to program design.  
The chapter concludes with the identification of cases that reflect observable implications 
of the hypotheses developed. It explores the variation in these countries' primary targeted social 
programs according to the theory to understand logical outcomes of the interaction.  These 
interactions and their outcomes are detailed in brief illustrative case studies. 
2.1 SOCIAL POLICY AND TARGETING 
This section synthesizes perspectives that explain how leaders target redistributive programs, 
building political constituencies while delivering benefits to selected groups. In doing so, it draws 
on recent literature on democracy and institutions to develop a model of policymaking and on 
recent single country analyses for hypotheses relating political strategy to distributional outcomes. 
In doing so, it focuses on targeted social policy, distinguishing from regional analyses of overall 
social welfare regimes, particularly those assessing universalism in social policy (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Pribble 2010, 2013; Riggirozzi 2010). 
Democratic development scholars Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008) note that 
democracies extend greater social protections in Latin America, which squares with assessments 
of the effect of democracy on wider samples of less developed country social expenditures (Rudra 
and Haggard 2005). Boix (2003), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) argue that institutions are 
created to ensure redistribution in order to mitigate threats to the credibility of political leadership. 
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These authors describe how leaders redistribute in instances where the threat of mass political 
opposition to regimes creates uncertainty about leadership political survival. In order to 
understand how institutions affect leadership design of social policy, it is necessary to understand 
how leaders extend political representation to groups left out of the political system. In the case of 
the Latin American countries above, leaders designed social spending programs to mobilize 
previously disenfranchised social groups, particularly those that lost financial security in the 
period following global economic integration. Targeting social policy allows policymakers to 
choose specific programs to reach populations excluded from the traditional social safety net.   
Ideological rationales vary for the targeting of social policy, but programs allow leaders to 
“invest” in constituencies by generating private, excludable goods to different groups. This 
permits the construction of a “portfolio” of voting support for politicians who craft policy 
(Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, & Estévez, 2007, 187). How policies are designed demonstrates how 
institutions constrain leadership decision making within countries. Luna and Mardones suggest 
that political “institutional architectures” can shape incentives that politicians face to delivering 
policies to particular constituencies (Luna and Mardones 2010). The political institutions that 
constrain leadership behavior can be evaluated according to the outcomes they create, allowing 
scholars to draw policy implications from particular institutional arrangements.  
The increase in targeted social programs over universalistic ones is a hallmark of 
neoliberal government reform (Besley and Kanbur 1990; Grosh 1994; Mkandawire 2005). 
Targeted policies have been one mode through which governments facing fiscal pressures from 
global economic integration design programs that accept budgetary constraints in an era of 
economic globalization (Rudra 2002). Financial constraints are coupled with political limitations 
as leaders encounter distributional coalitions that mobilize to protect programs that benefit them  
 25 
(Olson 1982; Rudra 2007). While leaders navigate these constraints to deliver programs to select 
constituents, early neoliberal advocates of targeting did not address the possibility that it could 
yield political benefits as beneficiaries were prioritized.  
In many cases, however, leaders seeking to target social groups seize political opportunity 
with redistributing resources in what Luna and Mardones (2010, 6) term “selective distributional 
politics.” Targeting allows politicians to design policy to reach specific constituents, which can be 
used to mobilize political participation from newly included social groups either in core or 
opposition constituencies (Cox 2009). This can be utilized to mobilize on the basis of class 
cleavages (Handlin 2012). The result is inclusion of traditionally disenfranchised groups that were 
left out of the social inheritance of Latin America.  
Recent scholarship raises questions over the political distribution of targeted programs in 
Latin America, finding variation among the political effects of targeted programs in Chile, 
Argentina, and Mexico (Giovagnoli 2005; De La O Torres 2013; Luna and Mardones 2010; 
Takahashi 2007). Further scholarship on program distribution and vote choice shows that political 
effects are seen among other targeted programs in countries such as Venezuela and Brazil (Bohn 
2011; Hawkins, Rosas, and Johnson 2011; Hawkins 2010a; Hunter and Power 2008; Licio, 
Rennó, and Castro 2009; Nicolau and Peixoto 2007; Penfold-Becerra 2008; S. Soares and Sátyro 
2009; Zucco and Power 2012). By raising different hypotheses of distribution strategies and 
showing the electoral effects of program reach, this literature responds to questions of clientelism 
raised in the transfer of social programs to particular recipients (Ansell and Mitchell 2011; Lyne 
2008; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007; Ortega and Rodríguez n.d.; Penfold-Becerra 
2008). These different effects suggest that politicians vary their strategies to reach voters: some 
target core or opposition support, others aim for close contests, while still others seek the 
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politically excluded. Variation in distributional strategies and the electoral effect of program reach 
require a systematic approach to explain the range of targeting outcomes shown across Latin 
America. To understand how redistributive strategies demonstrate the political goals of 
leadership, the next section categorizes program expenditure outcomes.  
2.1.1 Dependent Variable: Programmatic and Parochial Social Program Outcomes 
Targeted social programs achieve political ends as leaders pursue distribution strategies, reaching 
particular constituents with benefits with both “good” and “bad” policy choices. This project 
draws its definition of politicization from Rosas’s (2005, 827) discussion of political space: 
programs divide constituents by partisan dimensions by activating political support among 
particular populations. Electoral support can result from both “good” and “bad” forms of 
targeting. Both programs distributed according to antipoverty criteria as well as those distributed 
according to political criteria are tools that politicians can use to build constituent support. By 
delivering to constituents, “good” (programmatic) policies can produce votes that genuinely 
reflect the support of constituents who are receiving the benefits of policies designed to reach 
them. Trading excludable benefits for political support can generate electoral success through 
“bad” (parochial) policies. Leaders choose to redistribute because they seek political survival, but 
the choices between parochial or programmatic distributions are dependent on how political 
institutions constrain policymakers from redistributing to political constituencies over others. This 
section introduces definitions for both sets of programs. Indicators of distributive strategies 
including program oversight, expenditure patterns, and targeting choices – such as core, 
opposition, and swing voter strategies and turnout boosting – are then described.  
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Targeted social programs create “club goods,” which provide benefits to a set of citizens 
but exclude others (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, 11). Leaders pursue these to “redistribute life 
chances across groups society” and to “increase the size of their electoral coalitions” (Kitschelt & 
Wilkinson, 2007, 11). Club goods can be distributed in a programmatic or clientelistic manner, 
depending on the targeting of constituencies and the nature of eligibility rules.  
Targeted redistributive outcomes can be grouped into two categories of distribution 
strategies: programmatic and parochial. These are detailed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Programmatic and Parochial Distributions 
 
Programmatic Distributions Parochial Distributions 
How 
Distributed Targeted Social Program Targeted Social Program 
Inclusion 
Preferences 
Preferences for inclusion based on 
program rules 
Preferences for inclusion based on 
political criteria 
Clientelism No enforcement of patron-client relationship 
Voluntary enforcement of patron-
client relationship 
Entitlement Interpreted at national level Interpreted at program implementation level 
Political 
Effect 
Little expectation of associating 
benefit with politician 
Expectation of generating electoral 
benefit for politician 
 
 
Programmatic distributions reflect antipoverty goals and are distributed nationally without 
a mediated enforcement of the distribution of the patron-client relationship. Programmatic 
distributions are created without regard to exclusivity, without leaders “verifying whether 
beneficiaries will actually deliver their votes” (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, 10). Because of this, 
leaders must distribute the program widely to hope for an electoral effect for their party or 
candidacy (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, 12). Programmatic distributions reflect general rules 
with specific implementation criteria, and rules by which administrators and recipients must abide 
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(Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, 12).  Preferences for inclusion based on political criteria only 
include the technical aspects specifying program eligibility, and the political effect rests in 
program distribution to a general population, only some of which may associate the benefit with 
the politician.  
Parochial distributions reflect policy goals but are distributed selectively with preference 
for inclusion based on political criteria. Kitschelt and Wilkinson note that clientelist distributions 
of club goods reflect narrow targeting of programs with rules and regulations that leave 
conditions of entitlement and disbursement to the implementation level (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 
2007, 12). Clientelist programs can include a range of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms 
to ensure that a contingent direct exchange relationship between patrons and clients yields 
political results, including voluntary compliance and individual and group monitoring 
enforcement (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007 12.-18). Parochial distributions are a kind of clientelist 
policy. This analysis identifies characteristics of clientelism that relate to the targeted social 
programs that occur in Latin America. These include accepting voluntary compliance with voting 
by recipients, and a willingness to focus distribution in areas where politicians can be reasonably 
certain that these will win votes, while minimizing enforcement of inclusion criteria. 
Parochial distributions are identified as selective distributions with rules that leave 
entitlement to the implementation level, with a voluntary scheme of patron-client enforcement.  
The political effect of parochial distributions rests in narrow targeting and minimal specification 
of exclusion criteria at the national level. These aspects allow for voluntary participation in 
programs that are expected to generate electoral benefits for officials associated with program 
implementation. 
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The club goods status of the targeted social transfers under analysis means that neither 
parochial nor programmatic distributions are universal, and neither is apolitical in its influence. 
Even programmatic redistributive strategies have influence on politics. By their very nature, the 
goals of political inclusion that mark the range of policies identified in this chapter have political 
effects. Programmatic distributions can boost participation among any group that finds the 
distribution of benefits to signify their inclusion in the political franchise.  Parochial distributions 
are structured to produce political effects by inducing votes to support politicians who distributed 
benefits. The redistributive strategies employed in both kinds of policies are identified in the 
section below. 
2.1.2 Indicators of Strategy 
In each subsection below the macroeconomic effects of leadership behavior identified by 
Kaufman are mapped to the conditions that lead to targeting strategy and the targeting outcomes. 
Examining oversight reveals the degree to which program administration reflects rules 
implemented in the program. Spending trends reveal program oversight and time horizon effects 
of policy design, while the analysis of program distribution permits evaluation of the ways in 
which programs are parochial or programmatic in nature. These indicators operationalize the 
dependent variable by revealing observable differences in social programs.   
2.1.2.1 Program Oversight 
After designing a program, developing its bureaucratic capacity and guaranteeing its budget is 
accommodated through formal mechanisms ensures that a program functions according to its 
legal mandates. These institutional aspects allow for routine planning and budgeting within the 
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administrative centers of the programs, allowing program implementers the ability to focus on 
delivery of services. They mitigate the risk that poor implementation of the program will result in 
parochial distribution or corruption. Institutionalization is not only a matter of “state capacity,” as 
introduced by Luna and Mardones (2010). It reflects political choices that executives make to 
ensure that target populations that can benefit according to program goals. Oversight is the 
product of the integration of rules into enabling legislature, as well as the minimization of 
interference from executives implementing the program. Limiting executive interference by 
ensuring budget resources and building capable administrative centers for programs both can 
reduce the likelihood of parochial distributions, ensuring that geographic targets are widely 
dispersed across potential program recipients.  
Program budgeting provides one aspect of oversight. Ensuring that programs receive 
funds for expenditures through ordinary budgeting protocols allows administrators to develop 
long time horizons for the program instead of “now or never” strategies with the disbursement of 
resources to recipients. It also means that program administrators do not have to choose among 
program recipients in times when irregular funding sources are not available, resisting the 
temptation to deliver benefits parochially when budget shortfalls occur. Similarly, if programs are 
funded through extraordinary budgeting routines, windfalls can increase the propensity to 
distribute benefits parochially. Formal institutional budgeting is a form of oversight that generates 
certainty among program administrators.  
Institutionalized program administration is a second aspect of oversight. It is generated 
through the development of rule-based decision criteria to distribute resources through the 
program and through formal agreements that strengthen inter-institutional cooperation. By 
including these components in policy design and administration, executives assure that programs 
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will function according to mandate. Deriving clear criteria for program eligibility – and strictly 
following it – provides a guide for inclusion. Absent this, the probability of deviating from 
program goals decreases. However, as targeted social interventions require increasingly more 
complex interactions between government agencies to deliver benefits to particular constituents, 
the use of contracts and evaluation mechanisms serves as a way to ensure program compliance. 
Contracts provide formal institutional mechanisms that generate certainty that programs function 
according to legal mandates established in enabling legislation.  
Reduced oversight can be a political choice made during the development of programs, 
and can play out in administration by enabling clientelist distributions. Institutionalizing the 
administration of a targeted social program increases the likelihood of reaching the program 
goals, and reduces the likelihood of parochial distribution of benefits.  
2.1.2.2 Program Spending  
Program spending outcomes are a product of design and administration. Spending outcomes 
demonstrate whether programs reflect “now or never” strategies or measured expenditures that 
occur steadily over time (Kaufman 2008). Program expenditures displayed over time can reveal 
the extent to which the program receives consistent and reliable resources for administration, or 
whether the program shows short-term distributions to change the outcome of an upcoming 
election. Spending data disaggregated at the state level or below permits analysis of geographic 
targeting of program distributions.  
2.1.2.3 Distribution Strategy 
In order to selectively deliver resources, leaders have a variety of political tactics at their disposal: 
scholars have identified programs that target core voters, swing voters, voters in closely contested 
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districts, opposition voters as well as strategies that boost turnout among recipient populations 
(Cox 2009; Giovagnoli 2005; De La O Torres 2013; Luna and Mardones 2010; Takahashi 2007, 
2010). Linking the ways leaders redistribute to the different electoral strategies reveals outcomes 
of “selective distributive politics,” as leaders choose how to integrate the political tactics through 
program oversight and recipient selection criteria: 
• Core Voter targeting strategy is designed to reach constituents that support the incumbent, 
delivering benefits to win votes within leadership-aligned districts (Cox 2009; Luna and 
Mardones 2010; Takahashi 2007).  
• Opposition targeting strategy is designed to reach constituents that oppose the incumbent, 
delivering benefits to win votes in leadership-unfriendly districts (Luna and Mardones 
2010; Takahashi 2007).  
• Swing Voter targeting strategy reflects goals of distributing resources to districts in which 
competition is close among incumbent and opposition parties (Cox 2009; Giovagnoli 
2005; Takahashi 2010).  
These three strategies are identified as parochial in that they distribute in either-or 
scenarios, offering benefits as leaders pursue voluntary compliance schemes to win support. In 
these cases, leaders choose among constituencies to combine program delivery with electoral 
support. 
• Turnout Boosting strategy reflects goals of winning incumbent votes by targeting social 
drawing recipients into political participation (De La O Torres 2013; Luna and Mardones 
2010).  
Unlike the first three strategies, the turnout boosting strategy does not distinguish among 
constituents as “core” or “opposition” voters, reaching multiple geographies with their 
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distributions. Unlike the previous strategies, the electoral support is not expected to result in the 
favoring of constituents targeted in social policy distribution.  
The next section introduces the explanatory factors that result in the distributive strategies 
explored here.  
2.2 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS 
This section describes how executive and legislative institutions impact the design of targeted 
social policy. It provides the explanation for why some programs are parochial and others 
programmatic: legislatures delegate to executives the design of antipoverty policy to overcome 
their own limitations faced in representing the poor. The latitude afforded to executives in 
program design is a function of their partisan powers, which determine the amount of control 
legislatures have over executives. Greater partisan powers result in less control, allowing 
executives the ability to design excludable policies that maximize their electoral benefit.  
This theory recognizes the variation in executive strength and legislative control, 
particularly in light of the alternative hypothesis: given the strength of Latin American presidents, 
horizontal oversight does not affect the policy choice of executives. Literature on presidential 
powers in Latin America focuses on the strength of the president versus the legislature, 
characterizing the relationship as strong presidencies and weak legislatures (Morgenstern, Polga-
Hecimovich, and Shair-Rosenfield 2013; Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart and Mainwaring 
1997). Constitutional framers gave greater presidential powers to prioritize efficiency over 
checks, leading to presidents intruding into legislative territory traditionally by assemblies 
(Alemán and Tsebelis 2005; Cheibub and Limongi 2002; Cox and Morgenstern 2001). These 
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include: veto powers, decree powers, rights of legislative introduction, and declaration of state of 
emergency (Morgenstern, Polga-Hecimovich, and Shair-Rosenfield 2013; Reich 2002; Shugart 
and Mainwaring 1997). Scholars recognize that the presidential ability to control the legislative 
agenda is also dependent on partisan powers (Morgenstern, Polga-Hecimovich, and Shair-
Rosenfield 2013; Shugart and Mainwaring 1997). In instances where control over the majority 
control exists the capabilities of president could render legislative oversight meaningless. In these 
delegative democracies, according to O’Donnell (1994), executive power is too great and  the 
improper exercise of authority occurs absent these checks.  
Yet even in delegative democracies, there are times when behaving like an elected king is 
unfavorable or impossible. Popularity has been shown to influence executive usage of decrees 
(Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2005, 2008). Constitutional decree authority may not generate 
permanent laws, and delegated decree authority may require a greater majority than the plurality 
necessary to pass laws. Still, legislatures act according to their own preferences even when the 
same party controls both branches, including the bargaining outcome of annual government 
budgets. Presidential latitude to create policy is affected by the constraints set by their partisan 
powers. 
Both presidents and members of assemblies act according to preferences for political 
survival. The subsections below lay out two key dimensions of the electoral logic of redistributive 
program design in Latin America. The first identifies how antipoverty programs are the product of 
strategic interaction between the executive and legislature. The interaction results in principal-
agent behavior where executive initiatives are introduced but influenced by institutional checks 
that allow for legislative control.  As the legislature seeks to advance its interest, two factors 
determine how the agenda is shaped. These factors are examined in the second subsection, which 
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identifies how partisan powers – executive popularity and legislative support – affect the latitude 
given to executives to determine policy priorities and the programs that implement them. Patron-
client problems limit the representation of poor constituents in the legislature, resulting in 
delegation to executives to initiate social programs. This determines the patterns of principal-
agent behavior practiced between the two branches, resulting in executive-designed policies that 
generate excludable benefits for the poor.  
Legislators, even those aligned with the president, are influenced by goals of reelection. 
Worried about their own chances at building careers, they find it risky to introduce antipoverty 
programs, since their closest watchdogs are often the rich. Hoping to gain electoral benefits from 
redistributive programs, they delegate the task to executives. Opponents, however, may try to 
thwart executive initiatives, and if they are powerful enough, the executives must anticipate the 
reaction of the legislature to the initiatives and design accordingly. The degree to which 
executives do so depends on their partisan powers. Weaker powers lead to programs that hew 
closer to legislative demands, and stronger powers allow leaders to design programs that stray 
from legislative oversight.  
2.2.1 The Dynamics of Executive-Legislative Interactions and Program Design 
According to Taylor-Robinson (2010, 189), electoral rules lead career-seeking politicians to 
represent constituents that closely monitor their behavior and provide sanction for behavior that 
counters their interest. Checking the behavior of politicians is more difficult for the poor to 
undertake than it is for the rich. This shapes how politicians form preferences to achieve their 
goals as they respond to the demands of their constituents. It means that the rich are likelier to 
have their policy preferences accommodated by representatives than are the poor, and causes the 
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poor to be historically underrepresented in the legislature (Taylor-Robinson, 2010, 197). This 
results in fewer policies for poor, and when they do occur, they are likelier to be clientelistic in 
nature because “politicians can benefit more” from excludable policies (Taylor-Robinson, 2010 
196). 
Because executives build an electoral base independent of legislators and have their own 
fixed term in which to govern, their preferences often vary from those of the legislature. 
Executives offer initiatives and legislate by exercising decree power, which are two behaviors that 
allow them to overcome the risks the legislature faces in representing the poor. As Taylor-
Robinson notes above, when politicians design these programs that provide benefits to a set of 
citizens but exclude others, they can help themselves and their political allies. Politicians deliver 
with social programs, reaching a specific constituency that receives a benefit that others do not 
share. In doing so, executives surmount the need for legislative majority support for an initiative, 
but they still depend on legislatures for approval through the power of the purse and in certain 
instances by controlling decree authority. 
2.2.1.1 Delegation 
Allowing executives to initiate policy means that legislatures can avoid the problem of 
representation outlined above. By delegating lawmaking to executives, allied legislators can still 
benefit electorally from the programs designed by executives. In cases of collective action, 
coordination, or social choice instability problems, Kiewet and McCubbins show how legislatures 
delegate authority to overcome deadlock generated by the patron-client problem (Kiewet & 
McCubbins, 1992, 232). Management of delegation is subject to the legislature’s ability to control 
the agent, and controlling the behavior of the agent depends on reporting, monitoring, and 
institutional checks (Kiewet & McCubbins, 1992, 38). The legislature serves as principal: it 
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delegates antipoverty policymaking to executive initiative, but retains its ability to approve 
initiatives. Assemblies provide an institutional check on executive authority; while they rely on 
executives to introduce certain initiatives or laws, these are subject to controls including approval 
of spending. Another form of control is practiced in some presidential democracies where 
delegation of decree powers given by enabling laws has depended on the partisan composition of 
Congress (Carey and Shugart 1997; Crisp 1997). 
2.2.1.2 Anticipated Reactions 
Because of the institutional check that the legislature has over the president – even in cases of 
delegation – executives need to anticipate the reaction of legislatures in the policy they design. 
The legislative reaction to the policy process shapes executive agendas in Latin American politics 
(Cox and Morgenstern 2001). Legislative control of the executive is dependent on the interests of 
the assembly, which are defined by its composition. The degree of latitude legislatures permit 
depends on the whether the chamber majority is of the same party or coalition as the president. 
Designing policy that anticipates the acceptance of the assembly reduces the cost of bargaining 
between the executive and legislature integrating legislative influence into bills that initiate in the 
executive. 
2.2.2 Independent Variable: Partisan Powers of the Executive 
The question of when executives have power over legislatures to enact their agenda depends on 
the constitutional and partisan powers afforded to them by their country’s political institutions 
(Shugart & Mainwaring, 1997, 40). The key independent variable affecting the design of 
antipoverty policy is partisan powers, which reflect the degree to which presidents maintain 
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popularity and legislative support among their own party and allied politicians. The variable is 
operationalized in this study by measuring the following dimensions: executive popularity, which 
reflects the ability to shape legislative interest through its own mandate; and legislative support, 
which reflects the degree to which presidential initiatives are met with approval. This is shown by 
two elements: the distribution of parties in the legislature; and the degree to which 
institutionalized party politics generate in systemic interactions over time.  
How partisan powers are held in check represents a form of horizontal accountability 
between the executive and legislative branches. The structure and interaction of parties within the 
legislature shapes the ways executives design programs, contributing to constraints that lead to 
programmatic policy choice or parochial ones. 
2.2.2.1 Executive Popularity 
Accounting for delegation involves examining how executives take into account their own level 
of popularity to issue decrees or build a mandate to govern. Throughout the presidential term, 
popularity may serve as a factor in issuing decrees or influencing the Assembly but the effect is 
often indirect (Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2005, 2008; Raile, Pereira, and Power 2010). At the 
beginning of presidential terms, margins of executive electoral support indicate popularity, with 
wider levels encouraging leaders to pursue their own agenda and legislators to respond, producing 
more executive-friendly outcomes. Competitive results threaten executive ability to stray from the 
interests of the legislature. Tighter popularity margins result in executive initiatives that are more 
closely shaped by legislatures.   
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2.2.2.2 Legislative Support 
Legislative support also determines how executives control the agenda for their initiatives. 
Without backing, initiatives may be subject to withdrawal of funding or lack of approval. Two 
dimensions of support are examined: the composition of the Assembly and the stability of the 
party system. Both impact the amount of latitude of executives in implementing redistributive 
policy: composition reflects the numerical partisan advantage, while party system stability 
provides a way of examining how policies are shaped when executives anticipate opposition 
reaction to initiatives over time.  
Legislative Composition 
How the legislature is comprised defines its interest. The legislative reaction varies according to 
the distribution of seats among the strongest parties, configured between the government and 
opposition. The structure and interaction of parties within the legislature shapes the ways 
executives design programs, contributing to constraints that lead to programmatic policy choice or 
parochial ones. While parties that reflect clear majorities for an incumbent executive are likely to 
support their initiatives, the conditions for legislatures composed of mixed parties are different. 
Geddes (1991) provides a theoretical tool for the assessment of party configurations on 
reforms. While her argument relates to administrative reforms in the civil service, particularly in a 
two-party context, implications exist for a multiparty setting involving antipoverty program 
choices where leaders are interested in political survival. Here, the electoral benefit of 
redistribution without oversight can be viewed as a patronage to support incumbents. Reforms 
that deprive incumbents of this kind of redistribution are likelier to be accepted when the large 
parties gain equally from this benefit; parties that benefit from the status quo will seek to maintain 
it, while parties that are disadvantaged by the electoral benefit will seek reform (Geddes, 1991, 
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376-7). When all major parties benefit electorally from parochial distributive strategies in social 
programs, they are likelier to integrate reform elements to make them programmatic. When a (or 
the) major party benefits from a parochial distributive strategy, the opposition will seek reforms.  
In a multiparty context, configurations between government and opposition parties may 
take the form of coalitional politics in countries where no individual parties are large enough to 
shape outcomes. When no party can govern on its own, the distributional pressures can be 
balanced by the formation of coalitions. This is likeliest when patronage gains are distributed 
evenly. Geddes notes that further reform over time is likeliest through additional stability in the 
“electoral weight” among top parties (Geddes, 1991, 388). Similar conditions for reform 
orientation exist when seats are evenly distributed among coalitions. This lends importance to 
how the party system generates stability, identified below. Geddes notes that so long as the 
distribution of seats among large parties is even, the impact on reforms progresses regardless of 
the number of parties.  
 The implications suggest that if major parties share an electoral benefit of parochial 
programs, they stand to benefit by introducing reform measures to improve program oversight, 
since they could claim credit on their introduction and show that they were oriented towards clean 
programs. This would occur in two-party and coalitional multiparty systems. If a dominant party 
benefits from not introducing reform measures, they will seek to maintain that status, while 
minority parties seek reform.  
Party System Stability 
A second element that relates partisan powers to policy choices is how politicians view the effect 
of past interaction and prospects for future ones. The institutionalization of the party system 
creates “centripetal incentives” through systemic interactions that make it harder for politicians 
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without a stake in the system to introduce radical reforms, disrupting the status quo (Flores-
Macías 2010). This has a moderating effect on policy, as it becomes more difficult for these 
politicians to exclude the input of opposition politicians that participate in the system.  
Institutionalized party systems have specific macroeconomic effects that translate into 
social spending outcomes. They provide a measure of horizontal accountability that requires 
leaders to target multiple geographies with social spending, while the deinstitutionalization of the 
party system frees leaders to focus on parochial spending targets (Kaufman, 2008). They affect: 
how politicians appeal to opposition and undecided voters; self-selection and learning from 
experienced candidates; moderation through reelection goals (including out-of-office goals); and 
the framing of policy approaches, given the credibility of opposition parties to temper them. 
Variation in constraints encountered by leaders in institutionalized and weak party systems result 
in different incentives for macroeconomic policy choices such as spending. 
Kaufman provides three reasons that Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) concept of party 
system stability matters to leadership macroeconomic decision-making. These include: the degree 
of policy stability given actor expectations about party competition, incentives to mobilize 
organizational identities and electoral bases of support, and horizontal accountability between 
executive and other governmental branches (Kaufman, 2008, 29-30). 
Expectations about Party Competition: leaders that expect regularized “repeat play” 
competition in political contests are more likely to govern in a manner that prioritizes the 
targeting of multiple geographies or coalitions with redistributive policies (Kaufman, 2008, 29). 
Kaufman expects that leaders in systems with repeated-play characteristics look beyond “now or 
never” opportunities to consider the implication of their policy choice to times when they might 
be in opposition in order to assert their credibility as responsible governors (Kaufman, 2008, 29-
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30). In the presence of “credible electoral challengers,” leaders would be less likely to attempt 
policy approaches that risked macroeconomic instability (Kaufman, 2008, 29-30). 
Organizational Identities and Electoral Bases of Support: Leaders in institutionalized 
party systems have incentives to mobilize both voters for rival parties and undecided “swing 
voters” that indicate their status as, according to Kaufman, “not only progressive but also ‘safe’ 
economic choices” (Kaufman, 2008, 31). Leaders in weakly institutionalized systems pursue a 
“plebiscitory” approach, and seek voters that want to reject the “institutional status quo” 
(Kaufman, 2008, 31). As a result, they mobilize groups on the economic margins.   
Horizontal Accountability: building on O’Donnell’s term, this refers to the acceptance that 
leaders “can be legitimately challenged by critics within their own party, and by competing 
parties based in the legislature and other institutional centers of power” (Kaufman, 2008, 32). In 
Shugart and Carey’s ideal presidential arrangements, this leads to national policy preferences 
being articulated over parochial ones. The authors argue that these preferences are articulated in 
systems when strong parties balance a weak president within the system (Shugart & Carey, 1992, 
194-7). Within their own parties, leaders in institutionalized systems were also capable of leaning 
on the experience of other candidates within the party for decisions on how to develop political 
credibility instead of relying on militancy (Kaufman, 2008, 30).  
Relating the leadership decision-making incentives back to antipoverty programs, a stable 
party system can be understood as a generator of elements of horizontal accountability that force 
policy design to be national in its orientation (as opposed to parochial), to target multiple 
geographies with their approach, and to mobilize voters in political coalitions. An unstable party 
system can be understood as a failing to generate elements of horizontal accountability, resulting 
in policies with narrow time horizons and parochial distributions that mobilize bases of support 
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from the margins. Given these effects, party system stability is a factor of the partisan powers 
examined, including executive popularity and the size of the legislative majority.  
2.2.3 Comparing the Theoretical Outcomes 
Four theoretical outcomes are arranged in a matrix according to the characteristics identified in 
Table 2. The table is organized according to elements of partisan powers through which 
executives shape agendas: presidential popularity and legislative support, two factors that impact 
how leaders pursue distributive strategies that characterize programs. These elements are arranged 
into a matrix to show the relationship between them.  
The elements are operationalized in a basic manner to introduce a comparative framework that 
relates the level of partisan powers to distributive strategies. The matrix examines the relationship 
of executive popularity and legislative support. This matrix simplifies the latter category into 
composition, reserving detailed analysis of the party system for later. Greater partisan powers are 
present among popular executives with majorities in the legislature (the upper right cell), and less 
partisan powers are present among unpopular executives with legislatures composed of coalitions 
(the lower left cell).  
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Table 2. Executive and Legislative Partisan Powers 
  Legislative Support 
  Coalition Politics Majority Politics 
Ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
Po
pu
la
ri
ty
 
High 
Uncompetitive Executive/ Coalition 
Politics 
 
Mixed Partisan Powers: Executives less 
influenced by reform-oriented 
legislatures 
 
Mixed Distributive Strategies 
 
Party Hegemony 
 
More Partisan Powers: Executives least 
influenced; non-reform-oriented 
legislatures 
 
Parochial Distributive Strategies 
Low 
Competitive Executive/ Coalition 
Politics 
 
Less Partisan Powers: Executives most 
influenced by reform-oriented 
legislatures 
 
Programmatic Distributive Strategies 
 
Precarious Majority 
 
Mixed Partisan Powers: Executives more 
influenced but face less reform-oriented 
legislatures 
 
Mixed Distributive Strategies 
 
 
The combination of executive and legislative factors results in programmatic policy outcomes 
where executives have the lowest margin of victory and legislatures are balanced between 
presidential and opposition forces. In these cases, executives are afforded less latitude by 
legislatures, which are likeliest to incorporate reform-oriented measures into policy. Program 
distributions are designed and administered without regard to exclusivity.  
Minimal incorporation of reforms and parochial policy orientation occurs where executives 
have the highest margin of victory and legislative politics are majoritarian. In these cases, 
executives are afforded more latitude by legislatures, which are least likely to incorporate reform-
oriented measures into policy. Program distributions are designed and administered in an 
exclusive fashion with a goal of political influence.  
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There are two scenarios where mixed distributions, ones that incorporate parochial and 
programmatic elements into the policy, can occur. In the first, the executive margin of victory is 
high, and the leader faces coalition-oriented legislative politics. In these cases, the legislative 
influence is stronger, resulting in more reform-oriented measures, but fewer than in the 
competitive executive/ coalition politics scenario above. Program distributions may be designed 
and administered in an exclusive fashion with a goal of political influence, but these can be 
mitigated through legislative control. In the second, the executive margin of victory is low, and 
the leader faces majoritarian legislative politics. In these cases, legislative influence is weaker, 
allowing more latitude to the executive, but less than a hegemonic scenario. Program distributions 
may be designed and administered in an exclusive fashion with a goal of political influence, 
subject to weaker legislative control.  
Understanding how leaders craft antipoverty policy requires an institutional approach to 
the constraints they face in doing so. The next section offers guiding hypotheses that link these 
concepts. 
2.3 HYPOTHESIS 
The explanation above suggests the following hypothetical implications about the political effect 
of targeted programs and how executive-legislative relations affect the way they are politicized. 
The main factor that determines the distribution strategy is the partisan powers of the executive. 
These reflect the ways in which executives exercise their latitude – and how much latitude 
afforded them by elements of horizontal accountability, including their own popularity, 
opposition party presence in the legislature, and the institutionalization of party systems. Partisan 
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powers have identifiable effects on how executives can design and administer programs, detailed 
in hypotheses below. The guiding hypothesis of the study refers to the latitude possessed by 
executives to generate parochial programs:  
H1) Greater (less) partisan powers results in parochial (programmatic) program design. 
 
Executives behave according to the constraints placed on their behavior, which is set by the 
degree of horizontal accountability practiced by the legislature during the policymaking process. 
This study expects to show evidence of partisan powers impacting program design according to 
the hypothesized relationship, which contrasts with the alternative hypothesis that legislative 
weakness in Latin America means that program design is unaffected. The dependent variable, 
program design, will be examined first, followed by the independent variable, partisan powers.  
The elements of partisan power identified in this study here – the level of executive 
popularity and legislative support – each impact horizontal accountability. Executive popularity 
negatively affects the level of horizontal accountability while the components of legislative 
support – legislative composition and party system institutionalization positively affects it. 
As executives initiate programs, they behave according to an electoral incentive to deliver 
excludable goods to different groups, seeking to maximize the extent to which the programs allow 
them to deliver to their electoral base. Executives with wider (tighter) electoral margins (and thus 
fewer concerns about future elections) design programs that offer benefits with fewer (greater) 
constraints to distribute to political supporters.  
The configuration of the legislature provides an important horizontal check on the 
policymaking process. The executive encounters institutional control of their initiatives through 
legislative approval. Supporting (opposing) legislatures will approve (check) executive plans to 
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distribute excludable goods to populations. However, when parties in legislatures stand to gain 
evenly from distributing excludable goods, they are likelier to integrate more reform-oriented 
elements into program oversight. Balance determines how politicians seeking to integrate reform-
oriented measures can influence the program  
Executives also factor into their decisions the incentives of partisan competition that 
structure their behavior, which requires that they consider of the credibility of their choices as 
viewed by other parties in the political system. The degree to which policies are moderated to 
generate programmatic outcomes depends on how the party system affects leadership over time. 
This means that strong (weak) party system institutionalization results in the moderation 
(immoderation) of policy preferences by executives. By generating expectations about party 
competition, stability in organizational identities and electoral bases of support, and establishing 
horizontal accountability, the party system constrains leaders to moderate policy. This means they 
look beyond now-or-never approaches to policy to progressive policy choices and articulate 
national policy preferences that mobilize beyond their constituency instead of particular ones. By 
doing so they develop credible approaches that they aim to have survive beyond the time they are 
in power. 
This establishes a set of basic expectations about the relationships examined in the later 
chapters of this study. The first relationship is expected between indications of oversight, 
expenditures, and program distribution: parochial social programs are expected to have weak 
oversight, unsteady expenditures, and distributions that favor inclusion based on political criteria, 
while programmatic social programs are expected to have strong oversight, steady expenditures, 
and distributions that favor inclusion based on demographic criteria. The second relationship is 
expected between targeted social programs and electoral payoff. Targeted social programs are 
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expected to have a positive effect on the probability of electoral support for candidates who 
implement them, but parochial social programs are expected to generate a greater probability of 
electoral support than do programmatic ones. 
Designing programs to include disadvantaged populations generates political opportunity 
for leaders, and whether they design policies to deliver for constituencies or guide voters towards 
electoral support depends on how elements of electoral competitiveness affects the executive and 
legislative interactions in the antipoverty policymaking process. The hypothesized outcomes are 
illustrated through a brief discussion of cases in the next section.  
2.4 CASE SELECTION 
The following cases illustrate the four outcomes of the executive-legislative interaction on 
targeted social policy choice. Argentina (Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desempleados), Brazil 
(Bolsa Família), Mexico (Progresa/ Oportunidades), and Venezuela (Misiones Sociales) each 
introduced targeted social transfer programs in the past 15 years. Below, narrative descriptions of 
the programs are introduced and political effects are detailed. The section concludes by 
organizing the country cases narratives according to the variables and predictions described in the 
section above.  
2.4.1 Organizing the Comparison 
Assessing spending outcomes and strategy shows how the interaction between the executive and 
legislature produces programs that generate political effects. The outcomes are organized in Table 
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3 below, which relates executive and legislative elements of partisan powers to programs with 
parochial, programmatic, and mixed policy outcomes for the four country cases.  
The four country cases are arranged according to executive and legislative elements of 
partisan powers that determine program characteristics, and are identified above in Table 2. 
Executive popularity is operationalized for this comparison is the level of executive margin of 
victory, categorized as high (≥10 percent) and low (<10 percent). Legislative composition is 
categorized by the composition of parties, according to coalition and majoritarian politics.  
Program distribution strategy, evidence of political effects, and program oversight are 
detailed in the cells of the table. Political determinants, policies, and political effects are described 
in the narratives below. 
Table 3. Partisan Powers and Targeted Social Policy Strategy 
  Legislative Composition 
  Coalition Politics Majority Politics 
Ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
M
ar
gi
n 
of
 V
ic
to
ry
 
H
ig
h 
Bolsa Família (Brazil):  
(Mixed Distribution) 
 
Program Oversight: 
Rollout followed by suspension of 
conditionalities. Reversion to auditing 
system. 
Political Effects:  Turnout Boosting 
Misiones Sociales (Venezuela):  
(Parochial Distribution) 
 
Program Oversight: 
Conditions not strictly enforced; limited 
auditing of participation. 
 
Political Effects: Opposition and core 
targeting among programs 
Lo
w 
Progresa/ Oportunidades (Mexico):  
(Programmatic) 
 
Program Oversight: 
Rollout included strict means test; survey 
& community review. 
 
Political Effects: Turnout Boosting (de 
la O 2013, Takahashi 2010) 
Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar 
Desempleados (Argentina): 
(Mixed Distribution) 
 
Program Oversight: 
Rollout with no agreement on eligibility. 
Limited local oversight of “Municipal 
Councils.”  
 
Political Effects: Core voter strategy in 
swing districts (Giovagnoli 2005) 
 
 50 
Comparing executive margin of victory, Brazil and Venezuela both shared high (greater 
than 20 percent) margins, while in Mexico and Argentina, the margins were closer (between 2 and 
a 10 percent). Lower margins reflect a higher level of program reform at introduction, while 
higher margins reflect a lower level of program reform. This is combined with legislative 
composition to provide a picture of partisan powers that lead to the different program outcomes: 
Brazil and Mexico are categorized as composed of coalitional legislatures with parties that are not 
large enough to control a majority of congress, and balance dependent on the alignment of major 
parties. Venezuela and Argentina have majoritarian compositions, with dominant parties 
comprising much of the legislature.  
When taken into comparison on elements of partisan powers and program design, the four 
cases support the theory presented above. Greater partisan powers influence program design, 
which produces core, opposition, and swing constituent targeting, indicators of parochial political 
effects. Less partisan powers produce turnout boosting effects, an indicator of programmatic 
strategy. This contrasts with the legislative weakness alternative hypothesis: while in some cases, 
the legislature had less influence, even popular executives faced constraints on their ability to 
target redistributive programs in ways that bettered their chances of political survival. 
These characteristics are detailed in the narrative cases below, which relate the political 
factors to the program design choices. Following the narratives, general lessons are collected and 
the variables and predictions are evaluated in a separate section.  
2.4.2 Argentina (Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desempleados)  
In Argentina, the emergency cash transfer program Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desempleados 
was organized in 2002 to counteract the unemployment crisis that stemmed from the austerity 
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measures implemented in 2001. President Duhalde, the loser in the previous election, had been 
recently appointed president, proposed the program during a period of legislative dominance for 
his Peronist party to respond to the wide public discontent over poverty and unemployment. 
Plan Jefes was structured to deliver 150 pesos per month to unemployed heads of 
households aged 18 or under, other youth unemployed, or adults aged over 60 not receiving a 
retirement benefit or pension (Giovagnoli, 2005, 6). The program was initially structured to 
directly transfer funds for the purchase of basic goods, but the government changed the eligibility 
criteria twice which led to enforcement problems (Giovagnoli, 2005 8-9). Difficulties were 
encountered in verification of the criteria, particularly unemployment status in a labor market 
dominated by informal employment. It meant that effectively, there were very few administrative 
barriers to program enrollment (Giovagnoli, 2005, 8). After conditions were placed on the 
program, September 2002 only 42 percent of beneficiaries (approximately 750,000) had 
registered for a workfare project or activity (Módolo, 2004, 14-5). The selection process for 
recipients was devolved to the municipal level, with Municipal Consulting Councils determining 
the allocation of benefits, evaluating community development proposals, and the auditing of 
irregularities in program distribution (Kostzer, 2008, 8,19). These councils have been shown in 
early research to have a lack of administrative and technical capacity, and to present some 
evidence of political manipulation (Giovagnoli, 2005, 10). 
These political distortions show parochial distribution outcomes. In an impact analysis 
conducted by Giovagnoli (2005, 37), the program distribution was shown to favor incumbents in 
majority Peronist municipal districts, suggesting a core voter strategy. Distributions are lower in 
areas with the greatest support for Peronist incumbents, and greater in areas with lower Peronist 
incumbent support, offering evidence of a core voter distribution strategy in swing districts.  
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2.4.3 Brazil (Bolsa Família) 
President Lula initiated Bolsa Família in 2003. The program was designed and decreed at a time 
when Lula held a minority coalition within the Assembly, forcing the leader to accommodate the 
preferences of the neoliberal-aligned opposition majority by instituting program conditionalities. 
The program targeted the poorest sector of the population utilizing a registry and means test, 
including an interview process involving a social worker visiting the household that was set to 
receive the benefit. Health and education conditions were monitored through the Ministries of 
health and education, and the management of the registry and transfer of funds were conducted 
through the Caixa Economica Federal (federally controlled savings bank), though in Brasilia, 
funds were transferred through the Banco de Brasilia (Lindert et al., 2007, 21). Municipalities 
were responsible for implementing aspects such as local coordination, registration of potential 
recipients of the Cadastro Único, monitoring health and education conditions, linking program 
beneficiaries to other services and establishing social control councils (Lindert et al. 2007). 
Targeting and registration was conducted through this centralized mechanism, with oversight 
contracted to the state bank Caixa Economica on a performance evaluation basis (Lindert et al., 
2007, 36, 42). Inclusion was based on the program rules, as evaluated by the national bank, and 
administration of the inclusion criteria for the program was conducted in a way that disassociated 
the recipient from the politicians that created the program. This enabled a programmatic 
distribution of resources.  
Bolsa Família became part of a decade long debate over instituting a guaranteed citizen 
income when monitoring for conditionalities was temporarily suspended in 2004 (Britto & 
Soares, 2010, 14). This set off a debate over the impact of monitoring compliance and program 
purpose, (Lindert & Vincensini, 2010, 62-3). Opposition to the suspension of conditions grew 
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among government, press, and scholars, who suggested that this would hurt long-term structural 
goals of the program and lead to clientelism (Lindert & Vincensini, 2010, 63-4). This pressure led 
to the reinstatement of program condition monitoring. The debate over the program focused first 
on implementation issues, technical elements of the program, with a later debate over clientelism, 
showing that the program prioritized antipoverty goals rather than political ones. 
Examining the distribution data reveals that despite early concerns with the enforcement 
of conditions, Bolsa Família favors the poor but not a particular group of political supporters. The 
program distribution shows a programmatic outcome. In Chapter 4, a series of regression analyses 
conducted to determine the effect of political and demographic factors on program distribution, 
and poverty is a consistent determinant. The overarching distribution of monthly assistance 
benefits does not target a specific political group, though targeting of voter support of the Partido 
dos Trabalhadores was shown to be greatest in 2006.  
2.4.4 Mexico (Progresa/ Oportunidades) 
Progresa - Programa de Educación, Salud, y Alimentación – was initiated to by then-President 
Ernesto Zedillo of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) to distribute resources to 
combat poverty in rural Mexico during a series of fiscal austerity measures. The program included 
three components: a cash transfer to the female head of household intended to subsidize food 
purchases, a scholarship intended to offset income from child labor, and basic health care for 
family members (De La O, 2013, 3). A strict means test was employed, based on an index 
developed to evaluate the marginality of beneficiaries (Takahashi, 2007, 110). This index 
identified poor communities based on census data and then poor households were chosen 
households based on a survey that examined socioeconomic level and program eligibility 
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(Takahashi, 2007, 12). A series of institutional reforms included 1999 constitutional changes 
where the Supreme Federal Auditor was given a larger amount of investigative authority in 
matters of public finance (Takahashi, 2010, 9). 
Following a crisis of legitimacy in the mid 1990s in Mexico, Zedillo allied with a 
reformist movement within his party that sought technocratic fixes to increase policy transparency 
and reduce corruption. The leader sought to avoid the clientelism that plagued Salinas with the 
program PRONASOL (Takahashi 2010, 7). For PROGRESA, the alignment with the reformist 
camp further reduced the degree of policy latitude afforded the president. This was reinforced by 
a reduced overall share of PRI politicians in the legislature, which reflected greater pluralism 
(Takahashi, 2010, 9).  
Under President Vicente Fox of the center-right Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), the 
program was renamed Oportunidades and expanded to urban areas. During the Fox 
administration auditing of irregularities was extended by the passage of three laws that provided 
legal assurances for citizen monitoring of government social program activities (Takahashi, 2010, 
9). These changes allowed for the expansion social auditing measures to avoid manipulation of 
the program. The further development of democracy aided oversight, improving the program.  
Takahashi and De la O Torres assess the program utilizing statistical analysis, 
investigating the effects of PRI incumbent status on program distribution, finding a turnout 
boosting effect for the incumbent in the 2000 election, consistent with this study’s categorization 
of a programmatic distribution strategy. Takahashi finds the vote share for incumbent candidates 
of the PRI to be a significant determinant of program distribution during Progresa, but this effect 
is not found during Oportunidades for the PAN (Takahashi, 2010, 28-9). De la O Torres shows 
that the early group of individuals assigned to benefit from Progresa had increased turnout, 
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specifically on party vote shares for PRI candidates (De La O Torres 2013). The turnout boosting 
effect is shown in Progresa during the Zedillo administration but according to Takahashi, 
Oportunidades shows no similar effect during the Fox administration.  
2.4.5 Venezuela (Misiones Sociales) 
The Misiones Sociales were initiated in 2003 as a range of services complementary to existing 
government education, health and social welfare programs. They were wide-ranging, serving not 
simply the poorest, and only involved conducting means tests for certain aspects of the programs 
– those that included becas, or scholarships – but not for others, such as neighborhood medical 
care. The initial Misiones were: Barrio Adentro (within-neighborhood primary health care), 
Mercal (discount grocery), Robinson (basic literacy), Ribas (basic education), Sucre 
(postsecondary education), Habitat (housing), and Vuelvan Caras (cooperatively owned goods 
production businesses). Of these, becas were introduced for the education programs Robinson, 
Ribas, and Sucre, awarded to low-income participants, particularly: single mothers, unemployed, 
or individuals in precarious situations, over 60 years of age, or family breadwinners. These were 
awarded within the classroom, not through a centralized administration of payouts (D’Elia, 2006, 
98). 
The Chávez government interfered with the program design and organization multiple 
times over the course of the decade. Chavez supplemented the funding of the Misiones with 
resources drawn from PDVSA, avoiding subjecting them to budget oversight in the legislature. 
These programs were under near constant institutional redesign from 2005-8. The Misiones 
underwent their first full makeover following the release of the Nuevo Mapa Estratégico (New 
Strategic Map) established new institutional objectives and management structures for Misiones 
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Ribas and Robinson (Mundo, 2009, 45). The second set of changes occurred following the 
passing of enabling laws that established the quasi-institutional status of the Misiones as official 
bureaucratic structures.  
Assessing the educational programs, in particular Misiones Sucre and Ribas, reveals a 
parochial distribution of benefits. In Chapter 4, a series of regression analyses conducted to 
determine the effect of political and demographic factors on program distribution. Poverty does 
not determine distribution, but political factors show an effect. Misión Sucre cash transfers and 
community education centers reflect a core voter strategy, prioritizing Chavez and Partido 
Socialista Unido de Venezuela supporters over opposition votes. The distribution of Misión Ribas 
cash transfers reveal an opposition voter targeting strategy for program recipients. This analysis is 
consistent with Lupu (2010) who reports that voting support for Chávez has increased among the 
middle class, which coincides with education Misión program benefits, though the author does not 
inquire about a relationship. Prioritizing different blocks of electoral support through program 
targeting suggest goals of selective distribution of benefits consistent with the parochial 
distributions identified above.  
 
2.4.6 Institutional Effects on Program Outcomes 
The interaction between executives and legislatures shapes the policy design, resulting in 
programmatic or parochial outcomes as leaders pursue distribution strategies. In the first two 
cases – Brazil and Mexico – parties are not large enough to dominate the legislature, increasing 
the reform orientation of policies. In the latter two cases – Venezuela and Argentina – the 
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distribution of seats among major parties is out of balance resulting in majoritarian politics, 
limiting the reform orientation of policies. 
Comparing the composition of the legislature, coalition politics define the legislatures of 
Brazil and Mexico. The structure of electoral rules in Brazil results in a multi-party system, 
limiting the party of the president from holding a majority in the legislature (Alston et al. 2006; 
Cheibub Figueiredo 2007). Lula, a popular leader, combined with a legislature with an 
opposition-aligned coalition that balanced, limiting Lula’s partisan powers; this allowed latitude 
for a debate to suspend program conditions, but these were soon reinstated. In Mexico, regional 
dominance of the PAN, PRD, and PRI require coalition behavior to win a majority among the 
catch-all parties that developed there (Klesner 2005). A crisis of legitimacy produced a reformist 
camp within the PRI while the overall share of Zedillo’s party declined in the legislature, 
resulting in a technocratic approach to PROGRESA that that avoided the parochial distributive 
outcome of a prior program.  
Venezuela and Argentina are defined by majority politics, with histories of disciplined 
parties in the legislature. Venezuelan parties were highly disciplined until the early 1990s, which 
declined in a volatile manner and left a polarized system with partisan interactions between the 
parties associated with Hugo Chavez and opposition movements (Alvarez 2006; Crisp 2000; Lyne 
2008; Monaldi et al. 2006). Chávez-aligned legislative dominance combined with a popular 
leader in Venezuela yields a considerable degree of partisan powers, allowing the president 
latitude to design programs distributed in a parochial manner, favoring core and opposition voters 
with program benefits in the education Misiones. The highly disciplined parties in Argentina are 
driven by regional relationships with governors result in the domination of the governing majority 
Peronists over the opposition Unión Cívica Radical (Jones 2002; Scherlis 2008). Plan Jefes was 
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introduced at a time of great public discontent over the large share of the population that was poor 
and unemployed, by an appointed president – the loser of the previous election – during a period 
when the Peronists dominated the legislature, resulting in a program that failed to have clearly 
defined eligibility criteria and parochial distributions. 
Legislative composition and the degree to which the party system facilitates cooperation 
based on stable expectations of competition and draws from persistent electoral bases of support 
determines the extent to which policies are oriented toward programmatic or parochial outcomes. 
The cases support the theory, revealing variation in distributional outcomes that correspond to the 
institutional effects. Detailed evidence of how this interaction determines politicization of 
redistributive programs and their targeting outcomes will be presented in cases and statistical 
analysis comparing Brazil and Venezuela in Chapters Five and Six. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Despite limitations on their ability to initiate antipoverty programs, legislatures exert control by 
delegating the process to the executive, who seeks to seize on the electoral opportunity to deliver 
to its constituency. Partisan powers determine the latitude the executive has to shape programs. 
The extent of these powers is indicated by the amount of electoral popularity, the number of seats 
controlled by the executive and allied parties in the legislature, and by the institutionalization of 
the party system. The legislature maintains an important role in this process since the body 
ultimately approves the initiatives. Programmatic and parochial distributional outcomes are an 
effect of the ability of the legislature to introduce reform elements into targeted social program 
design. The content of these reform elements is determined by the institutionalization of the party 
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system in the legislature, which moderates appeals to voters through the generation of 
expectations about party competition, the construction of bases of support and organizational 
identities, and the establishment of horizontal accountability, resulting in the articulation of 
national policy preferences over parochial ones. 
This chapter presents variation in outcomes across four cases organized by indicators of 
the theoretical mechanism presented above. It reveals leaders’ ability to redistribute targeted 
social policy according to the strategies identified in the literature to be a function of legislative-
executive interaction. Chapter 5 will examine in detail the executive-legislative interaction in 
Brazil and Venezuela that results in the different distributional outcomes.  
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3.0  METHODS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS OF TARGETED 
REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY 
This chapter presents the research design and methods to evaluate the theory identified in Chapter 
2, describing the elements of the design, methods and data sources used to perform the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the project. In order to investigate how social programs are 
politicized, this chapter describes the analytical methods employed in chapters 4-6 of the 
dissertation. First, it introduces a set of tests in Chapter 5 to evaluate the dependent variable – 
program design. These tests examine oversight, expenditure, and model the political and 
demographic determinants of program distribution on Bolsa Família and the education Misiones. 
Then, it identifies a country case study approach used in Chapter 5 to describe the independent 
variable – partisan powers – that determine how social programs are politicized in their design 
and administration. Then it introduces a statistical model used in Chapter 6 to evaluate the 
relationship between program participation and vote choice in Brazil and Venezuela to examine 
the electoral payoff of different program designs. It concludes with analysis of project validity 
and challenges to reliability of analysis.  
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3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research project employs inductive inference, constructing a theory from rational choice and 
historical institutionalist perspectives in political and policy science in order to build a 
generalizable model based on the analysis of cases. To present a complete understanding of the 
theory, this study employs a mixed methodology, testing the hypotheses developed from the 
theory.  In order to examine the electoral effects of policies, it employs a statistical model to 
examine the electoral effects of targeted social programs identified within the universe of cases. 
In order to understand the politics of the policy design, the study employs country case studies 
based on semi-structured research interviews conducted in the field, quantitative data collected 
from governments, including and elections data, as well as secondary sources including third-
party organization reports on programs and academic and journalistic accounts of historical 
developments to examine the institutional effect of horizontal accountability on program design. 
Government and opposition political preferences are examined to determine what shape the 
programs could have taken, had the institutional effect not occurred. It then employs a statistical 
model evaluating program oversight, using interview and secondary accounts, government 
expenditure data, and program enrollment data to examine the influence of political and program-
relevant factors affecting targeting strategy for the programs. Drawing inferences from data 
utilized to develop the theory, this project directly tests the effects of:  
1. political and demographic determinants on program distribution to examine how programs 
with different levels of oversight are targeted; 
2. partisan powers on the design of programs, particularly the integration of reform elements 
that provide oversight to examine how horizontal accountability affects the moderation of 
program design;  
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3. program participation on vote choice, to examine the effect of participation in programs of 
different design on incumbent electoral support. 
Chapter 4 utilizes a mixed-method approach, informing the substantive results of a 
statistical model with qualitative data on program characteristics and oversight and expenditure 
data. Chapter 5 utilizes a comparative case study approach to examine the effect of partisan 
powers on the design of programs. Chapter 6 utilizes a statistical model to examine the effect of 
program participation on vote choice. 
3.1.1 Unit of Analysis 
In order to examine the institutions that constrain the behavior of political actors, this project 
employs levels of analysis both aggregate and individual to describe how leaders politicize 
redistributive social programs. Examining country cases aggregated at institutional levels permits 
the analysis of political inputs including executives, legislatures, and parties, as well as policy 
outputs such as ministry oversight, program expenditures, and for the purposes of examining 
targeting direction, the distribution of program resources across geographic lines.  
Individual-level data is employed to describe the electoral effect of program politicization 
by identifying the effect of recipient (and non-recipient) status on vote choice across values of key 
variables. Examining survey data provides researchers with the ability to observe the effect of 
recipient status on individuals, rather than rely on examination of political effects at levels 
aggregated by district or state. Performing analyses on the causes of vote choice that are the 
product of recall data from surveys months and years on is acknowledged to be problematic, but 
choosing this analysis avoids problems with the ecological fallacy at the aggregate level. While 
observing directly (and immediately) whether recipient status affected vote choice is most 
 63 
preferable, assuming that recipients are the voters casting ballots to support politicians that 
distribute resources to districts is inimical to understanding how leaders shape policy to encourage 
vote choice. Utilizing recall data to assess the effect of recipient and non-recipient status on vote 
choice is preferable so long that potential biases in the data are acknowledged.  
3.1.2 Data Sources 
This study employs the following quantitative and qualitative data sources to realize the mixed 
methodological approach it takes. It employs survey data to examine program effects on vote 
choice, primary data to examine firsthand accounts of political context, program oversight, 
design, and distribution, as well as secondary data to triangulate perspectives introduced in the 
primary interviews. 
3.1.2.1 Survey Data 
In order to examine the individual effect of program participation (and non-participation) on vote 
choice, this study utilizes survey data from the 2007 wave of the AmericasBarometer at the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University (LAPOP, 2007). Both Brazil 
and Venezuela surveys contained interview questions about recipient status for Bolsa Família and 
the Misiones as well as questions about prior deputy and presidential elections, in addition to the 
2006 elections in each country. Coding choices are discussed in the model description below.  
3.1.2.2 Primary Data  
Primary data was collected in two months of field research in Brazil and Venezuela in November 
and December 2010.  Over that time, 25 interviews were conducted among government officials 
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at the ministerial level, government program workers, nongovernmental organization members, 
and policy analysts within government. In addition to these, further discussions were had with 
members of academic and policy institutions including Centro de Estudios de Desarollo at the 
Universidad Central de Venezuela, the Universidad Católica Andres Bello, the Universidade de 
Brasilia, the UNDP International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, and the World Bank. These 
interviews were structured to provide description of political interactions and expert accounts of 
the coverage intended in the design and administration of targeted social policies.  
3.1.2.3 Secondary Data 
In order to corroborate the perspectives introduced through interviews, secondary data, including: 
expenditure data from government ministries, foundations, and state-owned corporations, 
elections data from government elections authorities, as well as third-party organization reports 
on programs, and academic and journalistic accounts of historical developments. This enables the 
triangulation of perspectives through the by comparing the viewpoints of interview subjects to 
actual coverage through statistical analysis of spending data by geography, controlling for 
population factors. 
3.2 MEASURING PROGRAM POLITICIZATION 
 
This study conducts a first set of tests to examine program politicization –whether strategy is 
programmatic or parochial – in Chapter 4. Programs are examined according to three assessment 
criteria: program oversight, program expenditure, and the direction of program targeting.  
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Program oversight, expenditures, and distributions are assessed separately to show the 
influence of partisan powers on indicators of programmatic and parochial programs. The 
assessment of program oversight is conducted through case study accounts based on interview 
data, third-party reports that detail oversight, and government program descriptions. This shows 
the ways in which programs reflect rule-based implementation, including specification of 
program eligibility based on poverty or political preferences for program inclusion.  Program 
expenditures are assessed through government and third party reports on spending, which reveals 
ways that leaders are constrained from spending. Whether expansions are moderate or oscillate in 
a now-or-never fashion shows how program rules affect the level of expenditures on social 
programs. 
Assessing program distribution – whether a program has parochial or programmatic 
distributive outcomes – requires examination of targeting strategies identified in Chapter 2, 
conducted through the modeling of participation in cash transfer programs across geographical 
regions within each country. Program targeting models are based on assessing the effect of 
political and program-relevant demographic factors that determine the targeting outcomes. 
Elections and program distributions for both programs are examined over multiple time points, in 
2004, 2006 (Brazil), 2007 (Venezuela), and 2010. This allows for the assessment of political 
targeting over multiple electoral events during the period, during which the comparison of 
political and program-relevant demographic characteristics is conducted. 
 The distribution of program benefits shows how rules are incorporated into inclusion 
criteria of program design, allowing for the assessment of the “selective distributive politics” 
strategic political targeting hypotheses introduced in Chapter 2. These strategies include: core 
voter strategy, targeting incumbent supporting constituents; opposition voter strategy, targeting 
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supporters of challengers; close or landslide voter strategy, targeting competitive races or shoring 
up supporters, or turnout boosting, encouraging political participation. Support for the first three 
are identified as parochial, while support for the latter is identified as programmatic. Unlike the 
first three, his spending reaches multiple geographies, redistributing beyond narrow criteria. 
Analysis is conducted by assessing the factors that affect program distribution through 
evaluating the number of program recipients in each state according to political and program-
relevant demographic variables. This involves regressing the number of recipients in each state on 
voting outcomes in political contests, partisan status of governors, a measure of educational 
enrollment, individuals living in poverty, and population. Substantive analysis is conducted 
through marginal effects calculations for each model, which allow the examination of two 
political influences on program distributions: changes in the level of support for Lula and Chávez, 
and being in a state with a Lula (or Chávez)-aligned governor.  Examining whether the number of 
program recipients is greater in states with leadership- or opposition-aligned governors allows 
examination of targeting core (Lula- or Chávez- aligned) or opposition support, or whether the 
targeting reflects programmatic distribution among the poor population in each state. Comparing 
close and distant races provides evidence of support for the swing voter hypothesis, where 
recipient share is greater in close races. 
The following variables modeled in a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
analyses comparing political and demographic targeting effects, based on previous efforts by 
Fried (2012), Hawkins, Rosas and Johnson (2011), Hawkins (2010), Penfold-Becerra (2008), 
Rocha-Menocal (2001), Molinar and Weldon (1994). Political factors include the following 
variables: the partisan status of governors in each state during the period of analysis, and a 
measure of political support for the incumbent party during major electoral events. These include 
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presidential and gubernatorial elections as well as the constitutional and recall referendums in 
Venezuela. Program-relevant demographic variables include: the number of individuals living in 
poverty, the number of individuals enrolled in basic education. A population estimate is included 
to control for differences in state populations.  
To supplement the regression analyses, marginal effects are plotted, permitting the 
comparison of the number of program recipients in states with core (incumbent-aligned 
governors) or opposition (opposition-aligned governors) states over increases in incumbent 
support with other variables held at mean values. The influence of close contests on program 
distribution is evaluated by examining the slope of the marginal effect plot. Negative slopes show 
support for close races, while positive slopes show support in landslide contests. Like the 
regression analyses, marginal effects analyses are considered over time to understand the overall 
effect of program targeting on the number of recipients in incumbent- and opposition-aligned 
states.  
Assessment of targeting strategy is best conducted at the district level. As the lowest level 
of decentralization in national-level government, it provides the largest set of observations and 
richest data for analysis of the effects of the party system on program outcomes. Cases evaluating 
targeting strategy in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico examine data at lower levels (Giovagnoli 
2005; De La O Torres 2013; Luna and Mardones 2010; Takahashi 2007). Limitations in 
Venezuela on availability of data at the district level require analysis at the state level. Analysis of 
targeting strategy in Brazil is conducted at the district level, which is also the state level. Despite 
the Venezuelan data limitation, the level of aggregation matches, and provides continuity of 
analysis between the two cases. Summary statistics for the state-level data are reported for Brazil 
and Venezuela in Tables 4 and 5.  
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Table 4. Summary Statistics for "Targeting" Data - Brazil 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log of Number of Bolsa Família Recipients 2010 27 12.625 1.033 10.650 14.324 
Log of Number of Bolsa Família Recipients 2006 27 12.281 1.291 8.066 14.146 
Log of Number of Bolsa Família Recipients 2004 27 11.869 1.177 9.236 13.640 
Share of Population registered in the Cadastro Único 2010 27 0.134 0.109 0.021 0.641 
Share of Population Registered in the Cadastro Único 2006 27 0.092 0.036 0.036 0.154 
Share of Population, Families Living in Poverty (IPEA) 2004 27 0.084 0.073 0.013 0.411 
Share Students Enrolled in Primary Education 2010 27 0.048 0.006 0.038 0.059 
Share Students Enrolled in Primary Education 2006 27 0.040 0.006 0.031 0.050 
Share Students Enrolled in Primary Education 2004 27 0.036 0.007 0.025 0.048 
Log Population Estimate 2010 27 15.255 1.065 13.020 17.535 
Log Population Estimate 2006 27 15.217 1.084 12.908 17.530 
Log Population Estimate 2004 27 15.181 1.098 12.853 17.500 
PT Coalition Governor Vote 2010 27 0.519 0.189 0.182 0.956 
PT Coalition Governor Vote 2006 27 0.280 0.222 0.000 0.629 
PT Coalition Governor /Vote 2004 27 0.290 0.174 0.000 0.636 
Governor 2010 27 0.593 0.501 0 1 
Governor 2004 27 0.185 0.396 0 1 
Lula Vote 2002 27 0.453 0.055 0.286 0.566 
Lula Vote 2006 27 0.509 0.145 0.262 0.781 
Dilma Vote 2007 27 0.475 0.120 0.239 0.706 
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Table 5. Summary Statistics for "Targeting" Data - Venezuela 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log of Number of Sucre Becas 2010 24 7.555 0.733 6.078 8.748 
Log of Number of Sucre Becas 2007 24 7.954 0.751 5.991 8.927 
Log of Number of Sucre Becas 2004 24 8.079 0.756 6.142 9.029 
Log of Number of Ribas Becas 2004 24 3.978 0.609 2.890 4.970 
Log of Number of Aldeas 2010 24 4.171 0.701 2.833 5.030 
Log of Number of Aldeas 2007 24 8.532 1.005 5.935 9.951 
Governor 2010 24 0.583 0.504 0 1 
Governor 2007 24 0.875 0.338 0 1 
Governor 2004 24 0.750 0.442 0 1 
Share PSUV Seats Assembly Election 24 0.025 0.010 0.006 0.043 
Share Yes Constitutional Proposition A 24 0.529 0.072 0.427 0.658 
Share Yes Constitutional Proposition B 24 0.523 0.068 0.425 0.627 
PSUV Governor Vote 2008 23 0.544 0.072 0.418 0.735 
Chávez Coalition Governor Vote 2004 23 0.600 0.094 0.435 0.785 
Recall Referendum 2004 (no) 24 0.618 0.073 0.500 0.729 
Share Chávez President 2006 24 0.664 0.081 0.511 0.802 
Share Chávez Presidential Vote 2000 24 0.611 0.063 0.472 0.739 
Share Individuals Living In Poverty 2010 24 0.332 0.090 0.135 0.478 
Share Individuals Living In Poverty 2007 24 0.329 0.090 0.135 0.538 
Share Individuals Living In Poverty 2004 24 0.546 0.114 0.305 0.732 
Share Students Enrolled in Secondary and 
Vocational Education 2010 24 0.023 0.002 0.018 0.027 
Share Students Enrolled in Secondary and 
Vocational Education 2007 24 0.026 0.002 0.022 0.030 
Share Students Enrolled in Secondary and 
Vocational Education 2004 24 0.022 0.002 0.017 0.027 
Secondary and Vocational Schools 2010 24 230.125 139.355 38.000 626.000 
Secondary and Vocational Schools 2007 24 168.208 116.583 20.000 465.000 
Log of Population Estimate 2010 24 13.707 0.832 11.942 15.156 
Log of Population Estimate 2007 24 13.656 0.838 11.865 15.102 
Log of Population Estimate 2004 24 13.601 0.845 11.781 15.045 
 
 
Operationalization choices and expected relationships are described below. 
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3.2.1 Dependent Variable – Program Distribution 
 
The dependent variable, program distribution, shows the amount that programs are made 
available to constituencies on a statewide basis. The distribution reveals whether program design 
has political determinants (parochial), or demographic ones (programmatic). In Brazil, 
distributions are expected to be unaffected by political factors. In Venezuela, they are expected to 
be dependent on the partisanship of governors and the amount of electoral support.   
Program distributions for both programs in 2004, 2006 (Brazil), 2007 (Venezuela), and 
2010 are examined. Participation rates are made available by government ministries that manage 
the programs, including Venezuela’s Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educación 
Universitaria, and the Fundación Misión Sucre, and the third party report by D’Elia (2006) and 
by Penfold-Becerra (2005) for Misión Ribas. In Brazil, the measures are provided by the 
Ministerio do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome. Program participation is measured as a 
log count statistic in order to accommodate the normality assumptions of the model, but the figure 
is converted back to a count statistic to facilitate marginal effects analysis.  
3.2.2 Independent Variable – Political Support 
The independent variable, political support, is expected to determine the program distributions in 
parochial strategies. It is coded two ways, allowing for analysis of targeting according to core and 
swing support and closeness of electoral margins. Coding according to the alignment of 
incumbent governors allows for assessment of program targeting toward areas of core and 
opposition support. This is conducted by evaluating the partisan or coalition status of governors in 
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each country. Governors are coded according to whether they are affiliated with the government 
or opposition.5 Coding decisions for relevant periods are displayed in Tables 6 and 7 for Brazil 
and Venezuela.  
5 Coding choices are made according to criteria both Table 1 and 2 above for Brazil and Venezuela, respectively, 
including the coalition structure described during Lula’s presidency in Cheibub Figueiredo (2007) and alignments 
cited in Crisp (2000), Ellner (2008), and Lyne (2008).   
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Table 6. Brazil Governors and Coding 
State Governor pre-2010 Party Year 2006 
Previous 
Governor 
During Bolsa 
Família Party Year 
200
4 
Acre Binho Marques PT 2007-2010 1 Jorge Viana PT 
1999-
2007 1 
Alagoas Lessa PDT 1999-2006 0 
   
0 
Amapá Pedro Paulo Dias PP 2003-2010 0 
   
0 
Amazonas Carlos Braga PMDB 2003-2010 1 
   
0 
Bahia Paolo Souto PFL 2003-2007 0 
   
0 
Ceará Lúcio Alcântara PR 2003-2007 0 
   
0 
Distrito Federal José Roberto Arruda PT 2007-2010 0 
Joaquim 
Roriz PSC 
2003-
2006    0 
Espírito Santo Paulo Hartung PMDB 2003-2010 1 
   
0 
Goiás Alcides Filho PP 2006-2010 0 
   
0 
Maranão Jackson Lago PDT 2007-2009 0 
   
0 
Mato Grosso Blairo Maggi PR 2003-2010 0 
   
0 
Mato Grosso do 
Sul 
José dos Santos 
"Zeca do PT" PT 1999-2006 1 
   
1 
Minas Gerais Aécio Neves PSDB 2003-2010 0 
   
0 
Pará Ana Júlia Carepa PT 2007-2010 1 
   
1 
Paraiba Cássio Cunha Lima PSDB 2007-2009 0 
   
0 
Pernambuco Eduardo Campos PSB 2007-2010 1 
Jarbas 
Vasconcelos 
PMD
B 
2003-
2006 0 
Piauí Wellington Dias PT 2003-2010 1 
   
1 
Paraná Roberto Requião PMDB 2003-2010 1 
   
0 
Rio de Janeiro Sérgio Filho PMDB 2007-2010 0 
Rosinha 
Garotinho PR 
2003-
2006 0 
Rio Grande do 
Norte Wilma de Faria PSB 2003-2010 1 
   
1 
Rondônia Ivo Cassol PSDB/ PPS 2003-2010 0 
   
0 
Roraima 
José de Ancieta 
Júnior PSDB 2007-2010 0 
Ottomar 
Pinto PSDB 
2004-
2007 0 
Rio Grande do 
Sul Yeda Crusius PSDB 2007-2010 0 
   
0 
Santa Catarina 
Luiz Henrique da 
Silveira PMDB 2003-2010 1 
   
0 
São Paulo José Serra PSDB 2007-2010 0 Alckmin  PSDB 
2003-
2007 0 
Sergipe Marcelo Déda PT 2007-2010 0 João Filho DEM 
2003-
2007 0 
Tocantins Marcelo Miranda PMDB 2003-2009 1 
   
0 
1= Party of President or coalition member in particular year. 
0 = Opposition-aligned Party (Freitas 2012). 
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Table 7. Venezuela Governors and Coding 
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Coding according to the share of votes received allows for analysis of whether programs 
targeted close elections. This is conducted by measuring the vote share of Chávez- and Lula- 
aligned candidates in governor, president, and special elections held in Venezuela during this 
period. It allows for the investigation of the relationship between candidate support in the state 
and the distribution of resources.  
3.2.3 Independent Variable – Program Factors 
The independent variables measuring whether programmatic targeting factors determine the 
distribution of program participants include: the number of individuals living in poverty and the 
number of individuals enrolled in education programs within each state. These are measured as 
count statistics in order to facilitate marginal effects analysis. A statewide measure of the number 
of individuals living in poverty is compiled from national statistics institute population estimates 
for given years, and in Brazil, the Cadastro Único registry where available. Poverty should be 
expected to determine the distribution of program participants, since it is a component of 
targeting criteria.   
As these programs under analysis each focus on education, a statewide measure of the 
number of individuals enrolled in education programs provides an annual estimate of state 
populations that should determine the distribution of benefits. For Brazil, a basic education 
enrollment figure is utilized to assess how the youth attendance criteria affected program 
distribution. For Venezuela, as Sucre and Ribas are intended to reach individuals seeking 
secondary and postsecondary education, a measure of secondary and vocational enrollment is 
utilized to assess how program needs within each state. 
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3.2.4 Control Variables 
As participation and program-relevant demographic factors are measured as count statistics in 
the models. A population estimate is included to control for differences in state populations, 
weighting the model for these count statistics.  
3.2.5 Marginal Effects Analysis 
Marginal effects analysis is conducted to compare the number of program recipients in states 
with core (incumbent-aligned governors) or opposition (opposition-aligned governors) states 
over increases in incumbent support with other variables held at mean values. The slope of the 
marginal effect plots illustrates the influence of close contests on program distribution. Negative 
slopes show support for close races, while positive slopes show support in landslide contests.  
These participation rates are evaluated according to, as explained in the theory, whether 
programs seek to boost turnout among core or swing voters as part of the strategy employed in 
their selective distribution, or whether programs are distributed evenly, avoiding a selective 
distribution of resources. Programs that are distributed toward leadership-aligned territories form 
a core voter strategy, while those oriented toward opposition-aligned territories form part of an 
opposition targeting voter strategy. Programs that are distributed evenly boost turnout among all 
recipients. This chapter now turns to assessment of bias and reliability of the data employed to 
answer the research question. 
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3.3 METHOD FOR COMPARING POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF POLICY 
CHOICE 
Case study analysis of Brazil and Venezuela proceeds in Chapter 5, first with an illustration of 
the independent variable – partisan powers – and then for the dependent variable – program 
politicization – across both countries. This allows for detail of variation across the criteria 
specified for each variable to show how the theory explains different political targeting 
outcomes. The case studies examine the effect of partisan powers on the process of program 
design: the cases focus specifically on how horizontal accountability affects the moderation of 
program design and the integration of reform elements into the programs. They explore the 
effects of competitive political systems on the integration of reforms, showing how opposition 
policy preferences are (or fail to be) integrated into targeted programs. This shows the effect of 
horizontal accountability: where the political system is competitive, programs are moderated by 
opposition preferences, integrating more reform elements into programs. Where the political 
system is uncompetitive, programs are not moderated by opposition preferences, integrating 
fewer reform elements into programs. To assess the variation created by this effect, most similar 
cases must be examined.  
3.3.1 Method 
For theoretical development and case study illustration of the theory, this project utilizes a 
research design that compares what Przeworski and Teune (1970) term “most similar” cases 
from a set of four countries. Each of these country cases: is geographically situated within the 
Latin American region; is of middle to low per capita income; has a presidential system; has high 
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levels of informal sector populations (see estimates in Chapter 1) or unemployed to mobilize; 
and had leaders that have been described as having leftist ideological preferences (Forero 2003; 
Jordan 2003). This controls for variation in ideological orientation, regional economic history, 
presence of executive-legislative interactions, and of a coalition of low-income population to 
mobilized through social policy.  
The variation occurs on the independent variable, where horizontal accountability differs 
for the presidents, shown through different levels of partisan power. Popular presidents that were 
elected with relatively margins of victory, encountered different configurations of parties in the 
legislature and institutionalized competition in a stable party system.  This generates expected 
differences on the dependent variable, as countries with greater horizontal accountability should 
have policies moderated through the influence of the opposition, incorporating more reform 
elements into the their design. Less moderated programs with fewer reform elements 
incorporated into design is expected in countries with weaker horizontal accountability.  
The project utilizes George and Bennett’s (2005) method of structured, focused 
comparison to guide the cases along its research question to reflect the goals of my study. This 
enables standardization of data collection and ensures systematic comparison of the cases. The 
research is structured diachronically, that is, tracing the periods of political activity both before 
and during the determination of social spending policy as well as the distributional outcomes as 
the programs are administered (Dogan and Pelassy 1990).  
3.3.2 Case Study Structure 
The Brazil and Venezuelan case studies are designed to illustrate the model in Chapter 2. The 
cases proceed through the political determinants of policy design, describing executive and 
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legislative characteristics. They then continue with description of policy design and 
administration, followed by analysis of the program. The degree to which program design 
reflects the political goals of leaders is analyzed through bivariate analysis, allowing use of the 
state-by-state data releases by the ministries providing oversight. 
Analysis of executive-legislative relations provides an assessment of how 
competitiveness of both governmental branches affects targeted social program design. In Brazil, 
greater horizontal accountability through a more competitive system that provided institutional 
checks resulted in programs moderated by the opposition, incorporating more reform elements. 
In Venezuela, less horizontal accountability through an uncompetitive system that provided 
fewer institutional checks, which resulted in programs there were not moderated by the political 
opposition, and incorporated fewer reform elements into policy design.  
Examining the constitutional and partisan powers of the president provides an assessment 
of horizontal accountability. Executive decree authority is described along with three 
components of partisan powers including: executive powers and margin of victory, parties in the 
legislature, and party system stability. This study utilizes government electoral data, third-party, 
and academic reports on the executive, the legislature, and the context of the party systems 
within each country to analyze the partisan and constitutional powers. In Brazil, despite strong 
decree powers, the executive is limited by weak partisan powers that limit their ability to enact 
an agenda. In Venezuela, despite weak decree powers, the executive is able to enact their agenda 
due to strong partisan powers.  
Multiparty systems – those that are more competitive – result in more moderated 
programs, as they limit the partisan power of the president. The degree of reform orientation of 
the legislature depends on the nature of political competition: competitive political systems 
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provide result in increased reform orientation, while majority politics result in limited reform 
orientation. The measurement of Effective Number of Parties is utilized to show the degree of 
party system stability, calculated according to shares of votes received by each party, and by 
shares of seats each party controls in parliament. This and other electoral data is collected from 
government electoral authorities to show how party systems consolidate or break down over 
time.  
The degree to which opposing groups moderate programs is shown by the integration of 
reform elements into program design. These are context-specific for each program, but key to 
these targeted programs is the degree to which oversight is incorporated into program design. 
Moderation is examined by comparing how policy design reflects the preferences of government 
and opposition actors. To do this, the positions from government members and opposition 
politicians and policy organizations on targeted redistributed programs are detailed. This allows 
analysis of changes to programs that could have been made, if institutional effect detailed above 
had not determined the outcome.  
Together the analysis of the cases is intended to present an illustration of the theory 
above and explain the variation in politicization found in the results of the model. Program 
politicization varies by the degree to which horizontal accountability limits their design and 
administration to programmatic outcomes.  
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3.4 MEASURING THE ELECTORAL EFFECT OF TARGETED SOCIAL 
PROGRAMS 
A second set of tests examines the electoral payoff of program targeting. These tests replicate 
and extend a statistical model previously published by Bohn (2011), which uses individual-level 
LAPOP data employed by the author and the corresponding Venezuelan survey data. Bohn's 
model examines the influence of social programs on vote choice over time, including other 
controls such as: income, gender, age, education level, and regional geographic location.  
This study builds on the Bohn model by replicating the analysis on vote choice of the 
influence of Bolsa Família in Brazil and extends analysis to examine the influence of the 
Misiones in Venezuela. It also examines multiplicative interaction models for each relationship, 
allowing for a baseline analysis of non-recipient probability of support for Lula and Chávez and 
to assess the importance of each factor – income and education – on program choice. This 
provides more substantive analysis examining the marginal effect of increases in values of key 
variables, while holding others at their means, and by comparing the probability of recipient 
support against that of non-recipients in each contest.  
3.4.1 Model Justification 
The final empirical test of this study examines the political effect of program design. Targeted 
programs are expected to have electoral payoffs, though programmatic and parochial distributive 
strategies are expected to differ in the amount. Previous research into the electoral effect of Bolsa 
Família and the Misiones suggests that both leaders benefitted from the introduction of the social 
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programs. The extent to which they benefitted has played out in debate in Brazil and has been 
examined only indirectly in Venezuela.  
3.4.1.1 Brazil 
The size of the electoral effect of Bolsa Família has been subject to debate in recent literature on 
the social program. Hunter and Power suggested an effect for Bolsa Família in their analysis of 
the 2006 election, as absolute poverty declined following targeted social program intervention 
(Hunter and Power 2008). With an average family size of 4.1, a basic estimate of the 11.1 
million families meant that Bolsa Família covered approximately one quarter of the population. 
With Lula winning in long-held opposition states and an increased level of turnout, the 
President’s success can largely be attributed to the delivery of the social program (Hunter & 
Power, 2008, 19-20). Nicolau and Peixoto corroborate a positive effect of Bolsa Família on vote 
choice (Nicolau and Peixoto 2007). Soares and Terron explore the expanded electoral geography 
resulting from Bolsa Família, with the positive effect of program participation increasing votes 
for Lula in municipalities in the poor Northeast, shifting from his 2002 base of cities (G. A. D. 
Soares and Terron 2008). The geographical transition is corroborated by Zucco (2008) but the 
Bolsa Família effect is not distinguishable from a pro-government voting pattern, as the author 
argues that the tendency in poorer areas to vote in favor of the incumbent holds over the four 
previous elections as well.   
Using individual-level data from the 2008 AmericasBarometer, Licio, Renno and Castro 
(2009) find that Bolsa Família had a positive effect on voter support and public opinion of Lula. 
Bohn, however, compares the effect in 2006 to the effect the program would have had on 2002 
supporters and argues that the program effect was diminished because Lula had already captured 
this coalition of supporters in 2002. Bohn claims that Bolsa Família recipients were already Lula 
 82 
voters in 2002 – and that by 2006 there was no statistically significant difference in the 
probability of voting for Lula for beneficiaries or non-beneficiaries (Bohn 2011, 74).  According 
to Bohn’s analysis, at the individual level the effect of the program on vote choice was weaker in 
the 2006 election than other characteristics that comprised the electorate compared to 2002 
because the Bolsa Família voter was already a Lula supporter.   
Zucco and Power call this conclusion (as well as the use of recall data- see Chapter 3) 
into question by revealing a significant effect of Bolsa Família on the probability of a 2006 vote 
for Lula in their attempt to replicate Bohn’s results (Zucco and Power 2012). This significant 
effect is corroborated in the model replication below. In claiming the effect on the probability of 
Lula vote choice, the authors underline the importance of analyzing marginal effects, but do not 
conduct the analysis in the paper. A marginal effects analysis contributes a substantive 
examination of the findings, exploring the difference between recipient and non-recipient vote 
choice among low-income and low education voters. Evaluating the effect of program 
participation on the probability of political support across respondent values of income and 
education allows assessment of program participation effects on the probability of voting for 
Lula according to factors relevant to targeting. This is key, since Zucco and Power suggest that 
this probability should increase as the program drew in more supporters, generating a 
demographic shift in support toward Lula among the poor. Analyzing the marginal effect of 
program participation at low-income levels between the two elections can determine whether the 
probability of voting for Lula increased after the program was introduced. 
3.4.1.2 Venezuela  
Problems relating to the availability of recipient data may be one reason that the effect on vote 
choice of the Misiones has been understudied. None of the major examinations of the 
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mobilization elements present in the Misiones examine the effect of the programs on vote choice 
(Ellner 2009; Hawkins 2010a, 2010b; Penfold-Becerra 2008). Hawkins considers voter issue 
salience, but not program participation (Hawkins, 2010b, 115-7; 120-3). The most recent study 
on voter behavior (Lupu 2010) does not model for the Misión participation, instead focusing on 
modeling class voting. Despite the absence of a direct modeling of the relationship, indications 
exist in previous research that an electoral effect was part of the calculus of program design.   
Penfold-Becerra (2008) finds that allocation of the programs Barrio Adentro, Robinson, 
Ribas, and Mercal occurred according to differing political rationales. Barrio Adentro and Ribas 
were allocated to areas with incumbent opposition leaders, while Robinson and Mercal were 
allocated to areas with incumbent government leaders (Penfold-Becerra, 2008, 77). Hawkins 
presents evidence that the profile of education Misión recipients contrasts with the distribution of 
Mercal stores, which more heavily favored supporters (Hawkins, 2010b, 221-2). 
An electoral effect may be a result of self-selection of partisans into the programs, but is 
less important for the education Misiones than for others. Hawkins shows that highest levels of 
affect for Chávez increase the probability of participation in the food market Misión Mercal and 
medical Misión Barrio Adentro (to 60 percent and 80 respectively), and the programs were made 
available in a manner that permitted any interested individual to utilize the program. These 
programs, though intended to reach the poor, had open-door policies that resulted in no screening 
or rejecting applicants (Hawkins, 2010b, 221). 
The expected probabilities presented for the education Misiones were much lower 
compared to these other programs.  The highest levels of affect reaching a probability of 
participating stood at nearly 20 percent in Ribas and Sucre and less than 10 percent for Robinson 
(Hawkins, 2010a, 59). As identified in Chapter 1, these programs had at least nominal barriers to 
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participation, including income and family status. Factors other than affect could determine 
participation.  
The difference in self-selection suggests that estimating the electoral effect of the 
education Misiones is subject to less of an endogeneity problem since not only Chávez 
supporters participated in the programs. With fewer individuals joining the education programs 
based on support of Chávez, the chances of merely capturing Chavista support when modeling 
the effect of program participation on the probability of voting for Chávez is reduced. 
In short, for Venezuela, the there has been limited assessment of program effects, 
requiring a detailed analysis of the effect of program participation on the probability of vote 
choice. The studies identified here suggest a positive correlation of Misión distribution and 
politicization among recipients. Extension of the Bohn panel analysis to the 2007 LAPOP 
Venezuela survey provides a direct measurement of the electoral effect of the Misiones. Analysis 
of this and the Brazil model proceeds below.  
3.4.2 Model Summary 
Recently, Zucco and Power have raised concerns about three issues associated with the 
methodological choices made by Bohn, including: validity issues associated with relying on 
memory recall from 2002 and 2006 elections in the 2007 survey, replication of coding, and the 
calculation and interpretation of marginal effects (Zucco and Power 2012). In light of these 
concerns, tradeoffs in model specification choices will be discussed in the sections below. 
Detailed discussion of the recall data issue will be covered at the end of the chapter in the section 
on threats to validity.  
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Key to the analysis of the effects is assessing how the direction of targeted social 
program spending affected voter behavior. Summary statistics are reported in Tables 8 and 9. 
Table 8. Summary Statistics for "Electoral Support" Data - Brazil 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
Vote Lula 2002 570 0.753 0.432 0 1 
Vote Lula 2006 942 0.723 0.448 0 1 
Gender 1214 0.495 0.500 0 1 
Age 1212 2.932 1.583 1 6 
Income 1032 1.424 0.722 1 4 
Education Level 1214 2.503 0.722 1 4 
Sul 1214 0.152 0.359 0 1 
Centro Oeste 1214 0.079 0.270 0 1 
Nordeste 1214 0.271 0.445 0 1 
Norte 1214 0.058 0.233 0 1 
Bolsa Família Recipient 1209 1.108 0.311 1 2 
Bolsa Família *Income Interaction 1028 1.550 0.820 1 8 
Bolsa Família * Edlevel Interaction 1209 2.737 0.958 1 8 
 
 
Table 9. Summary Statistics for "Electoral Support" Data - Venezuela 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
Vote Chavez 2006 984 0.755 0.430 0 1 
Vote Deputy 2005 373 0.850 0.358 0 1 
Gender 1510 0.501 0.500 0 1 
Age 1510 2.564 1.240 1 5 
Income 1270 2.541 0.997 1 4 
Education Level 1509 1.993 0.735 0 3 
Zuliana 1510 0.167 0.373 0 1 
Occidental 1510 0.103 0.304 0 1 
Centro Occidental 1510 0.252 0.434 0 1 
Oriental 1510 0.176 0.381 0 1 
Los Llanos 1510 0.106 0.308 0 1 
Misión Recipient 1493 1.798 0.402 1 2 
Education Misión Recipient 1480 1.167 0.373 1 2 
Misión*Edlevel interaction 1492 3.552 1.517 0 6 
Mision*Income interaction 1260 4.566 1.991 1 8 
Education Misión*Edlevel interaction 1479 2.335 1.142 0 6 
Education Misión*Income interaction 1249 2.944 1.425 1 8 
Key: Age: 1 = 16–24; 2 = 25–34; 3 = 35–44; 4 = 45–59; 5 = >59; education: 1 = illiterate; 2 = up to eighth 
grade, 3 = high school, 4 = college. Income is coded in Brazilian model: 1 = up to two minimum wages (MW);  
2 = 2.1–5 MW;  3 = 5–10 MW;  4 = 10–20 MW;  5 = 20= MW. Income is coded in the Venezuelan model: 1 = 
1/2 MW; 2 = .51-1 MW; 3 = 1.1-2 MW;  4 = 2.1-4 MW;  5 > 4 MW.  
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Operationalization choices and expected relationships are described below. 
3.4.3 Dependent Variable – Vote Choice 
The dependent variable, vote choice, is the reported vote of the respondent; in the probit models, 
the probability of vote choice is analyzed. The goal of the models is to reveal whether countries 
have differential impacts on vote choice, based on institutional differences. It is expected that in 
Brazil the programmatic distributive strategy has a lower impact on the probability of vote 
choice than the parochial strategy in Venezuela. 
Analysis of the probability of vote choice is based on utilizing the questions about prior 
voting behavior in the 2007 survey in the form of a panel study. In the 2007 Brazil survey, 
questions are asked about the 2002 and 2006 second round vote for president. In the 2007 
Venezuela survey, questions are asked about the 2005 legislative elections and the 2006 vote for 
president. This allows for a panel analysis of participant political support over time.  
3.4.3.1 Coding Choices 
Coding is conducted to measure whether respondents reported voting for the incumbent, which is 
expected to be conditional on receiving the program. This is accomplished by coding reported 
votes for Lula and Chavez as 1 and other valid responses as 0. 
Coding for the presidential elections in Brazil requires careful consideration of which 
participants offer a valid answer to the question. A problem encountered in replicating the 
models Bohn employs in her analysis of 2002 and 2006 vote choice is that the author does not 
specify how the dependent variable is coded.  Coding choices for Bolsa Família are examined in 
Table 10 below. Responses for Lula (or PT) are coded 1, Alckmin (or PSDB), are coded 0. For 
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this project, responses of “no one” (nenhum) or “other” (outro) are coded 0 as non-Lula votes in 
both presidential elections, since both involve casting a vote. 
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Table 10. Dependent Variable Coding, Brazil 2002/06 
      
  
Bohn (Author's best estimate) Zucco & Power 
 
Belasco Coding Choices 
BRA VB4 (2006 2nd Round) 
 
Valid? How Coded Valid? 
How 
Coded Valid? How Coded 
Lula  678 Valid Coded as 1 Valid Coded as 1 Valid Coded as 1 
PT  3 Valid Coded as 1 Valid Coded as 1 Valid Coded as 1 
Alckmin  210 Valid Coded as 0 Valid Coded as 0 Valid Coded as 0 
PSDB  2 Valid Coded as 0 Valid Coded as 0 Valid Coded as 0 
Nenhum (branco/nulo)  37 Valid Coded as 0 Valid Coded as 0 Valid Coded as 0 
Não Lembra  42 No/ Bad information Not Coded No/ Bad information Not Coded No/ Bad information Not Coded 
Outro  12 No/ Bad information Not Coded No/ Bad information Not Coded Valid Coded as 0 
NR  21 No/ Bad information Not Coded No/ Bad information Not Coded No/ Bad information Not Coded 
Não V otou  207 Valid Not Coded No/ Bad information Not Coded No/ Bad information Not Coded 
Missing in File  2 No/ Bad information Not Coded No/ Bad information Not Coded No/ Bad information Not Coded 
Lula Votes 
  
681 
 
681 
 
681  
Nonvotes 
  
468 
 
249 
 
261 
Share Lula 
  
59.3% 
 
73.2% 
 
72.2% 
Share Nonvotes 
  
40.7% 
 
26.8% 
 
27.8% 
Total 
     
VOL3A (2002 2nd Round) 
 
Valid? How Coded Valid? 
How 
Coded Valid? How Coded 
Lula  429 Valid Coded as 1 Valid Coded as 1 Valid Coded as 1 
Serra 120 Valid Coded as 0 Valid Coded as 0 Valid Coded as 0 
Nenhum (branco/nulo)  13 Valid Coded as 0 Valid Coded as 0 Valid Coded as 0 
Não Lembro 272 No/ Bad information Not Coded No/ Bad information Not Coded No/ Bad information Not Coded 
Não V otou  2 Valid Coded as 0 No/ Bad information Not Coded No/ Bad information Not Coded 
Outro  8 Valid Coded as 0 No/ Bad information Not Coded Valid Coded as 0 
Missing in File  370 No/ Bad information Not Coded No/ Bad information Not Coded No/ Bad information Not Coded 
Lula Votes 
  
429 
 
429 
 
429 
Nonvotes 
  
143 
 
133 
 
141 
Share Lula 
  
75.0% 
 
76.3% 
 
75.3% 
Share Nonvotes 
  
25.0% 
 
23.7% 
 
24.7% 
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 Table 10 includes a liberal estimate of Bohn’s coding choices – adding abstention to nonvotes – 
in addition to Zucco and Power’s choices (Zucco and Power 2012). All possible coding outcomes, 
including coding abstention as 0, result in a significant and positive effect for Bolsa Família 
participants on the probability of voting for Lula in probit models. This suggests that there may be 
an error in the coding decision on which Bohn bases her conclusions.  
For the presidential election questions, responses for voting for Chávez or Lula are coded 1, and responses 
for opposition votes or nonvotes are coded 0. Utilizing the listing of party endorsements for Chávez and opposition 
candidates found within the survey, the responses to the legislative elections voting question are recoded into 0 for 
opposition parties or nonvotes and 1 for Chávez-aligned parties. Coding for Chávez-aligned parties is displayed in 
Table 11. 
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 Table 11. Dependent Variable Coding, Venezuela 2005/06 
 
VB 3 (2006 Presidential Vote) 
 
Valid? How Coded 
Chávez 743 Valid Coded as 1 
Rosales 194 Valid Coded as 0 
Ninguno 10 Valid Coded as 0 
Otro 37 Valid Coded as 0 
Missing in File  526 No/ Bad information Not Coded 
Chávez Votes 
  
743 
Nonvotes 
  
241 
Share Chávez 
  
75.5% 
Share Nonvotes 
  
24.5% 
    VB 7 (2005 Deputy Vote) 
 
Valid? How Coded 
Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejo boleta en blanco, o anuló su 5 No/ Bad information Not Coded 
Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR) 279 Valid Coded as 1 
Partido Patria Para Todos (PPT) 11 Valid Coded as 1 
PODEMOS 12 Valid Coded as 1 
Unidad Popular Venezolana (UPV) 3 Valid Coded as 1 
MIGATO (Movimiento Independiente Ganamos Todos) 2 Valid Coded as 1 
CMR (Clase Media Revolucionaria) 1 Valid Coded as 1 
PCV (Partido Comunista Venezolano) 4 Valid Coded as 1 
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupamaro 2 Valid Coded as 1 
Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) 3 Valid Coded as 1 
UNT (Un Nuevo Tiempo) 32 Valid Coded as 0 
Primero Justicia (PJ) 14 Valid Coded as 0 
Acción Democrática (AD) 3 Valid Coded as 0 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) 1 Valid Coded as 0 
Un solo Pueblo 1 Valid Coded as 0 
Otro 10 No/ Bad information Not Coded 
Missing 1127 No/ Bad information Not Coded 
Chávez Votes 
  
317 
Nonvotes 
  
51 
Share Chávez 
  
86.1% 
Share Nonvotes 
  
13.9% 
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 The parties coded with “1” were referred to as the Polo Patriótico, which endorsed 
Chávez in the 2006 presidential contest, representing an alignment of “new” and old left parties.  
These coding choices were used in the Assembly elections of 2005 and the presidential elections 
of 2006 (Ellner 2008; Lacruz 2006; Lyne 2008; Mundo 2009).  
3.4.4 Independent Variable of Principal Interest– Program Participation 
Program participation is inquired of individuals in each of the LAPOP surveys. In Venezuela, the 
education Misión participation is aggregated from a listing of specific educational Misiones. The 
program participation variable is coded 1 (non-participants) and 2 (participants) in order to 
facilitate the examination of the multiplicative interaction. Program participation is expected to 
determine vote choice. 
3.4.5 Independent Variables: Controls: Income and Education 
Income and education, two targeting criteria for Bolsa Família and the education Misiones are 
expected to have a negative effect on the probability of voting for Lula and Chávez, as individuals 
with lower status are expected to have a higher probability of support. To remain consistent with 
Bohn’s coding, education and incomes are coded categorically.6 In marginal effects analysis, 
lower values are expected to be plausible for participating in the antipoverty programs, though 
this expectation should be relaxed partly for those individuals seeking college education in Misión 
Sucre, as few members of the poor are expected to qualify. In Venezuela, Lupu (2010) suggests 
6 Education: 1 = illiterate; 2 = up to eighth grade, 3 = high school, 4 = college. Income is coded in Brazilian model: 1 
= up to two minimum wages (MW);  2 = 2.1–5 MW;  3 = 5–10 MW;  4 = 10–20 MW;  5 = 20= MW. Income is 
coded in the Venezuelan model: 1 = 1/2 MW; 2 = .51-1 MW; 3 = 1.1-2 MW;  4 = 2.1-4 MW;  5 > 4 MW. 
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 that Chávez has seen gains among the middle class during his presidency, and this may be 
revealed in analysis of the Misiones.  
3.4.6 Interaction Terms – Income and Education with Program Participation 
To establish a baseline analysis of whether leaders receive electoral support from the distribution 
of benefits, measures of income and education are interacted with program participation. This 
allows conditional analysis including examination of non-recipients: the interactive model shows 
those that did not participate in the program, providing a baseline analysis for the probability of 
electoral support for Lula and Chávez. The interaction variable also shows the effect of income 
and education for only recipients, providing a conditional analysis of each effect compared 
against non-recipients.  This reveals which factor – income or education – is more important to 
explaining overall vote choice, informing the overall analysis. It is expected that both the income–
program participation and education–program participation variables will have a positive effect 
on the probability of leadership vote choice.  
3.4.7 Other Control Variables 
In order to reconstruct the Bohn’s model, replication of coding is conducted for respondent 
gender, age, income, education, and regional effects. Together these variables provide baseline 
predictors of vote choice among populations, taking into account characteristics of voters in the 
survey. Gender is coded dichotomously (with 1 = male), and in both Brazil and Venezuelan 
models the expected relationship is that male voters support the leaders. Age is coded 
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 categorically like the other variables in the model.7 It is anticipated that younger voters support 
Lula and Chávez. 
 Regional dummy variables are coded as well. While Bohn does not find that being from 
any region of Brazil significantly determines voter support of Lula, it remains likely that the 
Northeast and Southeast are regions that generate support for the president. In Venezuela, survey 
data suggests that voters in the Andina, Guyana, Los Llanos, Occidental, and Oriental regions are 
likeliest to support Chávez (Centro Gumilla 2012). 
3.4.8 Marginal Effects Analysis 
For marginal effects, Zucco and Power acknowledge the recommendations made by King, Tomz 
and Wittenberg (2000) to present data across relevant quantities of interest, though neither they 
nor Bohn evaluate the effects of recipient status in this manner (Zucco and Power 2012). In this 
study, marginal effects are estimated and interpreted for Bolsa Família and Misión recipients and 
non-recipients across values of interest for key variables, education and income, two important 
aspects of socioeconomic status that impact class effects vote choice and Bolsa Família 
participation. Marginal effects analysis is also conducted to examine the effects of the 
multiplicative interaction models to assess non-recipient support and the conditional effect of 
income and education of program participants on the probability of support for Lula and Chávez. 
7 Age: 1 = 16–24; 2 = 25–34; 3 = 35–44; 4 = 45–59; 5 = >59. 
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3.5 BIAS AND RELIABILITY 
In this section, potential sources of bias and error are identified, followed by a discussion of how 
they could affect the findings of this study. They include the reliability of data collected during 
the 2007 LAPOP wave in Brazil, and limits to conclusions about political targeting based on 
analysis of data collected at the state level. Efforts to check the reliability of the recall data, and 
suggestions for future research steps to increase the number of observations are included in the 
sections below. 
3.5.1 Reliability of Recall Data 
Zucco and Power suggest in their criticism to abandon analysis on the 2007 LAPOP survey given 
the distortions they argue are present in the data. Yet for the exercise explored here, examining 
the effect of Bolsa Família program participation on vote choice, this is only necessary if 
systematic distortions in the data affect on the probability of Lula support. No attempt is made to 
gather wider conclusions about a shift in Lula’s constituency, as discussed in Bohn (Bohn 2011). 
The analysis below suggests that abandoning the survey altogether is unnecessary. 
Zucco and Power criticize the reliability of responses from 9-10 months after the 2006 
election and 5 years after the 2002 election (Zucco and Power 2013, 10). In terms of assessing 
recall data, the authors report that doing so is “notoriously unreliable,” drawing on examples in 
related disciplines of psychology and economics.8 The authors also describe civic research that 
8 Examples from other disciplines include underreporting time out of work by unemployed individuals, age 
(earliness) at which a parent’s child reaches developmental milestones, and party identification (Dex 1995). 
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 acknowledges that reporting bias is nonrandom and favors preferences to demonstrate: civic 
engagement, a desire to show consistency with behavior at time of recall, and association with 
successful politicians (Himmelweit, Biberian, and Stockdale 1978; Zucco and Power 2013). 
Research in reporting bias shows that it occurs in the “socially desirable direction” for political 
participation (Presser and Traugott 1992; Zucco and Power 2013).  
Where should overreporting surface in survey results? Zucco and Power ignore an 
important caveat of the research: Presser and Traugott acknowledge the likelihood for reporting 
bias distortions to be stronger for both the better educated and more interested (Presser and 
Traugott 1992). This is particularly relevant to the analysis of voting behavior for a leftist 
politician such as Lula, since the tendency to overreport participation is likelier to occur among 
individuals who do not typically support leftists. Overreporting support for Lula should weaken 
the effect of Bolsa Família recipients on voters.   
Overall response rate in the 2007 LAPOP is biased in support of Lula with estimates of 
support exceeding the actual electoral and poll results (Zucco and Power 2013). Interpreting the 
likelihood among those overreporting to be biased in favor of Lula involves reasoning through 
whether the groups that overreport voting for Lula would have an effect on vote choice. Bias 
among the interested does not suggest a direction; bias among the among the well-educated 
should weaken the effect, as those of high socioeconomic status support an alternative to the 
leftist candidate.  
Given the identification of groups that could potentially bias the response, it is important 
to examine empirically how these factors influence the LAPOP 2007 data. Combining the two 
effects – underrepresentation of Bolsa Família and overreporting Lula votes according to social 
desirability – should suggest a weaker program effect on vote choice.  
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 Bolsa Família recipient status should generate interest, but program participation rates in 
the 2007 LAPOP data are considered to be, at most, slightly underrereported compared to the 
level of coverage at the time (Zucco and Power 2013). The program could demonstrate a smaller 
effect on vote choice as a result of underrepresentation of the population of recipients.  
The effect of social desirability on vote recall could also bias the data, as those who 
respond incorrectly or misremember tend to be of higher status. This could reduce the effect of 
program participation on vote choice by exaggerating the effect of income or education on 
support for Lula. By estimating the probability of support across the values of these variables, 
potential bias is revealed in education, compared to other surveys, but not income. In Chapter 4, 
marginal effects analysis of the 2007 LAPOP survey is used to examine this effect on the 
probability of vote choice. Doing so allows for insight into whether a distortion impacts the data 
in the survey. The models show a negative effect for income among recipients and non-recipients 
on the probability of voting for Lula for income. In models where education is interacted with 
program participation, a positive effect is shown for the probability of support among both 
recipients and non-recipients, meaning that increases in education level show increases in the 
probability of Lula support. The education interaction is not significant, showing there is no 
nonrandom relationship between education and the probability of a Lula vote choice. 
Analysis of other survey data conducted at the time (Vox Populi, 2006) by Zucco and 
Power shows a negative effect of education and income on the probability of voting for Lula 
(Zucco and Power 2013). Models that examine the interaction of education and program 
participation show the distortion that Zucco and Power describe, and suggest that modeling the 
relationship on income is a superior choice.  
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 While overall presidential support in Brazil is biased toward Lula as compared to electoral 
outcomes, the socioeconomic elements of the survey reflect the political reality of Brazil in 2006. 
Their effects are corroborated through analysis of other survey data collected at the time and 
compared in detail within the LAPOP data. The pro-Lula bias should weaken the effect of Bolsa 
Família, and analysis in Chapter 4 reveals that the effect of the program is a significant 
determinant of vote choice in the 2006 election. 
3.5.2 Limitations to Targeting Analysis  
Because targeting distributions are made available in state-by-state releases, the evaluation of 
strategy faces limitations that finer-level evaluations may avoid. Data availability concerns are 
present, particularly in the Venezuela case where the government does not report on these 
programs in a regular manner. Because of this limitation the evaluation is conducted for cash 
transfers for Misión Sucre and Ribas but not for Robinson, where data were unavailable. Even 
with a reduced number of observations, the distribution is still assessed over 25 states in 
Venezuela, and 27 in Brazil. This provides an adequate number of observations for the degrees of 
freedom of the model developed to determine whether the programs reach groups in opposition- 
or government- aligned territories. Future analysis of the Brazil case could complement the 
targeting strategy assessment, permitting an examination of additional control effects beyond the 
demographic controls included in the present analysis. 
The reliability and bias problems identified here can threaten the reliability of the analysis. 
However, the measures that have been taken to ensure that the analysis accurately reflects reality 
present acceptable solutions to the problems identified here. This chapter now proceeds to an 
assessment of theoretical validity.  
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 3.6 VALIDITY 
As this dissertation offers a novel method to analyze the interaction between the legislature and 
executive for the introduction of antipoverty policy, as well as how to measure the parochial and 
programmatic outcomes of such policies, attention must be given to the issue of theoretical 
validity of the project. The concepts of validity are identified in Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 
(2002) include: conclusion validity, internal validity, construct validity, and external validity. 
Each is identified and discussed below.  
3.6.1 Conclusion Validity 
Conclusion validity examines the presence of a relationship between the variables examined in 
the analysis. For the quantitative portion of the research, the results of the probit and targeting 
model analyses will clearly indicate whether there is a nonrandom relationship between the 
independent variables and the probability of vote choice. For the case study portion, efforts are 
made to show robustness of the relationship by examining the policy preferences of government 
and opposition actors to show what shape the programs could have taken, had the effect not been 
present. 
3.6.2 Internal Validity 
Internal validity assesses whether there is a causal relationship between the variables identified in 
the analysis. Steps to ensure internal validity are taken by assessing a range of predictions, 
including whether an effect exists between the strategies employed and the political outcomes 
 99 
 predicted in cases examined. This is conducted by assessing whether the theoretical predictions 
are consistent with the outcomes of the statistical model, revealing an effect of program 
distribution on vote choice. To the extent that the analysis supports the effect in the empirical 
record in the two country cases analyzed, the author can assert the internal validity of the 
findings. 
3.6.3 Construct Validity 
The primary concern introduced in the concept of construct validity is whether it is acceptable to 
claim that the theoretical constructs are operationalized by the variables in an accurate and fair 
manner. The variables measuring program participation and vote choice capture the effect under 
analysis: whether program participation impacts the probability of electoral support for incumbent 
politicians. Issues of bias are addressed above, but are not concluded to be problematic for 
analysis. Observed measures would be superior to stated preferences of support, given potential 
for social desirability bias, but in the context of secret ballot, this is not possible.  
Measuring the interaction between the executive and legislative branches includes 
assessment of: constitutional powers, executive popularity, share of parties in the legislature, 
coalition structure, and party system stability. These concepts are employed the institutional 
literature assessing powers of executives and legislatures. The degree of program moderation is 
subject to how government and opposition political preferences are incorporated into the 
programs. Since the degree of oversight matters to seriously check clientelism, the measurement 
is reserved for the targeting model. Here, accounts of serious oversight provide the detail of the 
outcomes of the political interaction. 
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 Choices regarding operationalization of the targeting model involve measuring political 
targeting by directly examining political support in states, and whether elected officials are 
aligned with the incumbent or the opposition. Measuring program oversight involves program-
relevant demographic variables, since programs are aimed at alleviating poverty, and increasing 
educational opportunities for targeted populations. Abstracting to the identification of program 
distribution strategy, such as: core, opposition, turnout boosting, and support of close races 
involves assessing the distributions reach these populations. Marginal effects analysis reflects a 
direct measure of the number of beneficiaries of program targeting according to these political 
criteria. The concepts identified here are shown in Chapter 2 as developed in the literature. 
3.6.4 External Validity 
External validity refers to whether the causal effect can be generalized to other cases. Because the 
project models the interaction between the executive and legislature, the theory developed within 
this dissertation only applies to presidential systems where targeted social programs are 
employed. Employing a model of delegation between these two governmental branches, and 
examining issues of horizontal accountability between the two limits the analysis to states where 
both institutions are present.  
Targeted social policy is defined as those redistributive programs that are selective in their 
application and that employ a measure to determine eligibility according to criteria specified in 
advance by policymaking institutions. By establishing criteria, these programs are distinguishable 
from universalist programs for which all citizens are eligible. Such criteria can include conditions 
recipients must meet to be initially eligible for, or to remain eligible for social programs, such as a 
means test, or behavioral requirements such as: child school enrollment and vaccination 
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 requirements (Mkandawire, 2005, 7). The definition of targeted social programs is wider than that 
of conditional cash transfers (CCTs), which would include both forms of criteria identified above. 
Some targeted programs do not include the progressive implementation of eligibility criteria such 
as the ones identified above, and instead focus on whether individuals meet initial eligibility 
criteria over time.  
Based on these two eligibility criteria, lessons from this model are generalizable to nearly 
all of the 30 countries that employ CCTs, except Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Pakistan, and 
Yemen, but are not exclusive to these, as other presidential systems employ targeted social 
programs (Fiszbein et al. 2009; Mkandawire 2005). 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents a research design to assess the ways that leaders politicize targeted social 
programs. In doing so, it offers a mixed-methods approach, identifying statistical analysis to 
assess the degree of the political effect and country cases to assess both the political interactions 
that result on program design and the nature of political targeting. It introduces data sources, the 
statistical model employed in Chapter 4, the key components of the case study approach 
employed in Chapter 5, and the mixed methodology employed in the targeting analysis in Chapter 
6. It assesses matters of bias and error and the validity of the theory developed. The project 
proceeds in Chapters 4-6 by offering an empirical record as defined by the choices made in the 
current chapter. 
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 4.0  DISTRIBUTIONAL OUTCOMES OF BOLSA FAMÍLIA AND THE EDUCATION 
MISIONES 
This chapter investigates expenditures and distributional outcomes of Brazil's Bolsa Família, and 
Venezuela's education-oriented Misiones. It presents the program design, expenditures, and 
distribution of program benefits. Bolsa Família and the education Misiones reveal different 
expenditure patterns, both in terms of the overall program expenditure and in the distributional 
outcomes described above. These aspects reveal the degree to which enforcement of a patron-
client relationship exists with the programs, offering evidence that the latter is parochial while the 
former is more programmatic.  
Combining oversight, expenditure, and distribution analyses yields the following 
conclusions about Bolsa Família and the education Misiones: the variation in distributional 
patterns in the two programs suggest political factors are more important in Venezuela than in 
Brazil, where targeting is determined by program inclusion factors such as poverty. Bolsa Família 
reflects a programmatic targeting strategy while the education Misiones show a parochial strategy. 
In Brazil, this programmatic targeting strategy is revealed through steady increases in 
expenditures and program enrollment, revealing a moderation in program expenditures reflective 
of strong program oversight. The distribution of expenditures has been oriented toward turnout 
boosting over time as rule-based inclusion criteria predominates the effects of electoral 
considerations when analyzed together. Over the decade, the distributions first show limited 
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 support for opposition-aligned states in 2002, then show peak differences between the two 
categories in 2006 as the distribution shifts to Lula-aligned states for the rest of the decade. The 
models provide evidence that inclusion criteria – poverty – is a chief determinant of the program 
rather than political criteria. This programmatic distribution does not reveal enforcement of a 
patron-client relationship.  
In Venezuela, this parochial targeting strategy is revealed through unsteady expenditure 
patterns that coincide with initial rollout periods and attempts to reinvigorate flagging programs. 
The distribution of expenditures varied by program: Misión Sucre becas were oriented toward 
core voters in 2004 and 2007, and in 2010 they reversed to target opposition voters. Sucre Aldea 
targeting favored Chávez-aligned states in nearly all measures in 2007 and 2010. Ribas beca 
distributions favored opposition-aligned states according to 2004 contests. The program 
distributions show a parochial distribution strategy: they offered no evidence that distribution 
occurred according to poverty inclusion criteria, and divisions according to political criteria reveal 
the enforcement of a patron-client relationship. 
The chapter proceeds with analysis of Bolsa Família and the Misiones through program 
design, expenditure, and distribution. The conclusion follows.  
4.1 BOLSA FAMÍLIA IN BRAZIL 
The case below presents analysis of Bolsa Família program oversight, expenditures, and targeting 
strategies based on secondary program accounts and government releases of social spending and 
beneficiary family counts. Examining the number of beneficiary families permits examination of 
the distribution of program resources according to political and program-relevant demographic 
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 factors through regression and marginal effects analysis. This analysis extends Fried’s (2012) 
assessment of Bolsa Família by providing marginal effects analysis according to political factors 
over the decade. Analysis of the distributions reveals a programmatic targeting strategy that 
shows rule-based inclusion criteria were a greater determinant than political factors in the 
distribution of program benefits. Below an account of program oversight is offered. 
 
4.1.1 Program Oversight 
The initiation of Bolsa Família resulted in the creation of the new ministry, the MDS, to 
administer of the program through its Secretaria Nacional de Renda de Cidadania (Senarc – 
National Secretariat for Citizenship Income) (Cunha, 2008, 16). The program established 
conditions for receiving Bolsa Família, including: vaccination and regular health check-ups and 
enrollment and school attendance  (85 percent)  for children, and for mothers, maternal care and 
health and nutrition seminars, as well as maintaining contact with the school and local program 
coordinator if the child changes schools (Lindert, Linder, Hobbs, & Brière, 2007, 18). Different 
transfer levels were based on a means test for family income, with ceilings for very poor: R$60 
(US$30) and moderately poor: R$120 (US$ 60).9 Benefits received for each level (depending on 
number of children per family ranged from R$50-95 to R$15-45 for the respective income 
categories (Lindert et al., 2007, 15-17). A variable adolescent benefit was later added that allowed 
the maximum transfer to rise to R$172 (US$ 104) (Cunha, 2008, 8).  
9 Initially the figures were R$50-R$100 for the income categories, but these were revised upward in 2006  (Cunha, 
2008, 8) 
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 The MDS coordinated the program but devolved evaluation of conditions to ministries 
specializing in the respective areas: health and education conditions were monitored through the 
Ministries of Health and Education. The management of the registry and transfer of funds were 
conducted through the Caixa Economica Federal (federally controlled savings bank), though in 
Brasilia, funds were transferred through the Banco de Brasilia (Lindert et al., 2007, 21).  
Municipalities were responsible for implementing aspects such as local coordination, registration 
of potential recipients of the Cadastro Único, monitoring health and education conditions, linking 
program beneficiaries to other services and establishing social control councils (Lindert et al. 
2007). State governments were responsible for support, training, complementary services, and 
identity documentation for families registered (Lindert et al. 2007). These included the Vida 
Melhor program offered by the Distrito Federal government in the state of Brasilia, which 
provided a complementary transfer of resources to extend additional benefits to qualified 
recipients  
MDS established oversight mechanisms, which included performance-based measures to 
minimize program leakages and clientelistic distribution of benefits. These included the Cadastro 
Único, which provided a single registry to access the programs. Targeting and registration was 
conducted through this mechanism, which was contracted to Caixa performance evaluation basis 
(Lindert et al., 2007, 36, 42). The Cadastro Único was inherited from Bolsa Escola, but 2005 
changes to the management of the program established MDS monitoring, which allowed for 
improved correction of errors (Lindert et al., 2007, 42). The MDS also incentivized municipality 
performance with administrative cost transfers based on the Índice de Gestão Descentralizada 
(IGD – Decentralized Management Index), and on having signed the Termos de Adesão (joint 
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 management agreement). Favorable scores on the IGD resulted in partial reimbursement for 
implementation costs for the program (Lindert et al., 2007, 27).  
Use of the oversight mechanisms, enforceable contracts and participation conditions 
established Bolsa Família as a rule-based program reflecting clientelism concerns and ensuring 
delivery of the benefit to the constituents that fit the program criteria. This effort received 
renewed focus after debate over program conditions discussed in Chapter 5 was resolved, 
reestablishing rigorous program controls. This enabled steady program expansion, and the 
continued enforcement of eligibility criteria ensured participants were included based on need.  
4.1.2 Program Expenditures 
Spending for Bolsa Família increased steadily as the program expanded. The program’s 
expansion coincided with efficiency gains from the combination of multiple programs into one. 
Program funding was dedicated up to 2007 through a public health tax initiated by Cardoso. From 
that point onward, the program has had to rely on alternative budgeting sources.  
Figure 2 presents Bolsa Família and pre-program spending data from the MDS, the 
Controladoria-Geral da União (CGU), Cunha (2008) and Hall (2006). Social Assistance 
spending data from CGU annual reports on the MDS is presented for comparison.  
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Figure 2. Bolsa Família and Social Assistance Spending 2001-11 
 
 
The amount of funds spent on Bolsa Família reflects overall about half of the amount 
spent on the Social Assistance programs. Bolsa Família spending increased from 1.8 percent-2.4 
percent of total federal spending from 2004-11, while Social Assistance spending increased from 
5.4 percent to 6.3 percent total federal spending over the same period. 
Evaluating Bolsa Família spending is easiest when taken as a share of government 
spending, though it is important to acknowledge the small share of overall consumption the 
program undertakes. As a share of federal government spending Bolsa Família increases from 
2004 (1.8 percent of total federal spending, over R$5.53 billion) to 2011 levels (2.4 percent of 
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 total federal spending, over R$17 billion). The data indicates a steady increase for Bolsa Família 
spending from the 2004 program launch, and an increase in spending compared to data available 
for the 2001-3 preprogram spending on Bolsa Escola, Auxílio Gas, and Bolsa Alimentação. 
Comparing overall Bolsa Família spending to program funds disbursed to beneficiaries, spending 
converges over the period of 2003-6 as management activities improved and duplicate functions 
were eliminated. This reveals that the managerial and oversight changes to the program resulted 
in real gains to the amount of resources available for distribution.  
4.1.3 Program Distribution 
Analyzing the distribution of program targeting requires the analysis of political and program-
relevant demographic variables to determine their effect on the number of Bolsa Família recipient 
families in different states in Brazil. Table 12 and Figures 2-4 display the results of regression 
models and marginal effects analysis for the number of Bolsa Família recipient families. Data are 
compiled from various years of the Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social Matriz da Informação 
Social (MDS Various Years) for recipients and MDS (2006-2010) and IPEA (2004) measures of 
poverty. The model examines the following political determinants: the 2002-2010 presidential 
and governor elections. The model includes a measure of the status of whether the governor is 
Lula- or opposition-aligned. The demographic determinants include statewide measures of: total 
primary school enrollment rates for each state for each year, an estimate from IPEA of families 
living under the poverty line (2004) and membership in the Cadastro Único (2006, 2010), and an 
estimate of population.  
Marginal effects analysis evaluates the number of transfers provided for Bolsa Família 
participants over increasing values of electoral support, holding other determinants at their means. 
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 The distribution of recipient families is analyzed by providing an estimate for both Lula-and 
opposition-aligned states according to coalition alignment of governors. The difference between 
the estimates reveals the effect of political alignment on recipient family distribution. In the plots 
below, the slope of the estimated values shows the attention to close or landslide races: a negative 
slope reveals targeting of close races (increasing numbers of recipient families as electoral 
support is lower), while a positive slope reveals targeting of landslide races (increasing numbers 
of recipient families as electoral support increases). While the models and plots are conducted 
with dependent variables transformed by natural logarithm, the estimates are transformed from 
the log values to actual values in the narrative below.  
4.1.3.1 Bolsa Família Model 
Table 12 displays the results of the Bolsa Família models 1-6, in which effects of the political and 
demographic variables on the distribution of recipient families are evaluated. Marginal effects 
analysis is conducted to compare the overall distribution of becas in states with Lula- and 
opposition-aligned governors, and these are shown in Figures 2-4 below. The models are 
examined below, followed by the marginal effects analysis. 
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 Table 12. Bolsa Família Distribution Analysis 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  
Bolsa 
Família 
Recipients 
2002 (Log) 
Bolsa 
Família 
Recipients 
2002 (Log) 
Bolsa 
Família 
Recipients 
2006 (Log) 
Bolsa 
Família 
Recipients 
2006 (Log) 
Bolsa 
Família 
Recipients 
2010 (Log) 
Bolsa 
Família 
Recipients 
2010 (Log) 
Governor Vote 2002 -0.499 
     
 
(2.170) 
     Presidential Vote 2002 0.727 
    
  
(0.693) 
    Governor Vote 2006 
 
-1.734** 
   
   
(0.583) 
   Presidential Vote 2006 
  
0.933 
  
    
(1.263) 
  Governor Vote 2010 
   
0.528 
 
     
(0.510) 
 Presidential Vote 2010 
    
0.354 
      
(0.994) 
PT-Aligned Governor 0.0123 -0.131 0.533† 0.288 0.0315 0.153 
 
(0.295) (0.318) (0.292) (0.330) (0.196) (0.166) 
Share of Low-income Families 7.463*** 7.162*** 10.84* 3.890 3.805*** 3.793*** 
 
(1.830) (1.761) (4.513) (4.969) (0.859) (0.882) 
Share of Population Enrolled in Primary School -22.15 -30.12# -33.63 -26.45 -39.48* -35.00# 
 
(19.63) (18.84) (26.46) (35.69) (14.92) (20.41) 
Log of Population 1.086*** 1.093*** 1.111*** 1.070*** 0.990*** 0.980*** 
 
(0.113) (0.111) (0.100) (0.132) (0.0836) (0.106) 
Constant -4.225* -4.438* -3.882* -3.827† -1.389 -1.413 
 
(1.925) (1.800) (1.796) (2.137) (1.363) (1.401) 
       Observations 27 27 27 27 27 27 
R-squared 0.817 0.826 0.867 0.816 0.877 0.872 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1, # p<0.15 
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 The key outcome revealed in Table 12 is that throughout the decade poverty, a program-
relevant targeting criterion, is a more consistent determinant of the distribution of program 
benefits than political criteria, though important trends emerge from the analysis of political 
distributions. Overall, the model fit is strong, ranging from an r-squared of 0.816 (for Model 4 - 
2006 presidential vote 2006 recipients) to 0.877 (for Model 5 - 2010 governor vote 2010 
recipient families. Below the political and demographic criteria are discussed. 
The models show two periods of political influence: early on in the decade, the program 
does not appear to target according to political criteria. As the decade proceeds, the program 
shifted to targeting core voters in landslide contests. The 2006 and 2010 presidential elections 
and the 2010 governor election each show this as a consistent outcome.  
The level of electoral support has a positive effect on the number of recipient families in 
Models 2 and 4-6, while negative effects on the level of electoral support occur in Models 1 and 
3. Targeting favored landslide races in the 2002, 2006, and 2010 presidential elections and the 
2010 governor vote. Close races were favored in the 2002 and 2006 governor elections, and the 
measure is significant in the 2002 governor vote (at the p < .01 level). No landslide determinant is 
significant in the models presented here.   
In Model 2 there is a negative effect on the number of families receiving benefits in states 
with Lula-aligned governors. In Models 1, and 3-6 the models reveal positive effect of Lula-
aligned governors on the number of families receiving benefits in states. Only the measure in 
Model 3 – the 2006 governor election measure – is significant, but the marginal effects analysis 
below shows sizable differences at times between the two groups of states, particularly for the 
effects of the 2006 governor and 2010 presidential races on the number of recipient families.   
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 The models also examine areas of program- relevant demographic influence, which yield 
consistent evidence for one aspect of program targeting: poverty has a significant positive 
relationship in all models, and is the most consistent determinant of all variables in each model. 
The enrollment variable shows a significant positive relationship with the number of recipient 
families in the 2004 elections but at other times this variable was negative. There is a clear 
indication that recipient families were targeted with an antipoverty focus, though enrollment 
shows less of a consistent impact.  
The number of families living in poverty has a positive and significant effect on the 
number of statewide Bolsa Família families throughout Models 1-3 and 5-6. For models 1-2 and 
5-6 the effect is significant (at the p < .001 level) and for models 3, the effect is significant (at the 
p < .05 level). The strength and persistence of this effect is worth noting in comparison to other 
variables in the model. Controlling for other factors, Bolsa Família recipients are families living 
under the poverty line, which is consistent with descriptions of program oversight above. 
The number of individuals enrolled in basic education has a consistent negative effect for 
each model. The program is organized to remedy lower enrollment, so a negative relationship is 
consistent with expectations: more recipient families are located in states with a lower number of 
individuals enrolled. The measure is statistically significant in Model 5, (at the p < .05 level), and 
is also associated in Models 2 and 6 with the level of recipient families just beyond traditional 
alpha levels (p < .15). 
Population has a positive and significant effect on the number of statewide becas for all 
models (at the p < .001 level). This means that the program distribution is appropriate for the 
population of each state. 
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 Comparing political and demographic variables, poverty is the most consistent 
determinant. Evaluating the influence of each of these variables on recipient family distribution 
allows comparison of individual determinants. The marginal effects analysis below permits 
substantive examination of the political determinants, comparing the distribution according to 
Lula- and opposition-aligned states across relevant levels of electoral support for the PT. 
4.1.3.2 Bolsa Família Marginal Effects 
This section provides substantive analysis of the models above, particularly the effect of 
increasing values of electoral support for the PT on the number of Bolsa Família recipient 
families, holding other variables at their means. The distribution is compared between states with 
Lula- and opposition-aligned governors, and closeness in political contests is evaluated. Figures 
3-4 below depict these comparisons.  
The key trend revealed in the figures below is that, holding other values at their means, 
the distribution of recipient families changes over time to Lula- aligned states. Early on, 
negligible differences exist between pro-Lula and opposition states, but as the decade progressed, 
Bolsa Família benefits were distributed to families to Lula-aligned states, though the size of the 
effect varies between presidential and governor races in 2006 and 2010, and in 2006 the direction 
of targeting is indeterminate, as it varies between close and landslide races.  
Taken in context with the significance of the determinants of targeting in the models 
above, the marginal effects estimates reveal a limited effect for the political outcomes, 
particularly in light of the consistency of the effect of program-relevant demographic variables 
on targeting over time. What begins as a programmatic distribution remains so throughout the 
decade, but the distribution also reveals political consequences. 
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Figure 3. Bolsa Família Distributions, 2004 
 
Figure 3 shows on the y-axis the distribution of recipient families 2004 in states with 
Lula- and opposition-aligned governors, holding other values at their means. There is no clear 
pattern that emerges from the 2002 elections on the 2004 data: the differences are revealed to be 
negligible between Lula- and opposition- aligned states, with a larger difference occurring in the 
governor election.  
The estimates for the 2002 governor election reveal the number of recipient families in 
opposition-aligned states was greater by 10 percent (14,535 more families). The estimates for the 
2002 presidential election reveal the number of becas in Lula-aligned states was greater by just 1 
percent (1945 more families). Comparing the slopes for the first and second contests, the 
governor election reveals support for landslide targeting while the presidential election shows 
support for closeness. There is no clear electoral targeting trend among the 2002 electoral data, 
as both core and opposition targeting is revealed, as well as support for close and landslide 
targeting. 
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Figure 4. Bolsa Família Distributions, 2006 
 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of recipient families in 2006 in states with Lula- and 
opposition-aligned governors, holding other values at their means. Comparing against the 2006 
electoral contests, pro-Lula distributions are revealed for program benefits, though the effect of 
closeness is unclear.   
The estimates for the 2006 governor election show peak differences with the number of 
recipient families in Lula-aligned states greater by 70 percent (141,062 more families). The 
estimates for the 2006 presidential election reveal the number of recipient families in Lula-
aligned states was greater by 32 percent (53,602 more families). In the governor contest the 
negative slope shows that states with lower levels of electoral support have more recipient 
families, though in the presidential contest, the slope is reversed, revealing support for landslide 
races. The two trends reveal core voter targeting, but neither the closeness nor landslide 
strategies are confirmed. 
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Figure 5. Bolsa Família Distributions, 2010 
 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of becas administered in 2010 in states with Lula- and 
opposition-aligned governors, holding other values at their means. Comparing against the 2010 
contests, pro-Dilma distributions are revealed for program benefits, with a clear effect for 
landslide states.  
The estimates for the 2010 governor election reveal the number of recipient families in 
Lula -aligned states was greater by 3 percent (7,661). The estimates for the 2010 presidential 
election reveal the number of recipient families in Lula-aligned states was greater by 17 percent 
(41,601). In both the governor and presidential election, the positive slopes show that states with 
higher levels of electoral support have more recipient families. The distribution of benefits 
reveals core voter targeting supporting landslide elections. 
Overall, the distribution of program benefits changes to support Lula (and Dilma) over 
the course of the decade, with limited support for landslide elections occurring in 2010. In 2004, 
no single trend emerges for the production of political support among constituents, holding other 
variables at their means. In 2006 and 2010 the program favors the PT consistently but the 
strength of the effect varies between governor and presidential elections. In 2006, the program 
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 strongly targets core voters though it is unclear whether the distribution favors close or landslide 
contests. In 2010, the program targets core voters, particularly landslide elections. Comparing 
with the examination of the models above, this appears to be the product of the program’s focus 
on program-relevant antipoverty determinants. 
4.1.4 Summing Up 
Regression and marginal effects analysis of Bolsa Família reveals that over the course of the 
decade, the program produced some of the political targeting techniques under analysis: core 
voters were reached in the 2006 and 2010 elections, where the number of program beneficiaries 
exceeded those in opposition states.  However, it did so by consistently prioritizing a program-
relevant demographic criterion: poverty. The count of families living in poverty was the most 
constituent predictor of the distribution of program benefits over the decade. This was an 
institutionalized component of Bolsa Família, and was a rigorously evaluated element of 
participant eligibility. It was shown to be a better predictor than basic education enrollment – 
another program element – across the models. The poverty result suggests that the program was 
distributed according to programmatic criteria.   
The program distributions revealed in analysis of Bolsa Família reflect a programmatic 
distributive strategy. The number of families living in poverty proves to be a consistent 
determinant, indicating the strong relationship between the program conditionalities and the 
distribution of benefits, limiting the patron-client relationship. The strength of the oversight is 
substantiated in the case study section above. The positive electoral effect shown Chapter 4 for 
program recipients on support for Lula and affiliated parties can be attributed to the 
programmatic focus of Bolsa Família. Comparing the political and demographic criteria, the 
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 antipoverty focus of the program can be credited with producing political support by boosting 
turnout among participants that were not part of the political system. The program delivered 
social benefits, which yielded political ones for Lula.  
4.2  THE EDUCATION MISIONES IN VENEZUELA 
The case below presents analysis of education Misión program oversight, expenditures, and 
targeting strategy based on secondary program accounts and government releases of social 
spending and program beneficiaries. Examining the cash-transfer component of the education 
Misiones provides a measure of distribution to individuals – becas – to be analyzed according to 
political and program-relevant demographic factors through regression and marginal effects 
analysis.  Becas are a only part of these programs, but since data transparency and availability 
problems make complete analysis of these Misiones difficult, the limited government state-by-
state releases of recipient data allow for analysis of the distribution of program resources in the 
Misión Sucre program.  
The analysis below extends the work of Penfold-Becerra (2008), Hawkins (2010) and 
Hawkins, Rosas and Johnson (2011), showing with marginal effects analysis that over the 
decade, becas have distinct political distributions. Penfold-Becerra found political effects in 
targeting of Misiones Ribas, Mercal, and Barrio Adentro (Penfold-Becerra 2008, 77). Hawkins 
found that compared to 2000 electoral results, Ribas and Sucre had expected distributions into 
areas that were between 50 and 60 percent supportive Chávez, making it less likely that those 
interested in the personalistic appeal of Chávez could participate in the programs (Hawkins, 
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 2010b, 221). This distribution was less Chávez-aligned than other Misión Mercal, which was 
made available in increasingly more Chávez-aligned areas (Hawkins, 2010b, 221). 
This analysis extends assessment of the political effect on the distribution of Misión 
Ribas and Sucre becas with a longitudinal analysis of distribution in Chávez-aligned states, as 
well as the distribution of Aldeas and Community Centers. Analysis of the distributions reveals a 
parochial targeting strategy that shows rule-based inclusion criteria were less of a determinant 
than political factors in the distribution of program benefits. Below, an account of program 
oversight is offered. 
4.2.1 Program Oversight 
The Chávez government initiated the Misiones in a series of executive decrees, announcing 
extraordinary plans to reach individuals excluded from traditional education systems, including 
adults and the poor. These decrees bypassed the legislature in the creation of the programs, and 
funding for the initial program push was allocated from state-owned Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. 
(PDVSA) resources. Over time, as the government gained a loyal legislature, the programs were 
further institutionalized, through a ley habilitante that allowed a decree to establish formal legal 
status and regular budgeting to the foundations that managed the programs. As described in 
Chapter Five, the programs were declared successful in the authorizing legislation, which 
conflicted with the record of Chávez attempts to “reinvigorate” flagging Misiones by shuttling 
the programs to other ministries and attempting new strategic objectives with the programs. 
The absence of registry and public documentation and the failure to institutionalize 
Misión administration reveals the extent to which the programs failed to integrate rule-based 
management (D’Elia, Lacruz, & Maignon, 2006 213-14). These effects were revealed in lower 
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 program quality and enrollment declines discussed in Chapter 7 (Aponte Blank 2012; Mundo 
2009). These problems were also revealed in unsteady expenditure levels, despite, as shown 
below, the legislature increasing ordinary budgeting activities for the programs. 
Critics of the Misiones supported the general idea behind the creation of programs to 
provide remedial services to populations that had been excluded from educational opportunities. 
However, they decried low quality and educational content and use of the programs as a parallel 
system that was designed to reinforce the practice of “revolutionary” (in the Bolivarian sense) 
values (Aponte Blank 2012; D’Elia and Cabezas 2010). Descriptions of ideological content are 
partly validated through the anecdotal evidence of pro-Chávez political socialization described in 
Ortega and Rodriguez (n.d., 28), and Mundo (2009, 41), and raise further suspicion of 
politicization with the naming conventions of students in Robinson and Ribas: “patriotas” 
(patriots) and “vencedores/ vencedoras,” (victors) respectively (D’Elia, 2006, 84-92). In 
Robinson, training was postponed in some cases in order to hold political discussions in the 
classroom during the campaign period for the 2004 recall referendum (Hawkins, Rosas, & 
Johnson, 2011, 193).  
The above criticisms offer anecdotal validation of the problems of politicization within 
the programs. Failure to institutionalize program administration revealed further issues: the 
programs were not integrated into existing educational expertise within ministries, and the 
programs were subject to management interference throughout their existence. While the 
placement of new institutions outside of ministries that traditionally managed programs was cited 
as an attempt at generating efficiency, the absence of administrative expertise and interference 
with program administration made them costly alternatives to traditional programs, as the 
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 programs failed to build on prior experience. This led to failures in enforcement of targeting 
criteria among national coordinators, described below.   
4.2.1.1 Program Administration and Parallel Bureaucracy 
The establishment of parallel bureaucracy for program administration meant that the programs 
avoided management expertise in ministries traditionally associated with related education 
programs. In addition to the creation of parallel administrative centers, funding the programs 
from PDVSA reduced the degree to which other bodies could practice oversight over the 
programs. The education Misiones were initiated in 2003 with decrees establishing extraordinary 
plans and foundations for each of the programs, which became their administrative centers10 
(D’Elia 2006). While Misión Robinson was located within the Ministerio de Educación, Misión 
Ribas was administered through the Ministerio de Energía y Minas, which combined resources 
including night and weekend physical space within public secondary schools together with 
resources from the state electric company - Compañía Anónima de Administración y Fomento 
Eléctrico (CADAFE) and Petroleo de Venezuela, SA (PDVSA) (Sanjuán Martinez & Gonzalez 
Plessman, 2009). Misión Sucre was administered through the Ministerio de Educación Superior 
(later the Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educación Universitaria- MPPEU), but later was 
moved to and from the Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Telecomunicaciones y la 
Informática, in an attempt at “reinvigorating” the Misión to fulfill its goal (Fundación Misión 
Sucre 2008).  
The government oversaw administration of Misión Robinson through a national 
10Plan Nacional Extraordinario de Alfabetización Simón Rodríguez (Extraordinary National Literacy Plan, Simón 
Rodriguez), Presidential Decree 2434, published in Gaceta Oficial 37,704; Plan Extraordinario José Félix Ribas 
(Extraordinary Plan José Félix Ribas), Presidential Decree 2656, published in Gaceta Oficial 37,798;  Plan 
Extraordinario Mariscal Antonio José de Sucre, (Extraordinary Plan Mariscal Antonio José de Sucre) Presidential 
Decree 1635, published in Gaceta Oficial 37,359; See D’Elia (2006). 
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 coordination office, which in turn oversaw state and regional level coordination offices 
(Hawkins, Rosas, & Johnson, 2011, 194). The Comisión Nacional de Alfabetización (National 
Literacy Commission), directed the program but relied on the government of Cuba for advice 
and facilitator training, video educational materials for the courses, advice on methodological 
techniques, and communication of the experience in using media for mass education and cultural 
knowledge (D’Elia, 2006, 79-80). The instructional method the government used consisted of 
facilitators presenting videos to students with a Cuban technique called “Yo sí puedo” (Yes I 
can), an intensive program that ran seven weeks long. (D’Elia 2006). Students were required to 
show their government identification card, provide goals for their studies, and commit to 
finishing the program (Hawkins, Rosas, & Johnson, 2011, 193). By the end of the course, 
students were expected to have the ability to write a letter to demonstrate literacy (Ortega and 
Rodríguez n.d.). Later, Misión Robinson II was established to provide elementary education, 
extending the program.  
Program facilitation and beca distribution presented evidence of politicization. There 
were no educational or experiential requirements for individuals to serve as a facilitator for the 
program, and initial facilitators were volunteers who surveyed their neighborhoods for students 
(Hawkins, Rosas, & Johnson, 2011, 193). While all facilitators of Robinson II were required to 
have a high school education, only 10 per cent had prior teaching experience (Hawkins, Rosas, & 
Johnson, 2011, 194). There was little organization in training facilitators, and for the first year of 
the program, the beca system was poorly regulated. Amid problems of clientelism, the national 
coordinator office began to require that recipients of the scholarships demonstrate need. The 
program then required that the regional multisite coordinator approve the becas, and in many 
cases the beca program was suspended while this change occurred (Hawkins, Rosas, & Johnson, 
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 2011, 194).  Until this coordinator was required to certify the becas, discretion was left to the 
facilitator.  
Like Robinson, the instructional method for Misión Ribas employed video lessons with 
classroom facilitators, though here it was based on a methodology developed by the MED in its 
Plan Nacional Educación para Todos (National Education Plan for Everyone). Students that 
participated were required to be eighteen years of age and to have completed primary education 
or the equivalent from Misión Robinson program (Hawkins, Rosas, & Johnson, 2011, 194). Two 
levels were established: the first corresponded to middle school and the second reflected high 
school, and in total there were nine thousand sites where the program was administered with 
thirty thousand classrooms.  At sites with more than one facilitator, a the program included 
coordinator staff (Hawkins, Rosas, & Johnson, 2011, 194).  
In Ribas, becas were awarded for low-income participants, particularly: single mothers, 
unemployed, or individuals in precarious situations, over 60 years of age, or family 
breadwinners. These were distributed within the classroom, not through a centralized 
administration of payouts (D’Elia, 2006, 98). This allowed room for discretion in their 
distribution. This left considerable room for discretion among the facilitator staff in the 
distribution of the becas. 
Sucre utilized live instructors in the classroom setting to provide post-secondary 
instruction to participants. Instructors were required to have bachelor’s degrees and experience in 
the field instead of being full-time university faculty that have research obligations, though some 
university faculty volunteered for the program (Hawkins, Rosas, and Johnson 2011, 195). 
Instructors that did not already work for the government were paid a stipend for teaching 
(Hawkins, Rosas, and Johnson 2011, 195). However understaffing of core courses due to failure 
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 to attract instructors led to overenrollment and unusual time periods between courses. For 
example, a Misión Sucre course could be taught once every other week (Interview with 
Education Expert 11/20). Students were required to have a high school diploma or the equivalent 
from Misión Ribas. Like Ribas, becas were awarded to some low-income program participants 
including: single mothers, unemployed, or individuals in precarious situations, over 60 years of 
age, or family breadwinners (D’Elia 2006, 98; Lacruz 2006, 175). These were also administered 
at the classroom level, allowing room for discretion by administrative staff for their distribution.   
4.2.1.2 Management Interference 
The education Misiones were subject to management interference as they were subject to near 
constant institutional redesign from 2005-8. They underwent their first full makeover following 
the release of the Nuevo Mapa Estratégico (New Strategic Map) established new institutional 
objectives and management structures for Misiones Ribas and Robinson. It ultimately shrunk 
both programs, reducing Robinson from a program administered in public spaces to courses 
hosted in homes. The second set of changes occurred following the passing of the ley habilitante 
through which Chávez established by decree the status of the Misiones as official bureaucratic 
structures.  
In 2005, the Chávez government undertook the Nuevo Mapa Estratégico, a plan to 
advance the development of a new social structure, increase participatory democracy, develop a 
new electoral strategy, increase institutionalization and fight corruption, among other goals 
(Mundo, 2009, 45). The effect of this plan was to link education to the country’s economic 
development, in part through changes to the education Misiones, changing their legal status from 
being situated within Ministries (particularly the MPPEU), to their own foundations. The 
foundations were charged with the responsibility of executing their respective extraordinary 
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 plans (Mundo, 2009, 47-8). With the strategic objective for the period changing to reflect the 
standardization, organization, and indoctrination of the new strategic plan, these “institutional 
wildcard” organizations were intended to be more effective in producing the results of the plan. 
A major change in the Misión Robinson program that resulted from this was the transferring of 
classroom environments from school locations within municipalities to the location of the 
program to private houses of volunteers, still conducted in the evenings, offered a more limited 
(as well as potentially excludable) environment for literacy and basic education for program 
participants (Mundo, 2009, 56). 
The second set of changes occurred when Chávez issued Decree Number 6217 with the 
Rank, Value and Force of Law of Public Administration, after the defeat of the constitutional 
referendum. It legitimized the structure of the Misiones as they existed, establishing them as a 
new type of bureaucracy in Venezuelan public administration (Mundo, 2009, 51). The preamble 
states that the measure was adopted following the success of the special programs referred to as 
the Misiones (Mundo, 2009, 51).  
Changes to Misión Ribas as a result of the second institutional reorganization prioritized 
education with the goal of insertion of the excluded populations into local indigenous 
development strategies and the management of educational programs jointly implemented with 
Cuba in areas of health management, intended to complement other Misión activities (Mundo, 
2009, 51). 
The shifting of institutional priorities affected Misión Sucre as well, in the following 
ways: the organization faced a constant debate over whether the municipalization of higher 
education through the Misión was intended to supplant or complement the Universidad 
Bolivariana de Venezuela. Eventually the structure was worked out to complement the 
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 organization, as UBV became one of the degree-granting institutions that awarded Misión Sucre 
graduates. Additionally, Fundación Misión Sucre was relocated twice among ministries as its 
success flagged. It was first moved between the MPPEU into the structure of Ministry del Poder 
Popular para las Telecomunicaciones y la Informática, situated within the Compania Anonima 
Nacional Telefonos de Venezuela (CANTV), the opposition news outlet that had been 
nationalized in 2007. At this point Sucre was subject to the minister, who was also president of 
CANTV. The move was credited with a goal of “reinvigorating” the Misión to fulfill its goal 
(Fundación Misión Sucre 2008). Fundación Misión Sucre was eventually returned to the 
MPPEU (Fundación Misión Sucre 2012).    
Weak oversight, particularly in beca administration, and changes in administrative 
priorities affected the programmatic nature of the education Misiones, deviating from rule-based 
implementation based on inclusion criteria. The effects of program oversight and management 
changes are revealed below through the description of education Misión expenditures, both over 
time and in how they were distributed. As the programs shifted due to changing priorities, 
increases and decreases in expenditures occurred, and the distribution of expenditures prioritized 
particular groups over the decade. These two outcomes are shown below. 
4.2.2 Program Spending 
Examining government funding for the Misiones programs between 2003-07 reveals not only a 
significant expansion in program spending, but the transition of program financing to routine 
budgeting over time as the programs were legitimized by the legislature. This section presents 
government financing sources for all of the Misión programs, compiled by Aponte, from funding 
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 material available from the Ministerio de Finanzas and news sources. 11 Examining government 
spending data reveals how the programs proceeded through the decade. The initiation of the 
Misiones begins with a sizable push for Misión Robinson, and ends with larger pushes from 
Sucre, and considering the PDVSA transfers, the same is likely the case for Ribas. Given the 
questions associated with the success of Robinson, the focus on Ribas and Sucre suggests that the 
government has shifted priorities to areas that may yield more successful outcomes. Fluctuation 
in PDVSA funding reveals the danger of reliance on extrabudgetary sources for social programs, 
which may result in funding declines in certain years. The contributions of PDVSA as a share of 
Misión funding may be on the decline, as the mix of funding sources shifted between 2003-07 
toward routinizing the Misión spending within the country’s budget. However, the extraordinary 
beginnings of these programs may have limited administrative planning and budgeting for future 
operations, which may force program planners into making tradeoffs among recipients. 
Education Misión spending data are limited, but available spending figures are compiled 
together in Figure 6. Data from Sanjuán & Plessman (2009, 2010), and the various years of 
Memoria y Cuenta publications of the Ministerio del Poder Popular Para la Educación 
Universitaria (MPPEU, Various Years)),  and the Fundación Misión Sucre (2010).  
 
11 It is necessary to acknowledge, as in Aponte (2010), that the tables and figures in this section and below are not 
consistent when compared against each other. The spending figures compiled from executed expenditures in the 
Memoria y Cuenta of both the Ministerio del Poder Popular Para la Educación Universitaria and reports by 
Sanjuán and Plessman reveal a lower share of spending than figures that PDVSA reports transferring to the 
programs. The overall government spending figures also reflect lower levels than do the PDVSA data, but the 
compilation of spending data, calculated by Aponte from the Ministerio de Finanzas and news sources through the 
year 2007 provides an account of the ways in which the programs have been funded over time. Aponte concludes 
that the PDVSA data is more up-to-date than government financial ministry figures so it is likelier to be correct 
(Aponte Blank 2010). We can conclude that the financial figures from ministries and funds responsible for 
administering the Misiones are also subject to the same logic. Additionally, the PDVSA data provides a distribution 
of Misión spending activities not made available from government sources, allowing an investigation into the 
priorities the government has placed on managing the programs over time (Aponte Blank 2010). 
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Figure 6. Education Misiones Spending, Share of Federal Government Spending 
 
After initial increases from 2004-7, declines occur in Misión spending in 2008. After this, 
increases occur in Misión Sucre spending, and likely occur with Mision Ribas. Misión Robinson 
spending figures demonstrate the massive push and subsequent decline in the program reflected 
in registration figures described above. Program spending largely tapered off following the peak 
in program spending at $660 million in 2005. Consistent with enrollment, spending figures for 
Robinson over the first part of the decade dwarf that of Ribas and Sucre.  
Contributions from PDVSA are displayed in Table 13. These reveal significant 
contributions over time for the Misiones: Alimentacion (Mercal), Barrio Adentro (I, II, III), 
Ribas, Revolucion Energética, Vivienda, and Vuelvan Caras. The total Misión spending also 
reveals an increase through Gran Misión Vivienda Venezuela, a new initiative begun in 2011.  
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 Table 13. Misión Spending: Contribution from PDVSA, Millions of USD 
(Petroleos de Venezuela S.A., 2011, 201) 
Millions, Current USD 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Misión Ribas 32 320 371 280 133 330 599 361 322 
Misión Alimentacion - 146 303 325 916 212 - 1,210 1,238 
Gran Misión 
AgroVenezuela - - - - - - - - 1,140 
Misión Barrio Adentro 
I, II, y III 34 275 309 1,693 3,258 130 7 650 - 
Misión Vuelvan Caras - 172 220 240 29 11 - - - 
Misión Milagro - - 125 - 25 9 - 1 - 
Misión Guaicapuro - - 11 - - - - - - 
Misión Sucre 3 113 668 - - 17 6 - - 
Misión Identidad - 44 1 - - - - - - 
Misión Ciencia - - - 291 28 - - - - 
Misión Vivienda 300 500 500 476 659 221 157 1,251 - 
Misión Robinson I y II 72 - - - - - - - - 
Misión Revolucion 
Energética - - - 210 219 174 745 2,115 2,197 
Misión Arbol - - - - 12 9 2 - - 
Misión Música - - - - 43 - - 22 - 
Misiones Spending 441 1,570 2,508 3,515 5,322 1,113 1,516 5,610 4,897 
Gran Misión Vivienda 
Venezuela - - - - - - - - 4,010 
Other Misiones and 
Contributions 96 13 481 152 175 280 246 3,984 307 
Total Misiones 
Spending, PDVSA 537 1,583 2,989 3,667 5,497 1,393 1,762 9,594 9,214 
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 Contributions reveal the priorities of the extrabudgetary activities determined by the government. 
They increased steadily between 2003-7, but decreased in 2008-9, during which oil price factors 
may have affected the organization’s ability to contribute to the budget. They increased again in 
2010-11, to a level of $8.9 billion in 2011. For the education Misiones, the company funded 
Misión Sucre in increasing amounts until a peak in 2005 at $688 million, then largely allocated 
resources elsewhere, only funding the program for $23 million in 2008-9. PDVSA only funded 
Misión Robinson in its initial year, for $72 million. 
Investigating contributions offer the most interesting analysis for Misión Ribas, as this 
program’s foundation is directly funded through PDVSA. Increases in Ribas funding occur from 
2003-5 from $32 million to $371 million, and were then followed by a decline in 2007 to $133 
million. Funding again increases beginning in 2008, peaking in 2009 at $599 million and 
declining to $361 and $322 million by 2011. This discontinuity in the primary funding source of 
Misión Ribas suggests that the program waned compared to other government priorities. 
However, PDVSA contributions tell only part of the story as the programs became more 
regularly funded in the ordinary budget.  
Compiled by Aponte, Table 14 reveals a crucial period of transition for that the Misiones 
became ordinarily budgeted programs as funding transferred across four sources to make the 
programs more permanent: the ordinary budget, additional credits awarded to the program by the 
legislature, as well as contributions allocated at the discretion of Chávez from PDVSA revenues 
and the Fondo de Desarollo Nacional (Fonden – National Development fund). 
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Table 14. Misiones Sociales: Government Spending, Millions of USD 
(Aponte Blank, 2010, 51) 
Millions of USD, Current Spending 
Financing Sources 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
  Ordinary Budget 9.2 257.6 211.6 - - 
  Additional Credits 41.4 248.4 195.5 - - 
  Budget and Credits Combined - - - 3422.4 4025 
  PDVSA 50.6 729.1 1154.6 1297.2 1702 
  Fonden and Others* 16.1 138 46 285.2 282.9 
Total 119.6 1237.4 1607.7 5004.8 6009.9 
Share of Financing from PDVSA 42.3% 58.9% 71.8% 25.9% 28.3% 
 
 
The Misiones became ordinarily budgeted programs through the following activities: a 
significant increase in the contribution of ordinary budget procedure funding for the programs, a 
decrease in the contribution of PDVSA to Misión budgeting, and a smaller increase in the level 
of Fonden and other funding. After increases in PDVSA funding from the initial level of 42.3 
percent to 71 percent in 2005, the share declines to above 25 percent in 2006-07. Current values 
for 2008-9 in Table 13 also reflect this trend. The transition from heavy dependence of the 
programs on PDVSA resources to ordinary government budgeting for the Misiones over time 
reveals that not only were the programs increasingly accepted by the legislature, but funding 
began to occur in a manner that enabled the programs to demonstrate continuity in their 
administration. The transition to routine budgeting was certainly a positive for the programs, 
though the increasing amount of funding inputs based on non-guaranteed oil revenues 
contributed to the difficult task of program planning.  
Because of the relationship between PDVSA and Misión Ribas, the decline in PDVSA 
funding in Table 14 between 2006-7 suggests that the corresponding spending data in Figure 6 
are low points for spending on the program. For Ribas, program spending likely peaks in 2005 
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 and 2009, as suggested in the PDVSA transfer data. Misión Sucre spending steadily increases 
into 2007, then decreases in 2008. Spending then increases for the program into 2010.   
Examining government spending data reveals how the programs expanded and contracted 
over the decade. The initiation of the Misiones begins with a sizable push for Misión Robinson, 
and ends with larger pushes from Sucre, and considering the PDVSA transfers, the same is likely 
the case for Ribas. Given the questions associated with the success of Robinson, the focus on 
Ribas and Sucre suggests that the government has shifted priorities to areas that may yield more 
successful outcomes. Fluctuation in PDVSA funding reveals the problem of reliance on 
extrabudgetary sources for social programs, which may be subject to discretion or revenue 
problems. The contributions of PDVSA as a share of education Misión appeared to be decline, as 
the mix of funding sources shifted between 2003-07 toward routinizing the Misión spending 
within the country’s budget. 
4.2.3 Program Distribution 
Analyzing the distribution of program targeting requires the analysis of political and program-
relevant demographic variables to determine their effect on the number of beca recipients and 
program centers (Aldeas) in different states in Venezuela. Tables 4-6 and Figures 6-16 display 
the results of regression models and marginal effects analysis for the number of beca recipients 
Misión Sucre and Ribas and the Aldeas and community education centers of Misión Sucre. Beca 
and Aldea data are compiled from MPPEU publications including Memoria y Cuenta (MPPEU 
2008), a retrospective report (MPPEU 2010), and Fundación Misión Sucre (2010). Sucre Beca 
data from 2004 are from D’Elia (2006) and Ribas beca data are from Penfold-Becerra (Penfold-
Becerra 2005). The model examines the following political determinants between 2000-2010: the 
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 2000 and 2006 presidential and 2004 and 2008 governor elections, the 2004 recall referendum, 
the 2007 constitutional referendum and the share of the PSUV in the 2010 assembly. The model 
includes a measure of the status of whether the governor is Chávez- or opposition-aligned. The 
demographic determinants include statewide measures of: total secondary and vocational school 
enrollment rates for each state for each year, an estimate of individuals living under the poverty 
line, and an estimate of population. For Aldea and community center models, the number of 
secondary schools in the state is substituted for enrollment data. Data are from Venescopio 
(Various Years) and the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2012). 
Marginal effects analysis evaluates the number becas and Aldeas provided for Misión 
participants over relevant values of electoral support, holding other determinants at their means. 
The distribution of becas is analyzed by providing an estimate for both Chávez-and opposition-
aligned states according to coalition alignment of governors. The difference between the 
estimates reveals the effect of political alignment on beca distribution. In the plots below, the 
slope of the estimated values shows the attention to close or landslide races: a negative slope 
reveals targeting of close races (increasing numbers of becas as electoral support is lower), while 
a positive slope reveals targeting of landslide races (increasing numbers of becas as electoral 
support increases). While the models and plots are conducted with dependent variables 
transformed by natural logarithm, the estimates are transformed from the log values to actual 
values in the narrative below. 
4.2.3.1 Misión Sucre Beca Model 
Table 15 displays the results of the Misión Sucre models 1-8, in which effects of the political and 
demographic variables on the distribution of Sucre becas are evaluated. Marginal effects analysis 
is conducted to compare the overall distribution of becas in states with Chávez- and opposition-
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 aligned governors, and these are shown in Figures 23-28 below. The models are first examined, 
followed by the marginal effects analysis. 
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Table 15. Misión Sucre Distribution Analysis 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
2004 Becas 
(log) 
2004 Becas 
(log) 
2004 Becas 
(log) 
2007 Becas 
(log) 
2007 Becas 
(log) 
2007 Becas 
(log) 
2010 Becas 
(log) 
2010 Becas 
(log) 
2000 Presidential Vote 0.561 
       
 
(0.752) 
       2004 Governor Election - Chávez Coalition  
 
1.428** 
      
  
(0.377) 
      2004 Recall Referendum 
  
1.254# 
     
   
(0.750) 
     2006 Presidential Vote 
   
0.814 
    
    
(1.085) 
    2007 Constitutional Referendum Package A 
    
0.385 
   
     
(1.362) 
   2007 Constitutional Referendum Package B 
     
0.313 
  
      
(1.380) 
  2008 Governor Election  
      
0.618 
 
       
(1.153) 
 2010 Assembly Election 
       
-2.649 
        
(9.599) 
Chavez-Aligned Governor 0.00744 -0.0842 0.00714 0.197 0.241 0.244 -0.343# -0.131 
 
(0.110) (0.0773) (0.0921) (0.175) (0.166) (0.164) (0.216) (0.192) 
Share of Individuals Living in Poverty 0.271 -0.0802 -0.131 -0.123 0.00302 0.0208 0.896 1.073 
 
(0.364) (0.296) (0.432) (0.708) (0.786) (0.810) (0.848) (0.860) 
Share of Population Enrolled in Secondary and 
Vocational Schools 42.19* 48.92** 51.09* 58.11† 50.81† 50.08† 61.21# 58.65# 
 
(17.83) (13.50) (17.79) (28.76) (27.82) (27.64) (35.35) (38.08) 
Log of Population 0.874*** 0.876*** 0.912*** 0.895*** 0.868*** 0.861*** 0.805*** 0.756*** 
 
(0.0489) (0.0412) (0.0520) (0.0931) (0.107) (0.0997) (0.0969) (0.122) 
Constant -5.229*** -5.671*** -6.164*** -6.476** -5.660* -5.515* -5.245** -4.378** 
 
(0.890) (0.614) (1.052) (2.146) (2.286) (2.156) (1.563) (1.451) 
         Observations 24 23 24 24 24 24 23 24 
R-squared 0.953 0.973 0.958 0.910 0.908 0.908 0.835 0.838 
Standard errors in parentheses 
        *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1, # p<0.15 
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 Below the model results are discussed for political and demographic determinants on 
Sucre becas. The key outcome revealed is that throughout the decade, the program has a positive 
relationship early with the level of Chávez support, while later in the decade, estimates show a 
shift in the distribution from Chávez-aligned to opposition-aligned states. Among program-
relevant demographic variables, poverty is not a determinant of Sucre becas, despite being a 
stated criterion for participation. However, enrollment has a significant effect on beca 
distribution, showing a degree of targeting according to program goals. Overall, the model fit is 
strong, ranging from an r-squared of 0.973 (for Model 2 - 2004 presidential recall 2004 becas) to 
0.835 (for Model 7 – 2008 governor elections on 2010 becas). Below the political and 
demographic criteria are examined.  
The models show three periods of political influence: early on in the decade, states with 
heavy Chávez votes receive becas, followed by a shift to those states with Chávez-aligned 
governors, and finally a shift to states with opposition-aligned governors. The first reveals 
landslide Chávez supporter strategy, and the second reveals core targeting. The third shows 
opposition targeting, as the leader sought support among the burgeoning opposition movement.  
Models 1-7 show a positive relationship between the level of Chávez support and the 
number of individuals receiving Sucre becas. Model 8 – the effect of the share of 2010 Assembly 
seats on 2010 becas – shows a negative relationship. Early in the decade, the level of Chávez 
political support among states in the 2004 governor election and the 2004 presidential recall 
referendum both show positive relationships with beca distribution. The 2004 governor election 
is a significant determinant at the (p < .05) level, and the 2004 recall referendum is also associated 
with beca distribution just beyond traditional alpha levels (p < .15). 
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In the 2004 and 2007 models, those living in a Chávez-aligned state received more becas 
than those in opposition-aligned states. The measure is significant (at the p < .1 level) only for the 
constitutional referendum votes in 2007, but the marginal effects analysis below reveals 
persistent, and at times, sizable differences between the two groups of states. Controlling for 
other factors, more Misión Sucre becas are distributed to Chávez-aligned states from 2004-7, 
showing substantive differences among the distribution of becas.  
Modeling the 2010 becas, the trend reverses, and opposition targeting is shown among 
2008 governor and 2010 Assembly elections. Distributions significantly favor states with 
opposition governors in the 2008 model, and the trend continues with a substantive opposition 
support in 2010.  
The positive effect of the level of electoral support on statewide becas persists across the 
pro-Chávez votes in models 1-4 for measures of the 2000 presidential election, 2004 governor 
election, the 2004 recall referendum, the 2006 presidential election, and in model 7 for the 2008 
governor election. Targeting favored landslide contests in each of these races. The measures are 
significant in the 2004 and 2008 governor elections shown in models 2 (at the p < .01 level) and 7 
(at the p < .05 level). A negative effect occurs for the level of electoral support on the becas in 
models 5 and 6 for the constitutional referendum in 2007 and model 8 for the share of PSUV 
seats in 2010. Targeting favored close races in these contests.  
The models also examine areas of program- relevant demographic influence, which yield 
consistent evidence for one aspect of program targeting: education enrollment, which has a 
positive and significant effect on the number of statewide becas in models from 2004-2007. 
However, poverty – the difference between merely being enrolled in Sucre and receiving a beca 
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 – is not a significant determinant of the number of scholarships. Poverty has a negative 
relationship with the number of becas in certain models for the 2004 and 2007 data.   
Sucre becas are distributed to states with more individuals enrolled in secondary and 
vocational education. The positive relationship serves as an indicator of targeting in the 
Venezuelan context, since the measure provides an estimate of eligible population for the 
program. Enrollment is significant in models from 2004 to 2007 and strongly associated with the 
2010 models. This measure offers partial evidence that program targeting reached states where 
more students were located. This relationship was statistically significant in Models 1-6: at levels 
of significance between the (p < .05) level and the (p < .1) level. In Models 7 and 8 evaluating the 
2008 governor and 2010 assembly elections, enrollment is also associated with beca distribution 
just beyond traditional alpha levels (p < .15).  
The number of individuals living in poverty is a poor predictor of beca distribution. The 
variable is not a significant determinant of scholarships in any of the models, and Models 2-4 
show Misión Sucre becas distributed to states with fewer people living in poverty when strong 
pro-Chávez political variables are modeled in 2004 and 2007.  
Population has a positive and significant effect (at the p < .001 level) on the number of 
statewide becas for Models 1-8. The effect of the population measure is less important than the 
demographic educational enrollment and poverty variables, but it suggests that the education 
enrollment variable is robust, as the number of becas varies with the population.  
Comparing political and demographic variables reveals an uneven effect: political 
determinants have some influence over Sucre beca distribution, while poverty does not. 
However, educational enrollment shows a degree of targeting influence. Evaluating the influence 
of each of these variables on beca distribution allows comparison of individual determinants. 
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 The marginal effects analysis below permits substantive examination of the political 
determinants, comparing the distribution according to Chávez and opposition-aligned states 
across relevant levels of electoral support for his parties. 
 
4.2.3.2 Misión Sucre Becas Marginal Effects 
This section provides substantive analysis of the models above, particularly the effect of 
increasing values of electoral support on the number of becas provided for Misión Sucre 
participants, holding other variables at their means. The distribution of becas is compared 
between states with Chávez- and opposition-aligned governors, and closeness in political 
contests is evaluated. Figures 7-8 below depict these comparisons.  
The key trend revealed in the figures below is that the Venezuelan government 
distributed Sucre benefits in an increasingly parochial fashion over the decade: early on, 
negligible differences existed between pro-Chávez and pro-opposition states, but as the decade 
progressed becas were first distributed to Chávez-aligned and then to opposition-aligned states. 
However, the government did not give much consideration to close races: despite changes in the 
distributions across the decade, the program only targeted close races in the in the 2010 
Assembly elections, a contest that reflected a narrow victory for the leader.  
Holding other variables at their means the marginal effect of the number of becas 
distributed in 2004 is relatively similar between opposition- and Chávez-aligned states. In 2007, 
the marginal effect of the number of becas distributed is greater in Chávez-aligned states than 
opposition-aligned ones. The 2006 presidential election and during the 2007 recall referendum 
show pro-Chávez distributions of becas to be greater by 39 and 27 percent respectively. The 
trend then reverses in 2010 as the marginal effect of the number of becas distributed is greater in 
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 opposition-aligned states than Chávez-aligned ones. The 2008 governor election and 2010 
assembly election show pro-opposition distribution of becas to be greater by 39 and 14 percent, 
respectively.  
Taken in context with the significance of the determinants of targeting in the models 
above, the marginal effects estimates reveal a substantive effect for the political outcomes, 
particularly in light of weakening of the effects of program-relevant demographic variables on 
targeting over time. What begins as a relatively programmatic distribution then becomes 
parochial as core, then opposition targeting strategies are pursued in the distribution of becas.  
 
 
Figure 7. Misión Sucre Becas Distributions, 2000 Election 
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Figure 8. Misión Sucre Becas Distributions, 2004 Contests 
 
Figures 7-8 show the distribution of Misión Sucre becas administered in 2004 in states 
with Chávez- and opposition-aligned governors, holding other values at their means. The 
differences are revealed to be negligible between Chávez- and opposition- aligned states, with 
the largest difference occurring according to the 2004 governor elections. Figure 7 evaluates the 
distributions for 2000 electoral data, where pro-Chávez states receive just 1 percent (21) 
additional becas than do opposition states. Figure 8 evaluates the distributions for the 2004 
governor elections and the 2004 recall referendum. In the 2004 governor elections, pro-
opposition states receive 9 percent (165) more becas than pro-Chávez states, holding other 
values at their means, with significant differences between 55 and 70 percent support. In the 
2004 recall referendum, pro-Chávez states receive just 1 percent (17) more becas than opposition 
states, holding other values at their means. In these three contests, the positive slope shows that 
greater levels of electoral support yield more becas. These estimates show support for landslide 
targeting strategy.  
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Figure 9. Misión Sucre Becas Distributions, 2006 Presidential Elections 
 
 
Figure 10. Misión Sucre Becas Distributions, 2007 Constitutional Referendum 
 
Figures 9-10 show a departure in 2007 from the early period, as the number of becas 
administered reflects a pro-Chávez distribution. Figure 9 evaluates the distributions for the 2006 
presidential election, where the number of becas in pro-Chávez states was greater by 39 percent 
(458). The differences are significant between 60 and 75 percent support. Figure 10 evaluates the 
distributions for the two packages of the 2007 referendum, where the number of becas in pro-
Chávez states was greater by 27 and 28 percent (598 and 612 respectively). The differences are 
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 significant between 47 and 60 percent support for the recall referendum. In all three contests, the 
positive slope shows that greater levels of electoral support yield more becas. Like the 2004 data, 
the 2007 distributions offer support for landslide contests. 
 
Figure 11. Misión Sucre Becas Distributions, 2008 Governor Elections 
 
 
Figure 12. Misión Sucre Becas Distribution, 2010 Assembly 
 
Figures 11-12 show a change in direction from the 2007 data, as the number of becas 
administered in 2010 reflects an opposition-targeted distribution. Figure 11 evaluates the 
distributions for the 2008 governor election, where the number of becas in opposition-aligned 
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 states was greater by 41 percent (720). These differences significantly favor opposition states 
between 45 and 65 percent support. Figure 12 evaluates the distributions for the Assembly 
election, where the number of becas in pro-Chávez states was greater by 14 percent (270). In the 
2008 contest, the positive slope shows that greater levels of electoral support yield more becas. 
Like 2004 and 2007, the data for the 2008 governor election shows a landslide contests. 
However, when the number of becas were examined according to the 2010 Assembly election 
determinants, the positive slope turned to negative, suggesting targeting for close races as 
opposed to the landslides that came before. The more recent 2010 data likelier reveals the 
strategy  
Overall, the distribution toward Chávez-aligned states is evident. Holding other variables 
at their means, the targeting of Misión Sucre becas was separately targeted to core and 
opposition support in 2007 and 2010 by delievering program benefits to different constituencies. 
From 2004-07 the program was primarily targeted to landslide contests, though the 2010 
Assembly elections show that the program eventually was directed to close contests. 
4.2.3.3 Misión Sucre Aldeas and Community Centers Model 
Table 16 displays the results of the Misión Sucre models 1-4, in which effects of the political and 
demographic variables on the numbers of Aldeas and Community Centers in 2007 and 2010 are 
evaluated. Marginal effects analysis is conducted to compare the overall distribution of Aldeas in 
states with Chávez- and opposition-aligned governors, and these are shown in Figures 29-31 
below. The models are first examined, followed by the marginal effects analysis. 
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 Table 16. Misión Sucre Aldeas and Community Centers Distribution Analysis 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VARIABLES 
2007 Aldeas 
and Community 
Centers (log) 
2007 Aldeas and 
Community 
Centers (log) 
2010 Aldeas and 
Community Centers 
(log) 
2010 Aldeas and 
Community 
Centers (log) 
          
2007 Constitutional Referendum Package A 2.974 
   
 
(2.317) 
   2007 Constitutional Referendum Package B 
 
2.473 
  
  
(2.365) 
  2008 Governor Election - Chávez Coalition Votes 
  
0.119 
 
   
(0.262) 
 2010 Assembly vote 
   
10.82 
    
(11.17) 
Chavez-Aligned Governor 0.229 0.264 2.517# 0.125 
 
(0.307) (0.307) (1.498) (0.214) 
Share of Individuals Living in Poverty -0.910 -0.747 -1.619# -0.960 
 
(1.410) (1.434) (1.054) (0.999) 
Number of Secondary and Vocational Schools 7.52e-05 0.000505 0.00229 0.00176 
 
(0.00237) (0.00237) (0.00171) (0.00152) 
Log of Population 0.819* 0.714† 0.243 0.242 
 
(0.376) (0.355) (0.299) (0.277) 
Constant -8.506# -6.945 -0.810 0.240 
 
(5.225) (4.833) (3.632) (3.393) 
     Observations 24 24 23 24 
R-squared 0.645 0.635 0.674 0.674 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1, # p<0.15 
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 Below the model results are discussed for political and demographic determinants on 
Sucre Aldeas. The key outcome revealed is that the program shows few significant determinants. 
However, in all four of the models, those living in a Chávez-aligned state received more becas 
than those in opposition-aligned states. No measure is significant, but the marginal effects 
analysis below reveals differences between the two groups of states for the 2007 and 2010, 
suggesting the greater distribution of Aldeas to Chávez-aligned areas. Overall, the model fit is 
weaker than for the Sucre becas, ranging from 0.635 (Model 2- 2007 constitutional referendum 
package B on 2007 Aldeas) to 0.74 (Model 3 and Model 4 - 2008 governor election and 2010 
Assembly election on 2010 Aldeas).  
Models 1-4 show a positive relationship between the level of Chávez support and the 
number of individuals receiving Sucre Aldeas. More Misión Sucre Aldeas are distributed to states 
with larger shares of Chávez support, offering evidence of landslide targeting strategy, though the 
electoral support measure is not significant in any of the models. Similarly, the models show 
greater numbers of Aldeas in states with Chavez-aligned governors. In Model 3, this measure is 
associated with beca distribution just beyond traditional alpha levels (p < .15). 
The models also present areas of program- relevant demographic influence, which provide 
contrasting evidence. The number of secondary schools has a positive effect on the number of 
statewide Aldeas throughout the models, and population is positive over time. However the 
relationship with poverty is negative. The effect of both the number of secondary and vocational 
schools and population are positive over time. In general, the measures offer evidence that Aldea 
targeting reached states with more schools, consistent with greater populations.  
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 The negative relationship of poverty on Aldeas suggests that the centers are being 
distributed to states that are not as poor. In Model 3, this measure is associated with Aldea 
distribution just beyond traditional alpha levels (p < .15). 
Comparing political and demographic variables reveals the consistent effect of political 
determinants on the distribution of Sucre Aldeas. Evaluating the influence of each of these 
variables on Aldea distribution provides an understanding of their individual effects on the 
program. The analysis continues below as the effect of the key political variables are evaluated 
for each model.  
4.2.3.4 Misión Sucre Aldeas and Community Centers Marginal Effects 
This section provides substantive analysis of the effect of increasing values of electoral support 
on the number of Aldeas and Community Centers provided for Misión Sucre participants, holding 
other variables at their means. The distribution of Aldeas is compared between states with 
Chávez- and opposition-aligned governors, and closeness in political contests is evaluated. The 
key finding revealed is that there is a consistent distribution of Aldeas and community centers 
toward Chávez-aligned states in both 2007 and 2010, particularly among landslide contests.  
Taken in context with the significance of the determinants of targeting in the models 
above, the marginal effects estimates reveal a consistent substantive effect for the political 
variables, which occurs in light of the weak effects of program-relevant demographic variables on 
targeting over time. Figures 13-15 below depict these comparisons. 
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Figure 13. Sucre Aldeas, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Sucre Aldeas, 2010 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Sucre Aldeas, 2010 
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 Overall the Aldeas show targeting to pro-Chávez states, particularly among increasing levels of 
electoral support, though at no point are the distributions significantly different from each other. 
Figure 13 evaluates the distributions for the two packages of the 2007 referendum, where the 
number of becas in pro-Chávez states was greater by 9.3 and 11 centers (26 percent and 30 
percent, respectively). In these contests, the slope of the line is positive, suggesting targeting for 
supportive races. By 2010, the differences in estimates vary, but the targeting is in the same 
direction as the 2007 data. Figure 14 evaluates the distribution for 2008 governor election, where 
the number of Aldeas in pro-Chávez states was greater by 86 percent (30 centers). In Figure 15, 
evaluating the distribution for the 2010 Assembly election, the number of Aldeas in Chávez-
aligned states was greater by 13 percent (5 centers). For both the 2008 contest and the 2010 
Assembly election, the positive slope shows that greater levels of electoral support yield more 
Aldeas in 2010.  
Overall, the distribution toward Chávez-aligned states continues. Holding other variables 
at their means, the targeting of Misión Sucre Aldeas is intended to produce support among core 
pro-Chávez constituents in 2007 and 2010 contests. The core targeting is directed to landslide 
supporters in all of the contests here. 
4.2.3.5 Misión Ribas Beca Model 
Table 17 displays the results of the Misión Ribas models 1-4, in which effects of the political and 
demographic variables on the numbers of becas in 2004 are evaluated. Marginal effects analysis 
is conducted to compare the overall distribution of becas in states with Chávez- and opposition-
aligned governors, and these are shown in Figures 32-3 below. The models are first examined, 
followed by the marginal effects analysis. 
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 Table 17. Misión Ribas Distribution Analysis 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
2004 Misión 
Ribas Becas (log) 
2004 Misión 
Ribas Becas (log) 
2004 Misión 
Ribas Becas (log) 
       
2000 Presidential Election 5.196 
  
 
(3.626) 
  2004 Governor Election - Chávez 
Coalition Votes 
 
3.165 
 
  
(2.634) 
 2004 Recall Referendum  
  
2.520 
   
(4.000) 
Chavez-Aligned Governor -0.0644 0.0162 0.251 
 
(0.532) (0.541) (0.491) 
Share of Individuals Living in Poverty -2.541 -3.307# -3.031 
 
(1.758) (2.070) (2.304) 
Share of Population Enrolled in 
Secondary and Vocational Schools 59.73 83.46 71.89 
 
(86.01) (94.39) (94.82) 
Log of Population 0.592* 0.481# 0.660* 
 
(0.236) (0.288) (0.277) 
Constant -2.582 0.0627 -2.125 
 
(4.293) (4.290) (5.607) 
    Observations 24 23 24 
R-squared 0.375 0.334 0.319 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1, # p<0.15 
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 Below the model results are discussed for political and demographic determinants on Ribas becas. 
The key outcome revealed for the 2004 data is that the program shows few significant 
determinants. The models present two kinds of political influence: the model that accounts for the 
2000 presidential election shows opposition targeting. According to models that accounts for the 
2004 contests, those living in Chávez-aligned state received more becas than those in opposition-
aligned states. No measure is significant, but the marginal effects analysis below reveals 
differences between the two groups of states. Overall, the model fit is much weaker than for the 
2004 Ribas analyses, ranging from .319 (Model 3 recall referendum) to .375 (Model 1 – 2000 
presidential election), and showing no significant determinants. 
Models 1-3 show a positive relationship between the level of Chávez support and the 
number of individuals receiving Ribas becas, with targeting favoring landslide contests. However, 
variation occurs among states with Chávez- and opposition-aligned governors. Model 1 shows a 
negative effect on the number of becas distributed to states with, while Models 2-3 show a 
positive effect on the measure. The more recent measures support core targeting, while the older 
measure supports opposition targeting.  
The models also present areas of program-relevant demographic influence, which provide 
contrasting evidence. The share of individuals enrolled in secondary and vocational school and 
population have positive relationships with the number of becas distributed, while poverty is a 
consistent negative determinant. The enrollment in secondary and vocational schools has a 
positive effect on the number of statewide becas in Models 1-3. Population is positive over time 
and significant in Models 1 and 3. In Model 2, population is associated with beca distribution just 
beyond traditional alpha levels (p < .15).  
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 Like the Sucre becas, modeling the relevant political contests on 2004 Ribas becas shows 
that poverty is a poor predictor of scholarships. The measure is a negative determinant, consistent 
across all models. In Model 2 poverty is associated with beca distribution just beyond traditional 
alpha levels (p < .15). 
Comparing political and demographic variables reveals an uneven effect: modeling the 
2000 political variables present evidence for opposition targeting, while modeling the 2004 
political variables shows evidence for core targeting, particularly in landslide contests. Like Sucre 
Becas and Aldeas, poverty was a poor determinant of the distribution of Ribas becas, though 
enrollment was slightly better. Evaluating the influence of each of these variables on beca 
distribution provides an understanding of their individual effects on the program. The analysis 
continues below as the effect of the key political variables are evaluated for each model.  
4.2.3.6 Misión Ribas Becas Marginal Effects 
This section provides substantive analysis of the effect of increasing values of electoral support 
on the number of becas provided for Misión Ribas participants, holding other variables at their 
means. The distribution of becas is compared between states with Chávez- and opposition-aligned 
governors, and closeness in political contests is evaluated. The key finding is the 2004 political 
contests show core targeting among for the Ribas becas, but this conflicts with the evidence from 
the 2000 model, which shows a slight level of support for opposition targeting.  
Taken in context with the significance of the determinants of targeting in the models 
above, the marginal effects estimates reveal a limited substantive effect for the political variables 
in 2004, which occurs in light of the weak effects of program-relevant demographic variables on 
targeting over time. Figures 16-7 below depict these comparisons. 
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Figure 16. Ribas Becas 2000 
 
 
Figure 17. Ribas Becas 2004 Contests 
 
Overall the becas show evidence of targeting to pro-opposition states in 2000. However in 
2004, they show consistent evidence of targeting to pro-Chávez states, particularly among 
increasing levels of electoral support, though at no point are the distributions significantly 
different from each other. Figure 16 evaluates the distributions for the two packages of the 2000 
presidential election where the number of becas in opposition-aligned states was greater, by 7 
percent (111 becas), holding other values at their means. For the recall referendum and governor 
election, however, core targeting is revealed. Figure 17 evaluates the distribution for these 
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 contests. Evaluating the distribution for the governor elections the number of becas in opposition-
aligned states was greater by just 24 becas (2 percent), holding other values at their means. As 
above, the positive slope shows that greater levels of electoral support yield more becas. 
Evaluating the distribution for the recall referendum, the number of becas in core states was 
greater by 693 becas (29 percent), holding other values at their means. For each of the three 
governor and recall contests, the slope of the line was positive, suggesting targeting of landslide 
races, but for the recall referendum, the slope was negative, suggesting targeting of close races.  
Overall, the evidence is mixed. The 2000 model shows opposition targeting primarily 
directed to opposition, though both the 2004 governor and recall referendum show core targeting 
support for close elections. With 2004 being the only year of available data for Ribas becas, it is 
difficult to conclude a single program direction for resources targeted that year, but two of the 
three measures support core elections. 
4.2.4 Summing Up 
Regression and marginal effects analysis of the education Misiones reveals that over the course of 
the decade, at different times the various programs accomplished most of the political targeting 
techniques under analysis: core and opposition voters were reached in both close and landslide 
elections. Modeling the program relationships with political and demographic variables shows 
particular trends: Misión Sucre initially targeted core states with becas, but moved to opposition 
targeting; its Aldeas and community centers were targeted to core states, and with limited 
evidence, Ribas targeted core states with becas.  
The program-relevant demographic variables did not consistently predict distribution of 
benefits. The strongest evidence that programs targeted intended beneficiaries occurs according to 
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 measures of the number of students enrolled in each state, but not according to measures of 
poverty. This is striking, as Sucre and Ribas becas were intended to reach disadvantaged students.  
In Sucre, beca distributions were significantly determined by enrollment during the early 
part of the program, while during the middle of the decade the models revealed poverty to vary 
negatively with beca distribution. For Ribas, the enrollment variable varied positively with the 
number of becas, but the poverty variable was consistently negative, suggesting that the program 
was not distributed according to programmatic criteria.    
Misión Sucre becas were distributed first among supporters and core voters in mostly 
landslide contests. Holding other values at their means, estimates of the effect of the 2006 
presidential election and the 2007 constitutional referendum showed that Chávez-aligned states 
received 39 and 27 percent more becas respectively. Throughout the early part of the decade, 
becas were distributed to shore up support among core political constituencies in landslide 
elections. However, estimates of the effect of the 2008 governor contest and 2010 Assembly 
election reveal support for targeting among opposition constituencies, holding other values at 
their means.  
Misión Sucre Aldeas and community centers were distributed to core voters in landslide 
contests. In the constitutional referendum of 2007, the size of the effect was clearer, but estimates 
of the effect of the 2008 governor contest and 2010 Assembly election show uneven effects for 
how many Aldeas supporting states receive. Controlling for other factors, the direction persisted 
throughout the decade.  
The limited data for Misión Ribas becas shows distribution to core voters in landslide 
contests in 2004, though the estimate of the presidential election in 2000 shows distribution to 
opposition voters. The mixed result is less clear than Sucre Aldeas, but the most recent data is 
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 likelier a better predictor on 2004 distributions. A clear trend emerges for landslide contests: the 
2000 presidential and 2004 contests each show landslide targeting. 
The program distributions revealed in analysis of the education Misiones reflect a 
parochial distributive strategy. Program-relevant demographic variables, particularly poverty, 
prove to be limited determinants, indicating minimal program oversight to limit the patron-client 
relationship. The limited oversight is substantiated in the case study section above. The result is 
the stunning electoral effect revealed in Chapter 6 for education Misión recipients on support for 
Chávez and affiliated parties. In choosing among recipients according to political criteria, 
minimizing program rules and oversight, the education Misiones provided Chávez with a 
mechanism to build electoral support among constituents. The program delivered social benefits, 
but through careful political targeting, the electoral benefit to the leader was greater.   
4.3 CONCLUSION 
Analysis of Bolsa Família and education Misión program oversight, expenditures, and 
distribution of program benefits reveals the institutional effect on distributional strategy. Bolsa 
Família reflects a programmatic distributive strategy, featuring rule-based program 
administration. The education Misiones reflect a parochial distributive strategy, with the rule-
based contours of the Brazilian program largely absent. 
The distribution of Bolsa Família benefits is consistently determined by program criteria 
instead of political criteria. Although core voter targeting peaks in the 2006 elections and core is 
consistent between 2006 and 2010, there is otherwise no consistent difference between 
beneficiaries in Lula- and opposition-aligned districts. Case study analysis reveals the criteria to 
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 be firmly established, with steady expenditure patterns that reveal no now-or-never expenditures 
to quickly gain the support of constituents in advance of an election. The outcomes of regression 
and marginal effects analysis show the effect of program oversight as Bolsa Família limits the 
patron-client relationship through its administration.  
This contrasts with the distribution of the Misiones, which reflect persistent differences 
between Chávez- and opposition-aligned states: as Misión Sucre targeted supporters and core 
voters before switching to opposition voters in 2010. Sucre Aldeas were targeted to supporters in 
2007 and 2010.  Ribas appears to have targeted core voters. Case study analysis reveals the 
limited importance of program criteria, with oversight problems appearing throughout the decade. 
Expenditure patterns revealed both now-or-never spending peaks to quickly gain the support of 
constituents in advance of elections in the middle of the decade, and spending declines as 
programs flagged. The outcomes of regression and marginal effects analysis suggest parochial 
strategy, as program oversight and expenditures show that the Misiones do not limit the patron-
client relationship in program administration.   
This chapter depicts the expenditure and distribution of program benefits for the two 
programs. Chapter 5 will examine the determinants of parochial and programmatic policy 
choices.  
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 5.0  EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE INTERACTIONS AND TARGETED 
ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS IN BRAZIL AND VENEZUELA 
This chapter examines the political determinants of antipoverty policies chosen by presidents in 
Brazil and Venezuela. Each case illustrates the constitutional and partisan powers of the 
presidency by revealing institutional differences that determine relations as legislators delegate 
policymaking authority. The case begins by describing the capacity of decree power and the 
political context that enables decree usage. It then proceeds by describing the characteristics of 
the legislature that limit the latitude of the executive in designing policy: the institutionalization 
of the party system and the share of parties in the legislature. Following this, the cases describe 
the executive-legislative interactions that resulted in program passage. Key opposition and 
government representative political preferences are detailed, allowing for the analysis of what 
characteristics the programs could have had absent the institutional effect on the program 
features. The cases are then related to the theory introduced in Chapter 2. 
The chapter proceeds with the Brazil case, presenting the characteristics outlined above, 
then continues with the Venezuela case. Presenting the cases in this order permits illustration of 
the horizontal accountability effects in Brazil that limit the executive’s ability to exploit their 
authority before demonstrating the party system breakdown in Venezuela that exposes the limits 
of horizontal accountability. The political routes to Bolsa Família and the Misiones are described 
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 here followed by detailed descriptions of program oversight, expenditure and redistributive 
outcomes in Chapter 6.  
5.1 BRAZIL 
This section will evaluate the constitutional and partisan powers of the presidency in Brazil.  The 
Brazilian case illustrates the effects of a strong president with constitutional decree authority and 
favorable conditions to issue decrees. However, the partisan powers of the president are weak, as 
electoral rules limit partisan composition of the legislature from containing a majority of the 
president’s party and require the crafting of coalitions to govern.  This results in a limited 
president whose partisan powers matter more than their decree powers: to get decrees passed into 
laws, the executive relies on the presence of a stable supporting coalition.  
Even as decree usage increased after 2001, presidents required a coalition to translate 
decrees into law. In Brazil, constitutional powers allow the executive to initiate legislation by 
decree, labeled by Carey and Shugart as a form of Constitutional Decree Authority (Carey and 
Shugart 1997). Constitutional changes and a public opinion climate amenable to delegation of 
legislative power to the newly elected President Lula resulted in a favorable climate for the leader 
to issue decrees: a 2001 constitutional amendment increased the decree powers of the executive, 
allowing the president to issue provisional decrees with a rule that required the assembly to act on 
them within 45 days. These changes were met with an executive that came to power with a large 
margin of victory, giving broad authority on which Lula placed his agenda.  
Despite increased decree usage, the executive relies on partisan powers – political support 
from its coalition – to enact their agenda. The partisan powers of the presidency are constrained 
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 by electoral rules that limit the president’s party from maintaining an outright majority in 
Congress. This results in coalition behavior among the major parties that have institutionalized 
over time. Initial coalitional composition limited the policy agenda initiated by Lula, and due to 
institutionalized political opposition in a consolidating party system, the leader was met with a 
legislature amenable to the introduction of reform measures that moderated the policy outcome of 
Bolsa Família.   
The strong decree power of the executive and broad electoral authority of the Brazilian 
presidency meet weak partisan powers, given how electoral rules affect the composition of the 
legislature. The interaction of these two factors explains how the legislature checks presidential 
initiatives introduced by decree (Alston et al. 2006; Ames 2001, 2002). Despite the particularly 
strong constitutional powers, the president is checked by the composition of parties in the system.  
This section will review the strength of the constitutional and partisan powers in Brazil. It 
will then describe the passage of Bolsa Família, and relate the outcome to the theory proposed in 
Chapter 2 and elaborated in the earlier sections. In doing so, it will review the policy preferences 
of the opposition and members of the PT to illustrate the constraints faced: in the presence of the 
strong party system that left the PT with weak partisan powers, members of Lula’s party could not 
reduce program conditionalities to deliver it in a way to include more political supporters.  
5.1.1 Constitutional Powers 
In Brazil, decree authority is constitutionally permitted under Article 62, allowing the executive to 
introduce legislation through decree, known as medidas previsórias com força de lei (provisional 
decrees with the force of law) (Carey and Shugart 1997; Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2008). 
Delegation theory posits that decree use increases during periods of political conditions favorable 
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 to the executive. Three conditions made decrees more likely: a change in decree rules that 
resulted in stronger agenda power and an increase in the number of decrees issued, Lula’s overall 
level of popularity, and Congressional composition  – here government coalitions – favorable to 
Lula’s government. 
5.1.1.1 Institutional Effects on Executive Power 
The number of decrees has increased over successive presidential administrations from Franco to 
Lula. The practice of introducing decrees – (medidas provisórias com força de lei, or MPVs) is 
routine, however decree power sharpened in the early 2000s (Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2008; 
Reich 2002). That year, an amendment to Article 62 of the Constitution in 2001 limited their use 
to specific issue areas, and limited the number of times that decrees could be reissued to one from 
an unlimited number of reissues (Alston et al. 2006, 18).  With the change, issuance allowed the 
executive to legislate while requiring Congressional review within 45 days (Alston et al. 2006). 
Failure of Congress to act within that timeframe resulted in the decree automatically rising to the 
top of the legislative agenda, overriding other business, a sure impact on the assembly’s ability to 
prioritize initiatives (Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2008, 7).  If no action were taken, the decree 
would expire 120 days after issue, and after expiration, and the president could not reintroduce the 
decree during the same legislative session. This allowed the president a limited window to 
propose legislation and secure a coalition for approval, and placed demands on the executive who 
had one chance to “get it right” (Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2008, 14). This placed pressure on the 
executive branch to decree legislation that would be met with approval. It also led to increases in 
decree introduction, as a decree would make a vote on legislation likely to occur within 45 days 
of issue. After this change occurred, the president had increased power over the Congressional 
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 agenda: Lula signed decrees at a rate nearly 50 percent greater than the average rate of 
predecessors from 1988-2001 (Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2008, 7). 
Passage of the amendment had a sharpening effect on the agenda power of the president, 
resulting in more decrees, not less, being introduced. After the amendment was passed, the 
monthly average of decrees more than doubled (from 3.1 to 6.8 per month) at the end of the 
Cardoso administration, and the high rate persisted during Lula’s first term (4.8 per month) 
(Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2008, 7-8). Because presidents could reissue decrees indefinitely in 
the re-reform period, these decrees were more resistant to political context (Pereira, Power, and 
Rennó 2008, 21). The change resulted in greater sensitivity of the executive to the context of 
Congressional politics. Over time, decree usage by the president has become more sensitive to 
political context as the reduction in the number of decree reissues required more careful 
consideration of matters of popularity, management of the coalition that supports the president 
(Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2008, 20-1). With careful management of Congressional politics, 
decrees became one of the specialties of the executive branch over time as rule changes focused 
the agenda power of the presidency. 
5.1.1.2 Favorability Effects on Delegation 
In addition to the effect of the constitutional change, positive public opinion creates a climate 
more favorable to decree usage. Periods where legislatures delegate to executives to issue decrees 
include times when presidents enjoy greater support from the legislature and the public and 
during congruence among policy preferences of the executive and legislature (Pereira, Power, and 
Rennó 2005). The relative popularity of Lula resulted in legislative support for measures he 
introduced, as shown below through electoral and public opinion data.  
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 Table 18 shows electoral margin of victory in the second round of elections 2002-2010.  
The electoral margin of victory exceeded 20 percent in the second round of the 2002 election. 
Lula captured 61.3 percent of the vote compared to Serra’s 38.7 percent, a 22.6 percent margin of 
victory (Álvarez-Rivera 2010). 
 
Table 18. Executive Margin of Victory, Brazil 1994-2010 
Margin of Victory, 1994-98; 2002-2010 (Second Round) 
 Year Victor % of Vote Challenger % of Vote Margin 
1994 Cardoso 54.3% Lula 27.0% 27.3% 
1998 Cardoso 53.1% Lula 31.7% 21.4% 
2002 Lula 61.30% Serra 38.70% 22.60% 
2006 Lula 60.83% Alckmin 39.17% 21.66% 
2010 Dilma 56.05% Serra 43.95% 12.10% 
(Álvarez-Rivera 2010) 
 
 
Carrying a sizable electoral margin shows the public support for Lula compared to 
opposition candidates, but it also offers a mandate for the early part of the president’s term. Lula’s 
margin was smaller than Cardoso’s first-term margin (27.3 percent), though certainly sizable. The 
level of popularity expressed through electoral support supports the presence of conditions 
favorable to delegation by the legislature.  
This support is reinforced in the early part of Lula’s term (through 2004) by public 
opinion data sampling the Brazilian population. At the time when Lula introduced decrees 
relating to Bolsa Família, favorable opinion (43 percent) provided him with a climate conducive 
to delegation. Figure 18 reveals that an overall rating of “Great/Good” greater than 40 percent 
extended into early 2004 (Datafolha 2006). 
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Figure 18. Evaluation of Lula's Performance, 2003-5 
 
Lula’s positive rating was overall high in early months compared to Collor (15 percent), 
Franco (32 percent), and near the first term of Cardoso (47 percent, 24 percent second term) 
(Datafolha 2004).  In questions directly comparing the president and Cardoso, greater than 50 
percent of respondents rated Lula’s performance better than the former president from June 2003-
Decemmber 2004 (Datafolha 2004). 
Support for Lula in both public opinion and in the electoral arena shows the degree to 
which the conditions are favorable for delegation. The effects of support and institutional changes 
provided Lula with a position of strength to enact his agenda, and initiate its legislation through 
decrees. With decrees occurring at a rate 50 percent greater than Collor, Franco, or Cardoso, the 
 165 
 marginal difference in decree usage was a product of these enabling factors. The result of the 
increase in decree usages reflects greater agenda-setting power of the executive. 
Constitutional powers that give presidents the strong authority to issue decrees reflect only 
part of the executive-legislative relationship. The assembly has the power to control their policy 
interests through the amendment process during deliberation (Cox and Morgenstern 2001). Both 
Reich (2002) and Ames (2001, 2002) show how exercise of final authority on the approval of 
presidential initiatives means that decrees rarely emerge from Congress unscathed. The partisan 
powers that influence decree passage will be explored below. 
 
5.1.2 Partisan Powers 
At the time of introduction of Bolsa Família, Lula’s ability to exercise partisan power was limited 
by a weak governing coalition. Two components of the partisan powers of the president will be 
explored in this section: the institutionalization of the party system and share of congressional 
members in the governing coalition favorable to Lula. These reveal both regularization of 
interactions between the parties that compete in the system and the size of Lula’s contingent. 
They also show why initiatives rarely pass the legislature unscathed: as deputies align with the 
pro-government and opposition coalitions, the share of representatives that support presidential 
initiatives and the institutionalization of the opposition affect the degree to which the President 
can enact their agenda. In the case of Bolsa Família, this mattered on two occasions: at passage, 
the program had to sufficiently reflect the policy preferences of opposition political groups that 
the PT needed to court to pass the program; and later during debate over the reinstatement over 
program conditions, in opposition mobilization to constrain the PT from eliminating them 
 166 
 altogether. Both periods will be detailed later; the focus below is on the consolidation of the 
system that resulted in opposition checks.  
5.1.2.1 Party System Consolidation 
After democratization the party system consolidated, transitioning from the dominance of legacy 
pro-government and opposition polices to a widely dispersed distribution of parties in the 
legislature that requires governing coalitions within the presidential system. The system lacks 
rootedness, with party switching, low partisan identity, and little education- and income- based 
party identification (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Zucco 2009). Yet the parties remain, and 
average party age has increased from nearly 10 years in 1990 to over 20 years in 2006 (Zucco, 
2009, 31). According to Zucco, the party system in Brazil has shown to be more stable over time, 
despite the failure to establish rootedness.  
Over time, the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) and Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (PT), have emerged as the two most successful parties, while the Partido do 
Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) has served as a swing party, with other smaller 
parties alternating their alignment over time (Zucco 2009). In an examination of polling data from 
1989-2006, from Zucco (2009) finds low levels of societal rootedness among parties.12 While 
respondents identified supporting the PSDB and the PT stands at a low rates of 7.5 percent and 
19.9 percent, these parties captured 80 percent of the presidential vote in the last five elections 
(Zucco 2009). Support for the PT has traditionally rested with middle class voters, though the 
level of highly educated and middle-income voters decreased by 2006 (Zucco, 2009, 8-9). Yet 
121989-2002 surveys conducted by Datafolha asked the open-ended question: “what is your preferred party?” The 
2006 survey, conducted by Ibope, asked first whether the respondent “had preference or sympathy for any party” and 
“if yes, which party?”  
 
 167 
                                                 
 over this time, the total amount of partisan identification has fallen below 45 percent of 
respondents. The PMDB maintains support among voters with little education, though the support 
is relatively uniform among low-income levels. Support for the PSDB is found among higher-
level income and education groups (Zucco, 2009, 9). This lack of rootedness has resulted in a 
tendency to choose pragmatic strategies that maximize votes.  
Because of electoral rules that limit the size of the presidential party, Brazilian parties 
must build coalitions to govern. This means that cooperation occurs among parties that mobilize 
via mass movement politics as well as those that are vote-maximizing, moderating their positions 
to achieve electoral strategy. Radical redistributive-oriented parties, which would historically 
apply to the PT, find moderation to be an important consideration of policy proposals that require 
legislative approval, including budgeting for new spending initiatives (Hunter, 2010, 33). As 
parties choose to maximize voters without class- or status- based mobilizing roots, their 
programmatic linkages become less clear, and delivery of benefits becomes more important.  
Despite the incentive to generate vote-maximizing parties, the party system has 
consolidated, as can be seen in the measurement of the effective number of parties (Dunleavy and 
Boucek 2003; Laakso and Taagepera 1979). This provides not only a measurement of the size of 
vote-getting parties within the system but also a sense of the party competition that disciplines 
policymaking. Table 19 reveals the consolidation of the party system over the democratic period. 
It traces from the first post-liberalization election with limited parties through a considerable 
expansion in the 1990s where over 10 parties received double-digit numbers of seats in the 
legislature. 
 168 
 Table 19. Effective Number of Parties, Brazil, 1986-2010 
(Álvarez-Rivera 2010) 
 
 
Effective Number of 
Parliamentary Parties Effective Number of Electoral Parties 
Year (Party Share) (Vote Share) 
 1986 2.83 6.94 
  1990 8.68 30.90 
  1994 8.16 24.62 
  1998 7.14 12.66 
  2002 8.49 9.28 
  2006 9.32 10.62 
  2010 10.37 11.21 
   
 
The effective number of parliamentary parties increased steadily from 1986-2010. The 
value was at its lowest at 2.83 in 1986, expanded to 7.14 in 1998, and peaked in the 2010 at 
10.37.  The effective number of electoral parties increased from an initial value of 6.94 to a peak 
value of 30.90 in 1990, declining to 9.28 in 2002 and rebounding to 11.21 in 2010. While the two 
values differ in direction, by 2010 the share of voter support reaching double digits only included 
the PT, the PMDB, and the PSDB. The party system reflected three major parties and a number of 
smaller parties. How the parties aligned into legislative coalitions, particularly the share of the 
parties in the legislature during the conversion of Bolsa Família into law will be discussed below.  
5.1.2.2 Parties in the Legislature 
In Brazil, the coalitional structure forces political compromise among executives and rewards 
parties who deliver to their constituents. These governing coalitions are required due to electoral 
rules – open list proportional representation – that induce a multiparty system and limit the degree 
to which the president’s party can hold a majority of congressional seats (Alston, et al., 2006, 9). 
After the Collor regime, which initially avoided politicizing the government, executives cultivated 
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 coalitions with other parties (Cheibub Figueiredo, 2007, 199). In a system with weak party 
discipline and ideological roots for party strength, such coalitions are maintained through careful 
distribution of individual and coalitional goods, as well as cabinet positions.13 This is particularly 
true for politicians seeking to draw support of opposing legislators during roll call votes (Ames 
2002). 
The ability of the executive to control their agenda is dependent on creating coalitions to 
enact policy change. The coalition that formed following Lula’s inauguration comprised of the 
PT, the Partido Liberal (PL), Partido Comunista do Brasil (PC do B), Partido Socialista 
Brasileiro (PSB), Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), Partido Verde (PV). The composition of 
Lula’s coalition constrained his agenda for the first year of presidency, despite the typical 
enthusiasm associated with forcing him to rely on measures to court a winning coalition. 
Revisiting Table 1, Lula’s 2002 vote share was over 61 percent, 8 percentage points higher than 
Cardoso’s 1998 victory. Yet the leader could not muster a majority governing coalition until 
2005, restricting the extent to which he could enact his agenda.  
With a minority governing coalition, Lula lacked the partisan powers necessary to enact 
his agenda within the Assembly. Cheibub Figurerido (2007) offers calculations for the share of 
presidential party and government coalitions for democratic regimes in Brazil. Table 20 presents 
the composition and shares of the coalitions of Lula and Cardoso. In all the coalitions listed, the 
president’s share of seats in the lower house never exceeds 18.3 percent.  
13 Mainstream theory suggests that two main goods are exchanged to assist in the development of a coalition: 
patronage and cabinet positions. The exchange between the executive and members of the legislature allows 
presidents to manage the governing coalition. In a system with weak party discipline, the exchange of pork barrel and 
coalitional goods provides a means for ongoing adjustments to the coalition, given the weakness in party discipline 
(Alston et al. 2006; Ames 2002; Raile, Pereira, and Power 2010). In addition to pork, executives exchange ministry 
positions for coalition maintenance. The increase in this practice occurred following the Collor impeachment and 
continued through Lula’s presidency (Cheibub Figueiredo, 2007, 199). Interestingly enough, pork was not included in 
the amendments approved for Bolsa Família.  
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Table 20. Government Coalitions, Brazil, 1995-2007 
President Term 
Coalitio
n Party Coalition Dates 
President's 
Party Share 
of Seats in 
Câmara 
Coalition 
Share of 
Seats in 
Câmara  
Cardoso I 1 PSDB PSDB-PFL-PMDB-
PTB 
1/1/1995- 
4/25/1996 
12.5% 56.1% 
Cardoso I 2 PSDB PSDB-PFL-PMDB-
PTB-PPB 
4/26/1996- 
12/31/1998 
16.6% 77.2% 
Cardoso II 1 PSDB PSDB-PFL-PMDB-
PPB 
1/1/1999- 
3/5/2002 
18.3% 73.2% 
Cardoso II 2 PSDB PMDB-PSDB-PPB 6/3/2002- 
12/31/2002 
18.2% 45.2% 
Lula I 1 PT PT-PL-PCdoB-PSB 
-PTB-PDT-PPS-PV 
1/1/2003- 
1/22/2004 
18.0% 42.9% 
Lula I 2 PT PT-PL-PCdoB PSB-
PTB-PPS-PV-
PMDB 
1/23/2004- 
1/31/2005 
17.7% 62.4% 
Lula I 3 PT PT-PL-PCdoB-PSB-
PTB-PV-PMDB 
2/1/2005- 
5/19/2005 
17.7% 57.7% 
Lula I 4 PT PT-PL-PCdoB- 
PSB-PTB-PMDB 
5/20/2005- 
7/22/2005 
17.7% 58.3% 
Lula I 5 PT PT-PL-PCdoB -
PSB-PTB-PP-
PMDB 
7/23/2005- 
1/31/2007 
17.7% 69.6% 
(Cheibub Figuerido 2007) 
      
 
At inauguration, Lula’s coalition reflected 42.9 percent of deputies in the lower house. 
This remained until 2005, when the PMDB joined the coalition, bringing its size to 62.4%. In 
comparison to Cardoso, Lula’s initial coalition reflected a lower share of lower house seats  (42.9 
percent to Cardoso’s 56.1%) Passage of Lula’s agenda at the start of his first term – including 
converting decrees into law – required him to find the votes to secure a majority. This gave the 
assembly – particularly the opposition – the opportunity to react to the president’s initiatives and 
influence his agenda. This meant that programs would either require enough pork to secure a 
majority, or accept the influence of opposition parties on legislation. Relying on opposition 
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 legislative support affected the degree to which he could control the content of laws leading to the 
design of programs. For Bolsa Família, this limited how far the law could diverge from existing 
targeted social program design. 
In the year following his inauguration Lula’s weak partisan powers were laid bare. In the 
absence of a majority governing coalition, the leader lacked the political support necessary to pass 
key decrees without compromise. Lula needed to secure congressional conversion of MPVs into 
bills for final Senate approval, since his government coalition was smaller than necessary to pass 
without help. This meant that legislation needed to either reflect the policy preferences of 
members of both the government coalition and the opposition, or contain pork to reward 
opposition members individually for support. Passing an intiative without pork could allow 
opposition members to influence its content by requiring it to reflect their preferences as well as 
those of the government. In the case of Bolsa Família, politicians chose to attempt to influence 
policy.   
5.1.3 Partisan Powers and Bolsa Família 
This section reviews the policy preferences of actors during two key moments in the development 
of Bolsa Família. The first subsection examines the influence of opposition political parties on the 
content of MPV 132, the decree that introduced Bolsa Família, and program structure as the bill 
is sent from the Assembly to the Senate.  
The second subsection examines preferences of PT members, as they sought to influence 
the imposition of program conditions when these were suspended while the programs were 
integrated. Assessing the preferences of these actors allows for the analysis of what could have 
been introduced, had the institutional effect not been so strong on the policymaking process.  
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 These two periods are described and then theory is related to the program details. Both 
reveal the moderation of Bolsa Família during a period of weak partisan powers for the PT. 
5.1.3.1 Converting the Bolsa Família Decree into Law 
MPV 132 incorporated key features of existing government programs, drawing on support of 
politicians from parties who could claim ownership on program antecedents. This meant 
integrating existing management elements from local-level programs initiated by PT and PSDB 
politicians, and simplifying the array of targeted income support programs initiated under 
Cardoso into one. This meant that the leader could not accommodate the policy preferences 
sought by some members of the PT, such as converting the income transfer program from a 
conditional cash transfer to a guaranteed minimum income.  
Conversion of MPV 132 in the Câmara sent Bolsa Família to the Senate for final 
approval. The vote was conducted by secret ballot, obscuring the distribution of legislators that 
moved the legislation onto the Senate. The two parties that sought to obstruct conversion of MPV 
132 were a sizable contingent of Cardoso’s governing coalition.  
A procedural vote early in the day’s session to remove the conversion from the agenda 
offers evidence of opposition to passage. The PFL and the PSDB sought to remove the MPV from 
the agenda, offering party guidance to vote to obstruct the quorum. The obstruction failed 
(264/513, 51.4%), with a few members of the PSDB defecting from party guidance (Câmara dos 
Deputados 2003). Other procedural attempts at holding back conversion of MPV 132 included a 
PFL proposal to vote article by article. This proposal was rejected as well (Câmara dos 
Deputados, 2003, 68573). Reasons outlining this opposition were revealed in debate. 
PFL representatives cited two concerns in their addresses prior to the procedural vote. 
Party members offered concerns about the potential for clientelistic exchanges between elected 
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 officials and beneficiaries (Câmara dos Deputados, 2003, 68449). At the same time, members 
sought to expand eligibility by increasing the age of children eligible to receive a benefit from 15 
to 18 years of age, and by offering a higher (R$120 - half the minimum wage) income threshold 
on Bolsa Família (Câmara dos Deputados, 2003, 68450). Both changes would open Bolsa Família 
to a greater number of participants. During the debates on the conversion, the PFL reiterated these 
preferences, proposing them as amendments that were eventually rejected (Câmara dos 
Deputados, 2003, 68573). While these benefits would have distributed Bolsa Família more 
widely and transferred more resources to the poor, the PT held fast to their version of the 
program.  
The PSDB sought to defeat the MPV conversion and propose separate legislation that 
reflected the historical record as they saw it on Bolsa Família. Many of the complementary 
programs proposed for consolidation into the new program – Bolsa Escola, Vale Gás, Bolsa 
Alimentação, and Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (PETI) – were created under 
the Cardoso administration. The party sought to obstruct the vote on conversion, claiming 
ownership of the program’s key features (Câmara dos Deputados, 2003, 68559-60). It is 
important to note that while the PSDB criticized ownership of the idea to consolidate social 
programs into Bolsa Família, it did not seek amendments that would alter the structure of the 
program, as the PFL did. In the program debate, the content of MPV 132 was not subject to 
challenge by the PSDB.  
The matter of ownership of Bolsa Família was not enough to obstruct the vote, which 
occurred under secret ballot. MPV 132 was passed 18 December 2003, sending the bill enacting 
Bolsa Família onto the Senate. The content of the Bolsa Família decree was adequate for a 
majority of Assembly members to approve its passage because it contained many design elements 
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 introduced by opposition politicians. Because there is no roll call record of the vote, it must be  
inferred that since the main obstacle to PSDB support was ownership of the idea, the party’s votes 
helped pass the program that its politicians helped create.  
5.1.3.2 Turning Bolsa Família into a Minimum Income Program? 
The debate over guaranteed citizen income and conditions was an early feature of Bolsa Família 
program development in 2003-4. Much of the dialogue on social assistance had been framed by 
the work of PT Senator Edouardo Suplicy to implement a basic guaranteed income for citizens, 
attempting to establish a “compensatory social policy” up to 2.5 times the minimum salary (Britto 
& Soares, 2010, 5). Though it was never implemented, a law guaranteeing a minimum income 
was signed into law the day before Bolsa Família was approved (Britto & Soares, 2010). This law 
gave legitimacy to earlier debates over the establishment of pro-poor programs as the first steps to 
development of a guaranteed minimum income (Britto and Soares 2010). By the time it was 
passed, Bolsa Família was debated as a step in this direction (Britto & Soares, 2010, 10). During 
the period when the programs were consolidated and monitoring for program conditions was 
suspended, it almost became part of the process. 
The debate between the targeted Bolsa Família and universal guaranteed citizen income 
was further set off when monitoring for the conditionalities of Bolsa Família participation was 
temporarily suspended in 2004 during the transition year. While monitoring for Bolsa Escola had 
only ever reached 19 percent of schools reporting, this suspension caused a crisis in legitimacy of 
the program that resulted in leadership changes and management reforms14 (Lindert & 
Vincensini, 2010, 65, Britto & Soares, 2010, 14). As policymakers entered into the media fracas 
14 The authors also note that conditionality in pre-Bolsa Família programs was not emphasized by the media, which 
may have been a product of Bolsa Escola being a part of the Education Ministry (Lindert & Vincensini, 2010, 62)..  
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 that resulted from the suspension, a debate over the impact of monitoring compliance and 
program purpose occurred, with some policymakers suggesting that the mere existence of the 
conditions was enough to communicate to citizens their constitutional “rights” to basic services 
(Lindert & Vincensini, 2010, 62-3). Opposition to this view grew among government, press, and 
scholars, who suggested that this would hurt long-term structural goals of the program and lead to 
clientelism (Lindert & Vincensini, 2010, 63). 
The government responded to the media firestorm by announcing plans to “reinstate and 
systematize the monitoring and compliance with program conditionalities” which resulted in the 
replacement of the ministry’s technical team with “clear instructions to solidify all oversight and 
controls mechanisms – including for monitoring of conditionalities” (Lindert & Vincensini, 2010, 
63-4). By 2006, 99 percent of municipalities and 93 percent of schools were reporting on school 
attendance compliance (Lindert & Vincensini, 2010, 64). Lindert and Vincensini noted that media 
did not heavily emphasize the use of transfers as a way of promoting basic citizen rights. Media 
coverage did however focus on the “long run structural impacts,” “providing contractual 
incentives to invest in education and health,” and “reducing welfare dependency and 
assistencialismo” (Lindert & Vincensini, 2010, 60-1). Despite the media coverage, the debate was 
framed according to institutional aspects of the program and constitutional rights by policymakers 
and the government.  
This debate erupted during 2004, the same period of weak partisan powers in which the 
PT’s coalition was in the minority. This limited the extent to which the members of the party 
could legislate the conditions away. Despite revealing their preference to remove the conditions, 
the program continued to be administered as designed. The moderation reflected political 
limitations of Lula’s administration and prevented any backdoor option to achieving the goals of a 
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 guaranteed basic income. It revealed the shift from initial party policy goals to a moderated 
approach, continuing to administer the program as it was designed. The reestablishment of the 
program criteria ensured that the long-term impacts would be felt and that parochial distributions 
would be largely avoided.  
5.1.3.3 Relating the Passage to Theory  
The institutional checks described in the sections above reveal the weak partisan powers of Lula 
and PT politicians as they proposed Bolsa Família. The integration of reform elements predicted 
by coalition government and the moderation effects predicted in Chapter 2 are shown in the 
proposal and conversion of MPV 132. The presidential decree that introduced the program 
reflected moderated policy preferences that bore many reformist characteristics of antecedents 
introduced by the opposition. This moderation carried through to a precarious period in program 
administration: when program conditions were suspended, the PT had a unique opportunity to 
reshape Bolsa Família into a guaranteed income program, a policy goal of a prominent member, 
and reach more constituents by guaranteeing transfers. It could not, and the reforms persisted as 
the party succumbed to opposition and media pressure. Bolsa Família was subject to the political 
constraints imposed by the opposition when the president’s partisan powers were weak.  
The program introduced in MPV 132 was more reform oriented, targeted more tightly 
than desired by even the center-right politicians in the PFL. Compared to the alternative program 
features proposed, the decree’s thresholds were more restrictive in terms of income and age 
eligibility for recipient children. Even when conditions were relaxed during the first year of 
implementation, public pressure from opposition politicians and the media prevented the 
government from transitioning Bolsa Família into a guaranteed minimum income program. The 
limitations of the program’s scope resulted from how political competition shaped executive-
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 legislative relations. 
In the early part of Lula’s first term, his partisan powers were relatively weak. The 
institutionalization of the party system introduced an interaction between the government and 
opposition as political coalitions formed. It resulted in Lula anticipating the repeat-play 
characteristics of politics and factoring them into program design: Bolsa Família drew its reform-
oriented design elements from programs already implemented under the opposition PSDB. The 
party’s claims regarding the provenance of many of Bolsa Família’s components were correct, 
though PSDB and PT governments each initiated programs similar to Bolsa Escola at the 
municipal level in Campinas and Distrito Federal, respectively. Bolsa Família passed with tighter 
income thresholds, proposed by a president with a minority coalition in the lower house. It 
consolidated existing programs passed under opposition government into a single program, 
simplifying administration.  
During the year where programs were consolidated into Bolsa Família, the PT reopened a 
debate over whether the program should be changed to a guaranteed minimum income. With 
some party members viewing the program as a step in that direction, their best opportunity to do 
so came when program conditions were suspended during this transition. Two factors prevented 
the government from abandoning these conditions altogether, eliminating the reform-oriented 
elements from the program, and widening it to redistribute to more low-income constituents. The 
coalitional structure remained the same as when the program was introduced, resulting in weak 
partisan powers, and the public pressure from opposition and media made dropping the conditions 
impossible. The party simply could not change the program, despite members’ preference to 
widen it from a conditional cash transfer into a guaranteed minimum income by eliminating the 
reform elements. 
 178 
 Examining the preferences of the political parties in Brazil shows how weak partisan 
powers affected the program contours: Bolsa Família bore significant resemblance to antecedent 
programs, and at a time when the opportunity to alter the program arose, those who wanted to do 
so could not. The result of these interactions was a program that retained reform elements – 
conditionalities that limited parochial distributions from occurring and a targeted, rather than 
universal program – as well as moderated policy change from earlier programs. Below, the 
Venezuela case will provide evidence of increased policy latitude where partisan powers are 
strong.  
5.2 VENEZUELA 
This section will evaluate the constitutional and partisan powers of the presidency in Venezuela. 
The Venezuelan case illustrates the effects of a strong president through informally exercised 
decree powers and the presence of a wide executive margin of victory.  The decree powers are 
weak, dependent on the composition of the legislature. However, partisan powers of Chávez were 
strong, and since 2000 his political coalition contained a majority in the Assembly.  
The president has weak decree powers except in extraordinary situations where the 
assembly grants sweeping decree powers to the president, labeled by Carey and Shugart as 
Delegated Decree Authority (Carey and Shugart 1997; Crisp 1997). Chávez used the weak decree 
authority to govern informally, frequently without legislative approval. Rules regarding decree 
powers were met with an executive that came to power with a large margin of victory, suggesting 
broad authority on which Chávez placed his agenda; however the leader was not met with popular 
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 approval throughout his tenure. The patterns of decree usage and approval, particularly in the case 
of the Misiones, vary with the leader’s favorability. 
The partisan powers of the presidency include majority control of the legislature, which 
resulted in the Chávez-aligned Movimento Quinta Republica (MVR) and other smaller parties 
endorsing the leader’s agenda following the 2000 election, and the Partido Socialistia Unido de 
Venezuela (PSUV), the new party of the president, doing so after the 2005 election. In addition, 
the breakdown of the party system resulted in the absence of institutionalized opposition to 
moderate policy proposals.  
Decree usage and favorability of Chávez meet strong partisan powers, as the friendly 
legislature delegated decree authority to the President during a period of devastation for the 
opposition. The interaction of these two factors explains how the legislature does not provide 
strong checks on the presidential initiatives, allowing the Misiones to pass. 
This section will review the strength of the constitutional and partisan powers in 
Venezuela. It will then describe the passage of Misiones, and relate the outcome to the theory 
proposed in Chapter 2 and elaborated in the earlier sections. In doing so, it will review the policy 
preferences of the opposition and government to illustrate how Chávez faced so few constraints – 
in the presence a weak party system that left him with strong partisan powers – the program 
criteria were so weak that they could include more political supporters. Below the constitutional 
and partisan powers presidency will be explored. 
5.2.1 Constitutional Powers 
Decrees factored separately into the introduction and institutionalization of the Misiones. The 
decrees that initiated the Misiones reflected informal use of ordinary executive power to establish 
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 the foundations and institutions that reflected this new type of administration. The programs were 
decreed during a period of unfavorable public opinion during Chávez’s second presidential term – 
in part a response to Chávez’s favorability problem. They were institutionalized during a period 
of decree authority delegated by a Chávez-aligned Assembly. This occurred during a period of 
increased favorability and Congressional composition that was dominant in favor of Chávez-
aligned parties.  
5.2.1.1 Institutional Effects on Executive Power 
Prior to the changes in 1999, the constitutional powers of the executive in Venezuela were 
considered to be weak, with restriction on consecutive terms, limited veto capability, and 
delegated decree authority (Shugart and Mainwaring 1997). The new constitution enabled 
consecutive terms, which were lengthened to 6 years (Crisp, 2000, 232). While both constitutions 
permitted decree authority – leyes habilitantes (enabling laws) – delegated by Congress, under 
Article 203 of the Constitution. Decree authority was previously reserved for economic and 
financial matters. Under the 1999 Constitution, conditions of its use were expanded to all policy 
areas and in states of exception (Carey & Shugart, 1997; Crisp, 1997, 2000, 232). The expansion 
of decree powers and new term limits were pivotal in establishing the Misiones, as Chávez 
decreed the formal institutionalization of the programs in the term following their creation. 
Despite the attention to the practice of delegated decree authority, leyes habilitantes 
reflected only part of the decree authority practiced by Chávez, as the leader governed informally 
by executive decree. Chávez regularly governed by decree, utilizing them to initiate the 
legislation sent to Congress for approval. Chávez utilized decrees of this type to establish 
institutions, including the Misiones, foundations established to fund infrastructure development, 
and to direct the activities of nationalized industries. Chávez did not often wait for legislative 
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 approval after initiating a decree; activities often began before approval by the Assembly. It took 
five years for the Misiones initiated by decree in 2003 to be institutionalized into legislation, 
allowing for regular funding.  
The leyes habilitantes granted by Congress have been exercised 8 times between 1961-
2011. These included Caldera’s attempts to institute neoliberal economic reforms, discussed later, 
which affected the party system. Monaldi, et al. suggest specialization of the executive as a reason 
for delegating the drafting of legislation to the executive, citing inexperience and lack of expertise 
among members of the Assembly (Monaldi et al. 2006). Chávez was granted decree authority 
four times: in 1999, 2000, 2007 and 2010. For all but the 1999 decree, where Chávez threatened a 
state of emergency, the instances supported Carey and Shugart’s hypothesis that delegated decree 
authority was likelier when the president’s party controlled Congress. 
The 1999 law granted the leader the ability to issue decrees including a 0.5 percent tax on 
financial transactions, a value-added tax, income tax reform, and a reduction in the size of the 
government (Flores-Macías, 2009, 12). Chávez publicly threatened to declare a state of 
emergency to override Congressional refusal to grant him the authority he sought to renegotiate or 
incur additional debt and to decree laws that related to the oil industry (Flores-Macías, 2009 13). 
Congress eventually capitulated to the threat, allowing the additional changes. The 2000 law 
permitted Chávez to legislate on financial, economic, social, infrastructure and transportation, 
public safety, science and technology, and state organization, resulting in 49 decrees that 
increased the degree of state intervention in the economy. These included land reform, a new 
hydrocarbons law, and income taxes for oil companies (Flores-Macías, 2009, 13). 
The 2007 law – granted for an unprecedented 18 months – included the national defense, 
public safety, energy and infrastructure, and resulted in nationalization of the electric sector, the 
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 Orinoco Belt petroleum reserve, and determined the transition to the Bolivar Fuerte (Flores-
Macías, 2009, 14). Many of the decrees issued during this period were amendments to the 
constitution rejected by referendum (Brewer-Carias 2010). In 2008, the final day of authority, the 
law giving force to the Misiones was included among those decreed. 
The 2010 law, granted for 18 months following electoral gains by the opposition coalition, 
resulted in 54 decrees including disaster relief, banking sector reform, armed forces, and price 
controls (Procaduría General de la República 2012). This law allowed executive dominance over 
the new congressional session for the duration of Chavez’s term. 
5.2.1.2 Favorability Effects on Delegation 
Favorability had an effect on how the Assembly delegated decree authority to Chávez, both for 
the formal decree powers given to him, and informal ones practiced at times of diminished 
popularity. With a strong margin of victory and favorable public opinion, the legislature delegated 
to Chávez formal decree powers. Chávez also declared initiatives in the Gaceta Oficial that 
founded the Misiones during a period of less favorable public opinion. Doing so allowed him to 
set the policy agenda, resulting in the introduction of these social programs at a time when 
popularity flagged. These were bold decisions, which reflected institutional weakness revealed by 
the collapse of the party system.  Both kinds of decree powers impacted the Misiones: the 
programs were later formalized in legislation during a period of much greater popularity. By then, 
Chávez had an even more favorable coalition in the legislature, and much stronger partisan 
powers. 
Table 21 shows electoral margin of victory in 1993-2012 elections. Between 1998-2012, 
Chávez won with double-digit margins over opposition politicians, exceeding 20 percent margins 
in 2000 (22.3%) and 2006 (25.9%).  
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 Table 21. Executive Margin of Victory, Venezuela, 1994-2012 
      Year Leader % of Vote Challenger % of Vote Margin 
1993 Caldera 30.50% Fermin 23.60% 6.90% 
1998 Chávez 56.20% Römer 39.97% 16.23% 
2000 Chávez 59.80% Arias 37.50% 22.30% 
2006 Chávez 62.84% Rosales 36.90% 25.94% 
2012 Chávez 55.07% Capriles 44.31% 10.76% 
(Consejo Nacional Electoral 2013) 
 
 
The sizable electoral margins show the public support for Chávez compared to political 
opposition, but it also offers a mandate for the early part of the president’s terms. Chávez’s 
margin was certainly greater than Caldera’s margin (6.9 percent). As the description of the party 
system below shows, the relative strength of Chávez reflected outsize agenda power during the 
period where deinstitutionalization of the party system most greatly affected the popularity of 
opposition presidential candidates and their share of seats in the Assembly. The periods between 
elections reflected lower levels of Chávez popularity.  
Figure 19 shows the overall evaluation of Chávez management for the period 1998-2011 
(Consultores 21 2011). The line consists of the sum of all respondents who answered “good” or 
“very good” to the question “how would you rate this government of Hugo Chávez?” in 
Consultores 21’s quarterly survey (Consultores 21, 2011, 25). The favorability rating for the 
President’s government exceeded 50 percent through the first term, but then dipped below 30 
percent during the second term. The rating recovered during 2003 and peaked in 2006 before 
hovering at the leader’s historical average between 2008-2010.  
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Figure 19. Evaluation of Chávez's Performance 1999-2011 
(Consultores 21 2011) 
 
Chávez did not acquire delegated decree authority to found the Misiónes, but he used it to 
legislate their status in 2007. At their founding, his popularity was relatively weak, suggesting 
that it was a poor time to ask for these powers. However, a decree legislating the programs was 
issued during a ley habilitante granted to the leader in a period of average popularity. The period 
during which Chávez founded the Misiones corresponded with May-September 2003, which 
reflects some of the lowest ratings in the 13-year chart. The period during which the Misiones 
were formalized by legislative decree reflected the historical average for the Chávez 
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 government’s favorability. Popularity was one factor in how the president decreed the programs: 
during low popularity, these programs were informally established. Even at a point of average 
popularity, the legislature provided Chávez with a ley habilitante during which he legislated the 
Misiones. 
Support for Chávez in the electoral arena and in public opinion show the degree to which 
conditions were favorable to formal delegated decree authority, and the informal governance that 
occurred when conditions were unfavorable. The Misiones were introduced informally through 
decree during a period of diminished popularity after the coup. Later, during a period of average 
popularity, the assembly granted Chávez increased authority. In Venezuela, public opinion was a 
necessary but insufficient factor affecting delegation. When the legislature gave Chávez the power 
to codify the Misiones depended on its partisan composition. Described below, the partisan 
powers that affected delegated decree authority show what gave Chávez so much power at merely 
an average popularity level.  
5.2.2 Partisan Powers  
Two components of the partisan powers of the president will be explored in this section: the 
deinstitutionalization of the party system and the size of the political coalition favorable to 
Chávez. The account below reveals the absence of regularization of interactions between parties 
that compete in the system and resulting domination of Chávez’s contingent. They reveal the 
sheer scope of the leader’s agenda power in the absence of institutionalized competition: from 
2006-10, Chávez-led initiatives could become law when the majority Chávez-aligned Assembly 
chose to delegate authority to the leader. 
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 5.2.2.1 Party System Deinstitutionalization 
The decline of the party system in Venezuela between the 1990s-early 2000s devastated the Punto 
Fijo “partyarchy” system of democracy present since 1958. The two parties that had hegemonic 
status over party politics in Venezuela: Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente 
(COPEI) and Acción Democratica (AD). Both AD and COPEI declined in popularity as voters 
began to abstain from political process, recognizing few possibilities in changing their fortunes in 
the system of representation (Crisp, 2000, 13). The collapse of AD and COPEI allowed outsider-
led insurgent parties and once-smaller parties to gain in legislature. The transition to new parties 
occurred as social linkages to COPEI and AD were severed as leaders attempted to institute 
neoliberal economic policy (Roberts 2003a, 2003b). This change to rootedness of parties had a 
striking impact on how individuals identified with the once-hegemonic parties, and gave rise to 
the “new left” parties, the MVR, La Causa Radical (LCR - The Radical Cause), Patria Para 
Todos (PPT - Homeland for All), and eventually, the PSUV – parties that would come to 
dominate the Venezuelan National Assembly.  
AD fell first, as support for the party fell following the 1988 presidential election of 
Carlos Andres Perez, who announced neoliberal reforms. After seeking support through party 
linkages to labor confederations, the leader’s proposals were counter to these groups’ preferences 
(Murillo, 2000). Following the election, the president announced economic reforms that enacted 
neoliberal policies including the privatization of state-owned industries, trade liberalization, and 
private sector deregulation (Morgan, 2007, 82). Despite the protests associated with the 
announced reforms, Pérez chose to proceed with much of his agenda, though some of the reforms 
were scaled back (Morgan, 2007, 82). While Perez made concessions, the neoliberal policies 
enacted resulted in a collapse in popularity for AD amid socioeconomic consequences of the 
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 economic transition (Murillo, 2000, 154). Following the rejection of AD, COPEI too fell from 
popularity, as it failed to turn the unpopularity of the effects of the policies of Pérez into lasting 
political effects. The fall of COPEI began with the former president (and party leader) Caldera 
abandoning the party and then winning reelection in 1993 (Morgan, 2007, 82). According to 
Morgan, feuding over party control affected the institutional credibility of the party and its 
movement and weakened its viability of COPEI presenting itself as the alternative to AD 
(Morgan, 2007, 82). 
Political polarization followed social polarization. Throughout the breakdown of the 
pacted system over the 1990s, a change occurred in the way that parties participated in the 
electoral arena. Two events: consolidation of parties competing against the parties of Chávez and 
the 2005 legislative boycott effectively reduced the number of competing parties within the 
country over the late 2000s.  
Compiling polling data on partisan identification, Morgan (2007) depicts the decline of 
these traditional parties and a rise in popularity of the “new left” and “new right,” with new 
parties surpassing old ones in 1998.15 Decreases in the level of respondent support for AD and 
COPEI and “Old Left” parties, including: MAS, Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo (MEP – 
People’s Electoral Movement), Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR - Revolutionary 
Left Movement), Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV - Venezuelan Communist Party) reveals 
a significant shift in partisan identification. The resulting transition toward the “New Left,” 
included the parties: LCR, MVR, PPT, and “New Right,” of Convergencia Nacional (National 
15 Morgan categorizes the “Old Left” to include: MAS, MEP, MIR, PCV.  The author categorizes the “New Right” to 
include: Convergencia, IRENE, PV, MPJ, and Gente de Petroleo. The author categorizes the “New Left” to include 
LCR, MVR, PPT. The author draws the sources from face to face polls conducted by the following public opinion 
organizations: Baloyra, Batoba, Consultores 21, DATOS, and IVAD, and compiled them accordingly (Morgan, 2007, 
81). 
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 Convergence), Integración y Renovación Nueva Esperanza (IRENE - New Hope Integration and 
Renovation), Proyecto Venezuela (PV), Movimiento Primero Justicia (MPJ – Justice First 
Movement), and Gente de Petroleo parties (Morgan, 2007, 81). 
The transition from the “partyarchy” of the previous party system to polarization in the 
current system can be seen in the measurement of the effective number of parties. This provides 
not only a measurement of the size of vote-getting parties within the system but also a sense of 
the party competition that disciplines policymaking. Table 22 shows how the party system 
changed between 1993 and 2010, with a steady decline in both the effective number of 
parliamentary parties and the effective number of electoral parties.  
 
Table 22. Effective Number of Parties, Venezuela National Assembly, 1993-2010 
(Consejo Nacional Electoral 2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2010) 
 
Effective Number of 
Parliamentary Parties  
(Party Share) 
Effective Number of 
Electoral Parties 
(Vote Share) 
 1978 2.83 3.61 
 1983 2.42 2.71 
 1988 2.67 3.31 
 1993 11.72 8.38 
 1998 6.29 9.70 
 2000 2.12 4.30  
2005 1.86 2.37  
2010 1.97 2.19  
 
 
Over the 30 years of elections, the effective number of parliamentary parties (those parties 
winning seats) swelled from just over 2.5 between 1978-88 to 11.72 parties during the period of 
crisis. The figure then declined to 1.97 effective parties in the legislature, with the steepest decline 
occurring between 1993-2000, where it reaches 2.12 effective parliamentary parties. The effective 
number of electoral parties (those parties getting a share of votes) expanded from just over 3.2 
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 between 1978-88 to 8.38 parties during the period of crisis in 1993. A peak value in 1998 of 9.70 
effective parties occurred in 1998, and the vote share measure truly begins consolidating into two 
effective parties in the 2005 election, declining to 2.19 by 2010. While the two measures differ on 
which election exhibits the endpoint of the transition to polarization, the breakdown of the 
previous system of representation is evident over the timeframe. By the time the parties 
consolidated following the crisis, the result found is that one large party (MVR, then the PSUV) 
dominated the legislature, while many small parties compete. 
The effective number of parties never reached a value of one, suggesting that Venezuela 
never became a one-party state. But during the decline, opposition parties became nearly 
completely ineffective, boycotting the 2005 Assembly elections and ceding it nearly entirely to 
Chávez-aligned parties (Alvarez, 2006, 25). The failure to effectively oppose Chávez’s coalition 
is an outcome of the party system collapse described below. The change in party support over 
about a 15-year period reveals the effects of social and political polarization on the party system. 
The outcome of this effect – strong partisan powers for Chávez – is reviewed below. 
5.2.2.2 Parties in the Legislature 
The consolidation of the polarized political system in Venezuela is revealed in electoral data and 
the formation of coalitions among New Left parties. The reshaping of the Venezuelan party 
system offered Chávez a massive partisan advantage over opposition parties between 2000-10, 
allowing the leader broad sway in agenda power over the course of the decade. 
The transformation of the party system in Venezuela is revealed in the shift of voting 
behavior away from AD and COPEI toward the Chávez-aligned parties. Table 22 displays the 
share of voting for Venezuelan parties in the lower house elections from 1947-2010.  
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Table 23. Share of Votes for Venezuelan Parties, Venezuelan National Assembly, 1947-2010 
(Figures in percentages)  
(Alvarez 2006; Consejo Nacional Electoral 2005, 2010) 
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The rise in vote share for the MVR between 1998-2005 reveals not only a significant 
increase in support for the party, but also a relative decrease for AD and COPEI along with other 
leftist parties including the MAS, LCR, and even minor parties such as MEP and the PCV. The 
consolidation of electoral support to the MVR (and later the PSUV) revealed an effective 
reduction in power to more diverse leftist interests within the legislature.  
This transformation continued into a bottoming out in the 2005 legislative elections, the 
first to follow the coup. The number of parties competing for the legislature declined as AD and 
COPEI held a boycott of the 2005 legislative elections. The choice was made according to three 
reasons: claims of voting fraud, an attempt to delegitimize the MVR, and most importantly, the 
anticipation of significant losses. A pre-election poll showed that the MVR was preferred by 55 
percent of voters, while opposition parties (AD, COPEI, PV, MPJ, ABP, UNT, and LCR) had the 
support of 14 percent of the voting population polled (Alvarez 2006).  
Following the 2006 general election, Chávez called for a new party, forming the PSUV, 
which was organized to serve as a mobilizing vehicle for social movements. The party attempted 
to incorporate a form of organization that was bottom-up in its orientation, emphasizing member 
activism (Hawkins, 2010a, 45). The PSUV was intended to address challenges to the MVR, 
namely corruption and top-down hierarchical organization. It also reflected an attempt to 
transition from a coalition of Chavez-aligned parties to replacement of all Chávez-aligned 
parties16 (Lyne 2008). Most Chávez loyalists followed the leader to the new party and by June 
2007, over 5 million members had joined the party (Ellner, 2008, 127).  
16 In some ways, the PSUV bore resemblance to the hierarchical structure of the MVR with its Círculos, utilizing a 
limited management structure and a primary organizational block, here referred to as “battalions.” These campaigned 
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 The MVR formed coalitions with other smaller parties as it transitioned from a minority 
party behind AD and COPEI in 1998 to the dominant party in the 2000 and 2005 elections.  Table 
24 shows the governing coalitions under Caldera and the three Chávez terms from 1999-2009, 
based on alignments cited in Crisp (2000), Ellner (2008), and Lyne (2008).   
Table 24. Chávez-aligned Parties in the Assembly 2000-10 
President Term Coalition Party Coalition Dates 
President's 
Party Share 
of Seats in 
Assembly 
Coalition 
Share of 
Seats in 
Assembly 
Caldera II 1 Convergencia MAS-MEP-
PCV-URD-
MIN 
1993-98 14.2% 15.3% 
Chavez I 1 MVR MVR-PPT-
PCV-MAS-
MEP 
1999-
2000 
16.9% 35.3% 
Chavez II 1 MVR MVR-PPT-
PCV-MAS 
2001-06 64.1% 68.3% 
Chavez III 1 PSUV MVR-PSUV-
PPT-PCV-
PODEMOS-
MEP 
2006-10 72.0% 93.8% 
Chavez III 2 PSUV PSUV-PPT-
LCR 
2011-13 59.3% 59.3% 
(Crisp 2000; Ellner 2008; Lyne 
2008) 
      
 
Comparing Caldera’s term with the first term of Chávez, both leaders faced AD pluralities 
and sought coalitions consisting of smaller leftist parties, including MAS and the PCV. The 
growth in share of seats of the MVR reveals the scope of the partisan power of Chávez as the 
opposition held out of the electoral contests. For Chávez, the major shift in coalition size occurred 
with the 2000 election – after the enactment of the new constitution – when the contingent of 
to mobilize voters heavily during the state and municipal elections in 2008, but were not considered central to the 
2009 term-limit constitutional referendum (Ellner 2009). 
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 MVR candidates reached 64 percent of the Assembly. The coalition seats brought the total 
Chávez-aligned figure to 68 percent, including Patria Para Todos (Homeland for All – PPT), 
MAS, and the PCV. 
Partisan power peaked between 2006-2010. With the opposition boycott in the 2005 
election, the MVR captured 72 percent of the seats in the Assembly. These members transitioned 
to the PSUV during the session as the MVR was dissolved. The Chávez-aligned coalition brought 
the total seats to 93.8 percent including the MEP, PPT, the PCV, and PODEMOS (Por la 
Democrácia Social) (Ellner, 2008, 127) .  
By 2008, opposition parties formed a coalition, Mesas de la Unidad Democrática (MUD), 
comprised of AD, COPEI, Primero Justicia, Un Nuevo Tempo, Proyecto Venezuela, PODEMOS, 
and eventually the PPT. In the 2010 legislative election, this coalition captured 47 percent of list 
voting compared to the 48 percent won by the PSUV.17 This resulted in 59.3 percent of seats held 
by the PSUV and 40.7 percent held by the opposition, reflecting a consolidation of the party 
system into two main opposing parties. With this new distribution of seats, Chávez lacked the 
two-thirds majority needed to introduce new leyes habilitantes into the Assembly. In response, the 
outgoing Chavez-dominated Assembly delegated decree authority for 18 months mere weeks 
before the new legislative session began, further cementing the power of Chávez (“Asamblea 
Nacional Sancionó Ley Habilitante Por 18 Meses” 2010). 
The arc of MVR/ PSUV dominance in the Assembly resulted in sweeping partisan power 
for Chávez during his third term. The lack of seats held by opposition parties following the 
boycott reduced the competitiveness of the Assembly, allowing Chávez-led initiatives to 
17 In 2010, between party list seats and nominal seats, the PSUV won a total of 96 seats in the assembly, while the 
MUD won 64. The PPT chose to be listed separately and won 2 seats.  
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 dominate the legislature and providing the president with broad authority to legislate the Misiones 
formally by decree.  
5.2.3 Partisan Powers and the Misiones 
This section reviews the policy preferences of the opposition and government actors surrounding 
the introduction of the Misiones. The first subsection describes how the Misiones were initiated in 
2003. The Chávez government first attempted to formalize them during by including amendments 
into the failed constitutional referendum of 2007, and then finally codified their status in 2008 
during a ley habilitante, during a period of strong partisan powers that permitted the introduction 
of decree legislation. 
The second subsection then describes alternatives sought by opposition policy 
organizations at the time of introduction. Assessing opposition preferences allows for the analysis 
of what could have been introduced, had the institutional effect not been so strong on the 
policymaking process. Opposition politicians and policy organizations introduced alternatives to 
the Misiones. Their key features differed fundamentally from the Misión program designs, in 
terms of how the government integrated the programs into the existing ministry structure, their 
funding, the role of the private sector in social program delivery, and the nature of Misión 
oversight.  
The section concludes with a discussion relating theory to passage. The strong partisan 
powers held by Chávez led to failure to moderate or introduce reform measures into the programs, 
and the failure of these groups to influence the policy outcome reveals the effect of a weak 
opposition on the policy process. 
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 5.2.3.1 Legislating the Misiones 
The Chávez government initiated the Misiones through executive decrees, the earliest of which 
appeared in the Gaceta Oficial between April 2003 and July 2004.18 As mentioned earlier, the 
initiation of these programs coincided with one of the lowest periods of public opinion support for 
the Chávez government. Over the span of the announcement of the programs, support improved 
for the government, exceeding the historical average rating for the president over his terms.  
The programs were structured to operate in foundations parallel to existing ministries that 
managed related program activities, avoiding being subjected to traditional managerial routines in 
ministries. The foundations avoided budget oversight in the legislature with funding 
supplemented with resources drawn from PDVSA (Aponte Blank 2010). The foundation structure 
was a departure from how remedial programs were administered: Robinson, was administered 
parallel to prior initiatives of the Ministry of Education.19 Ribas was administered from the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines. This trend extended beyond the education Misiones, as Barrio 
Adentro was clearly separated from Plan Médica Cubana, the Ministry of Health and Social 
Development program that preceded it (D’Elia, 2006, 28).  Chávez-aligned political figures 
endorsed the Misiones for their departure from the traditional ministerial structure.  The president 
of PDVSA, Alí Rodríguez Araque, declared the Misiones: “the seed of the new institutionalism, 
18 The decrees that created the Misiones included: Mercal: part of a basket of decrees, but institutionalized in decree 
2359, Gaceta Oficial 37,672, April 15, 2003; Vuelvan Caras: decree 2898, Gaceta Oficial 37,966, June 23, 2004; 
Robinson I: decree 2434, Gaceta Oficial  37,702, June 2, 2003, with later modification June 13, 2003, Gaceta Oficial 
37,711; Robinson II: decree 2602, Gaceta Oficial 37,775, September 15 2003; Ribas: decree 2656, Gaceta Oficial 
37,798, October 16, 2003; Fundación Misión Ribas: decree 3048, Gaceta Oficial 37,999; Sucre: decree 2601, 
September 8, 2003; Fundación Misión Sucre, decree 2604, Gaceta Oficial 37,772; Barrio Adentro: first announced in 
Aló Presidente 174, December 14, 2003; formalized in decree 2745, Gaceta Oficial 37,865, January 26, 2004; 
Vivienda (later Habitat): decree 3126, Gaceta Oficial 38,027, July 24, 2004.  
19 Robinson was intended to replace several programs: Acude, administered by the Asociación Cultural para el 
Desarrollo funded by private enterprises, and several other government initiatives directed by the Comisión Nacional 
de Alfabetización, the education ministry, and the Instituto Nacional de Cooperación Educativn (Sanjuán Martinez & 
Gonzalez Plessman, 2010, 18). 
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 before a major obstacle like this State bureaucracy, inefficient and ineffective, as they emerge, 
next to it parallel forms … of new institutions as instruments to make viable the principles of the 
constitution.” (D’Elia & Quiroz, 2010, 5) The Chavista view of the Misiones was supportive of 
this parallel form of administration, but despite the decrees, the programs lacked legal status, 
requiring further legislation to legitimize the programs. 
The Chávez government attempted to provide legal definition to the Misiones first through 
the constitutional referendum in 2007, which was narrowly defeated. Article 141 of the 
constitutional referendum of 2007 was an attempt to legally codify the Misiones as “exceptional 
and experimental systems” not governed by the Constitution or the laws, and instead under the 
direction of the executive to the attention of urgent and deep need (D’Elia & Quiroz, 2010, 6). 
The constitutional amendment packages narrowly failed at referendum, suggesting a divided but 
disapproving public. However, public sentiment was not enough to stop the Misiones from being 
institutionalized in by decree. 
 Later in 2007 Chávez was granted a ley habilitante, during which the leader codified the 
programs in decreed legislature. This decree was permitted during an enabling law in the MVR-
dominated legislature following the opposition boycott of 2005, where the Chávez-aligned share 
of seats reflected 93 percent of the Assembly. The Misiones were formalized at the conclusion of 
the enabling law period in 2008.  The foundation status of the programs was legally codified in 
Decree Number 6217 with the Rank, Value and Force of Law of Public Administration, Gaceta 
Oficial 5890, July, 31 2008. Articles 132-33 of this legislation legitimized the structure of the 
Misiones as they existed, establishing them as a new type of bureaucracy in Venezuelan public 
administration (Mundo, 2009, 51). The preamble stated that the measure was adopted following 
the success of the special programs referred to as the Misiones (Mundo, 2009, 51). As described 
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 above, this period coincided with relative popularity, as the ley habilitante was issued during 
above average popularity, and the final decrees under the period were announced during a period 
where public support reflected the historical average over the President’s terms. 
This led to a change in how the Misiones were budgeted by the Assembly. The legislature 
routinized the funding of the Misiones during this period, transitioning to ordinary budgeting 
procedures for the Misiones from the heavy reliance on PDVSA funds. The contribution of 
ordinary budget funding for the programs increased significantly during this period. This was 
matched with a decrease in the contribution of PDVSA to Misión budgeting, and a smaller 
increase in the level of other funding (Aponte Blank 2010). The transition from heavy dependence 
of the programs on PDVSA resources to ordinary government budgeting for the Misiones over 
time reveals that the programs were increasingly accepted by the Chávez-aligned legislature 
following the decree codifying legal status for the programs in 2008. 
5.2.3.2 Alternatives to the Misiones  
At the time the Misiones were introduced, several opposition organizations promoted contrasting 
proposals to change the redistributive landscape. These organizations presented alternative policy 
platforms that opposed fundamental features of the Misiones, including: the private sector’s role 
in the delivery of complementary social programs, strong oversight, the timing of program 
implementation, and funding of social programs from oil wealth. The organizations included the 
political coalition Coordinadora Democratica, which consisted of syndicates CTV, and 
Fedecamaras; large parties AD, and COPEI; and smaller parties.20 The Proyecto Pobreza, was a 
20 Smaller parties included: Acción Agropecuaria, Alianza Bravo Pueblo, Alianza por la Libertad, Bandera Roja, 
Convergencia, La Causa R, MAS, MIN Primero Justicia, Proyecto Venezuela, Solidaridad, Solidaridad 
Independiente Unión, Unión Republicana Democrática, and Visión Emergente. 
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 university consortium, which later became the Grupo del Acuerdo Social. 21 The Foro 
Permanente de Constructores de Inclusión (Gente que Une Gente) consisted of the Jesuit NGO 
Centro Gumilla, and the party Primero Justicia (Alarcón Cervera et al., 2007, 458). 
Of these, the Grupo del Acuerdo Social produced the most developed social policy 
platform. The group itself consisted of a larger number of universities than the Proyecto Pobreza, 
also including the capacity development organization Venezuela Competitiva, and the investment 
promotion board Consejo Nacional de Promoción de Inversiones (CONAPRI).22 The Grupo del 
Acuerdo Social echoed the critical perspectives introduced above, first acknowledging the 
legitimacy of the social problems the Misiones attempted to remedy, and supporting the 
empowerment of the poor population. They criticized the programs as clientelist, noting the 
timing of the programs coincided with the electoral campaigns and outside of the traditional 
social institutions, eliminating efficiency from consolidation with existing administration 
(Alarcón Cervera et al., 2007, 465).  
The Grupo del Acuerdo Social developed a set of policy recommendations entitled El 
Acuerdo Social para la Superación de la Pobreza (The Social Accord for Overcoming Poverty) 
in February 2003. The group sought to influence the government at prominent levels. Acuerdo 
Social presented the plan to Diosdado Cabello, then-Minister of the Interior and Justice and power 
broker for Hugo Chávez. However, the government did not recognize the document upon 
submission (De Vincenzo 2003).   
21 Universities included: Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración, and 
Universidad Simon Bolivar. 
22 These included: Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración, 
Universidad Simon Bolivar, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Universidad de Zulia, and the Universidad de los 
Andes. 
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 The Acuerdo Social acknowledged the need to develop additional programs to include 
populations that were not reached in current social policy, but did not view the need to develop 
parallel bureaucracy to administer them. The group proposed the development of structural, 
complementary, and transitional social policies, of which the latter two overlapped with the aims 
of the Misiones: 
1) structural social policy aimed at traditional governmental sectors: education, health, social 
and personal security, and housing; 
 2) complementary social policy constructed by a package of programs that addresses the 
causes of inequality that impede access to social services that enable the development of 
human and social capital among particular populations (juvenile offenders, homeless, 
indigenous population, population in extreme poverty, population in special territories);  
3) transitional social policy that gives support to solve problems of inequality through welfare 
assistance and training and retraining programs to needy populations over the age of 35 
(Acuerdo Social Para el Desarollo Y la Superación de la Pobreza, 2003, 4-5). 
Complementary and transitional policies represented attempts to reach individuals excluded from 
the structural social policy framework. They were intended to address problems of access and 
administration through institutions that led to the need to create the Misiones instead of appending 
new social programs onto the existing system (Alarcón Cervera et al., 2007, 465). This differed 
from the extraordinary plans through which the Misiones were developed. Opposition proposals 
reflected the belief that these policies could be undertaken through the government ministries 
already in existence.  
The Acuerdo Social called for independent social program oversight, addressing a matter 
that was not explicitly discussed by the government in Misión policy documents. Oversight and 
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 social accounting were part of recommendations in order to ensure that program benefits were 
closely monitored through management indicators to evaluate whether or not programs benefited 
populations (Acuerdo Social Para el Desarollo Y la Superación de la Pobreza, 2003, 5). The plan 
called for monitoring solutions including academia, consultants, special committees, associations 
of beneficiaries, as well as public opinion, and social media  (Acuerdo Social Para el Desarollo Y 
la Superación de la Pobreza, 2003, 7). The Acuerdo Social viewed it necessary to create a network 
of social accountability provide program oversight to ensure that programs were working.  
Opposition groups criticized the government’s role in the provision of antipoverty 
programs, proposing instead to promote both the state and the private sector as instruments in the 
delivery of benefits and participation in the labor market as a destination for those receiving 
benefits. In their policy vision statement, AD criticized state use of petroleum resources for 
funding of benefits (Acción Democrática, 2004, 7). The Acuerdo Social viewed private 
organizations as a potential provider of social benefits, stating that they could complement the 
state to provide social benefits to poor populations (Acuerdo Social Para el Desarollo Y la 
Superación de la Pobreza, 2003, 5). For the Misiones, the state bureaucracy was viewed as 
ineffective and yet the Chávez government sought new state solutions with less oversight. The 
private sector was not a part of the government’s plan. 
The preferences of opposition politicians and policy organizations differed greatly from 
the Misiones on key themes. However they were similar to proposed plans in other countries. 
Members of the Grupo de Acuerdo Social, the most developed of the contrasting proposals, could 
not get the state’s attention, and the weak position of the political opposition meant that the 
contrasting preferences were not accommodated. The subsection below will discuss the relation of 
these weak partisan powers to program design.  
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 5.2.3.3 Relating the Passage to Theory  
Absent the institutional checks of a competitive political system, the strong partisan powers of 
Chávez resulted in failure to integrate into the Misiones the reform elements predicted in 
countries with greater horizontal accountability. Program decrees reflected policy preferences for 
administrative structures parallel to existing and predecessor programs with funding from 
PDVSA, avoiding legislative oversight. The Misiones incorporated none of the proposed policy 
reform elements, many of which would increase program oversight. Opposition preferences were 
not integrated into program design when the programs were initially informally decreed. Voters 
rejected an amendment legitimizing the programs in the constitutional referendum of 2007. The 
Misiones were eventually codified by decree during a period of sweeping authority for Chávez. 
After an opposition boycott in Assembly elections produced an uncompetitive legislature, 
Chavez-aligned legislators granted the leader the ley habilitante that permitted him to decree. 
Throughout this process, the Misiones were not subject to political constraints imposed by the 
opposition, given the strength of the President’s partisan powers. 
Compared to opposition political preferences for social policy change, the Misiones did 
not integrate reforms, showing fundamental differences in: program oversight, how the programs 
integrated existing bureaucracies and the private sector, and the use of oil wealth. In addition, 
these groups criticized the timing of program implementation reflected now-or-never 
expenditures intended to coincide with electoral contests. The minimal incorporation of oversight 
elements resulted from the absence political competition. The Chávez-aligned legislature did not 
choose to shape these executive-led initiatives by incorporating reform elements. 
 Two aspects made the political context more favorable to program introduction and 
formalization: public support of the government and composition of the Assembly varied in 2003-
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 4 and 2008. During the introduction of the Misiones, Chávez’s partisan powers were weaker than 
when he formally institutionalized the programs. At introduction, with low public support, the 
programs were decreed through executive order but accompanying legislature was not introduced 
to make them into law. Their formalization did not win electoral approval in the 2007 
constitutional referendum. This finally occurred in 2008 after a boycott of the Assembly elections 
by the opposition resulted in failure to effectively oppose the presidential agenda, during a period 
when the Chávez government was more popular and the legislative composition was even more 
favorable than the introduction period. Legitimacy led to a change in how the Misiones were 
budgeted and in the later years of the program, the Chávez-aligned legislature increased regular 
budgeting for the programs, presenting another form of approval once the programs were 
legislated.   
Program elements, detailed here and in Chapter 5 reveal how sharply the programs 
differed from traditional education policy in Venezuela and opposition recommendations. The 
introduction and formalization of these programs – in the absence of political competition in the 
legislature – shows that the Chávez government did not recognize the repeat-play characteristics 
generated by a stable party system that introduces horizontal accountability to executive 
policymaking. With strong partisan powers, the Chavez government did not choose to moderate 
the programs or introduce reform measures, and the failure of opposition groups to influence this 
outcome reveals the extent to which horizontal accountability was limited. In the absence of the 
competition generated by a stable party system, the executive-aligned legislature delegated decree 
authority to permit Chávez to legislate the formalization of the Misiones.  
Examining the preferences of the opposition in Venezuela shows how strong partisan 
powers affected the program contours: the Misiones bore little resemblance to recommendations 
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 of the opposition, and those members who wanted to influence social policy could not. The result 
of the interactions detailed here was a set of programs that had little oversight and were 
disassociated from antecedent programs. The programs did not contain reform elements, allowing 
for parochial distributional strategies. The result of the absence of horizontal accountability will 
be described in the next chapter, revealing the extent to which education Misiones were targeted 
to achieve political results through the distribution of benefits.  
5.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter illustrates the constitutional and partisan powers of Lula and Chávez and shows how 
these powers determine the latitude of the executive in choosing the antipoverty policies in their 
countries. For Lula, despite strong constitutional decree powers, weak partisan powers – 
particularly, weak partisan composition of PT-aligned parties in the Câmara – limited the extent 
to which he could introduce or modify a program to reflect his party’s aims of a guaranteed 
minimum income for citizens. These weak partisan powers reflected the institutionalization of the 
party system, which created strong government and opposition parties that influenced coalition 
formation, even though the system generally lacks societal rootedness. This meant that Lula’s 
decree for Bolsa Família reflected similarities to existing programs initiated by both the PT and 
PSDB, integrating reform elements such as conditionalities, and limited program reach.  
For Chávez, despite weak constitutional decree powers, the President governed informally 
until strong partisan powers permitted delegation to him through a ley habilitante. Through this, 
he institutionalized the Misiones over four years after their introduction. Comparing program 
features to opposition preferences, reform elements were not integrated, leading to little oversight, 
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 allowing for the funds to be distributed in a parochial manner. The deinstitutionalization of the 
party system resulted in the devastation of societal rootedness to the opposition and challenges to 
political mobilization for the government’s parties. This influenced opposition participation 
within the system, and meant that the Assembly was comprised of nearly all Chávez-aligned 
politicians. Not only was the process of Misión introduction informal, and the program 
institutionalization extraordinary, but program design represented an explicit departure from the 
precedent of earlier antipoverty programs within the country. The absence of program oversight 
measures led to abuse in the distribution of the programs, allowing them to target beneficiaries on 
political criteria.  
Oversight, expenditure patterns, and benefit distributions of these programs examined in 
detail in Chapter 4 reveal the extent to which the powers described in this chapter yielded 
variation in targeting strategies. In the case of Brazil, the strong horizontal accountability 
described in this chapter results in programmatic targeting of Bolsa Família benefits, while in the 
Case of Venezuela, the lack of horizontal accountability described here results in parochial 
targeting of education Misión benefits. 
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 6.0  MODELING THE ELECTORAL EFFECT OF SOCIAL PROGRAMS IN BRAZIL 
AND VENEZUELA 
What electoral effect did Bolsa Família and the Misiones have after their introduction? 
Understanding whether the programs deliver electoral support is key to evaluating how programs 
are politicized: if the programs deliver no support, it matters much less how politicization occurs. 
Variation in support suggests politicization, as different levels of electoral support result from 
leaders reaching different constituents. The other chapters of this study present evidence of the 
constraints leaders face when designing targeted programs are institutional in nature, but the 
effect generated by the programs determines the relevance of this analysis. 
This chapter examines the electoral effects of program recipient status using surveys 
conducted over 2006 and 2007 in the two countries. The sections describe the statistical and 
substantive significance of recipient voting behavior over subsequent elections in Brazil and 
Venezuela as the programs were introduced.  
The key finding revealed in analysis of survey data is that while participation in both 
Bolsa Família and the Misiones increased the probability of voting for Lula and Chávez, the 
effect is much stronger – significantly so – in Venezuela as compared to Brazil. After 
introduction, the programs generated the positive support expected among recipients. However, 
when the effect of the programs is examined across values of income and education, first 
indications of the electoral effects caused by program politicization emerge: the Misiones 
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 generated a substantial degree more electoral support for Chávez among recipients than among 
non-recipients than did Bolsa Família, particularly among low-income recipients. While the poor 
tended to support Lula and Chávez, not all of the poor received the programs. The analysis 
reveals that Lula received about 10 percent and Chávez received greater than 40 percent more 
support among recipients. The differences among recipients and non-recipients are much smaller 
in Brazil than Venezuela. 
In Brazil, the probit model shows a significant effect of Bolsa Família on the probability 
of voting for Lula for both 2002 and 2006 voters. Marginal effects estimates show that comparing 
program recipients and non-recipients over increasing levels of income and education on vote 
choice reveals that those receiving the program had a greater probability of support for Lula, 
particularly among low-income recipients. Low-income recipients have a higher probability of 
voting for Lula than non-recipients, while low-education non-recipients have a higher probability 
of supporting Lula than do recipients. Models containing interaction terms with education and 
program recipient status and income and program recipient status corroborate the contrasting 
effect of income and education. This contrast highlights the importance of income in contributing 
to the probability of electoral choices in Brazil. 
The president was aided, but only minimally, by the effect of participation in Bolsa 
Família. The probability of voting for Lula among low-income recipients is only narrowly 
different between 2002 (10 percent greater) and 2006 (9 percent greater). The small variation 
between the two years suggests that the program effect, which benefits Lula, does not open up a 
larger electoral advantage among the respondents after the program was implemented. This 
suggests that the program may be less electorally important than other factors including the 
incumbent effect described by Zucco (2008).  
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 In Venezuela, the probit model shows a significant effect of the Misiones on the 
probability of voting for Chávez-aligned parties in 2005 and for Chávez in 2006. Marginal effects 
estimates show that comparing program recipients and non-recipients over increasing levels of 
income and education on vote choice reveals that those receiving the program had a greater 
probability of support for Chávez, particularly among low-income and low-education recipients. 
Support declines over unit increases income and education levels, though the effect extended 
beyond low-income and low education Misiones recipients. In both the 2005 and 2006 elections, 
the electoral effect of the Misiones on the probability of voter support holds among higher income 
and education levels as well.23 Models containing interaction terms of education and program 
recipient status and income and program recipient status reveal probability of support among low-
income and low education recipients. The relationships described here hold for both the education 
Misiones as well as the overall measure.   
The president was clearly aided by the effect of Misión and education Misión participation 
on the probability of support for his party in 2005 and presidential campaign in 2006. Among 
low-income recipients, the probability of support widens from 2005 (27 percent greater) to 2006 
(44 percent greater).  This relationship holds for the education Misiones, widening from 2005 (9 
percent greater to 2006 (17 percent greater).  
This chapter describes the model and examines model parameters. It describes marginal 
effects estimates of the probability of leader support, as well as the effect of recipient status across 
key variables relating to the program status – income and education level. The findings suggest 
the necessity of further analysis of how programs were politicized – particularly program 
distribution and spending over time – to produce the electoral effects shown in this chapter.  
23 Higher values of income and education levels are relevant to certain Misiones because the conditions that define 
excludability are not clearly specified, when they are enforced. 
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 6.1 MODEL 
This analysis replicates and extends Bohn’s work using the 2007-8 survey data from the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Brazil and Venezuela country survey data. It 
reconstructs the author’s model, examining the factors of education, income and program 
recipient status on the probability of an individual voting for Chávez or Lula, controlling for 
respondents’ gender, age, and for regional effects.  
The first section attempts to replicate Bohn’s (2011) results for the 2002 and 2006 
elections. The analysis reveals the probability of Lula support in 2002 prior to the introduction of 
the program. It finds that those individuals that identified themselves as recipients in the 2007 
survey indicated an increased probability of support for Lula in 2002, implying that they had 
already had a greater probability of supporting Lula. Consistent with Zucco and Power’s (2012) 
analysis, recipients had an increased probability of electoral support in the 2006 election. 
Interaction effects are examined for education and recipient status as well as income and recipient 
status on the probability of voting for Lula. Overall, low-income recipients have a greater 
probability of support for Lula, while low education recipients have a lower probability of 
support. 
The next section presents an extension of the model. It presents survey responses 
comparing Misiones recipients, showing that the effect of the social program on voting behavior 
is reinforced between elections in 2005 and 2006 in Venezuela, with stronger results in the 2006 
presidential voting, among both the overall Misión programs and education Misiones. Interaction 
effects are examined for education and recipient status as well as income and recipient status on 
the probability of voting for Lula. Overall, low-income recipients and low education recipients 
have a greater probability of support for Chávez.  The model results are reported below. 
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 6.1.1 Voter Support for Lula in Subsequent Elections 
Models 1-6 in tables 11-13 below display the results of probit analyses on 2007 LAPOP 
respondents who reported voting in 2002 and 2006. The main models are evaluated, then separate 
models for multiplicative interactions of program participation and income and participation and 
education are examined. Marginal effects analysis is then conducted for each model.  
6.1.1.1 Lula’s 2002 Election 
Models 1-3 in Table 11 below display the results of probit analyses on 2007 LAPOP respondents 
who reported voting in the 2002 election. These models show a positive effect for Bolsa Família 
recipients on the probability of voting for Lula, particularly when the relationship is modeled on 
income. The effect is shown to be positive and significant in Model 1 (at the p < .01 level) on the 
probability of voting for Lula. This effect is positive for the interaction term for income and 
program participation, shown in Model 2, but not for education and program participation, shown 
in Model 3. The 2002 models do not identify significant predictors beyond being Bolsa Família 
recipients in 2006. These models show a significant probability of support for Lula among low-
income recipients. 
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 Table 25. Probit of Being a Bolsa Família Recipient on Lula's Vote in 2002 
 
Model 1:  
Lula's 
Vote 
Model 2: 
Lula's 
Vote: 
Income 
Interaction 
Model 3: 
Lula's 
Vote: 
Education 
Interaction 
 2002 2002 2002 
Bolsa Família Recipient 0.424* 0.721 -0.650 
 (0.237) (0.459) (0.771) BF-Income Interaction -0.238 
   
(0.311) 
 BF-Education Interaction 
 
0.511 
   
-0.359 
Gender 0.00967 0.0157 0.00644 
 
(0.134) (0.134) (0.134) 
Age -0.0638 -0.0653 -0.0671 
 
(0.0496) (0.0497) (0.0499) 
Income -0.0902 0.163 -0.0814 
 
(0.0894) (0.344) (0.0900) 
Education -0.0202 -0.0232 -0.568 
 
(0.0950) (0.0951) (0.394) 
South -0.0502 -0.0563 -0.0523 
 
(0.189) (0.190) (0.189) 
Center-West -0.276 -0.281 -0.292 
  (0.237) (0.237) (0.238) 
Northeast 0.0844 0.0844 0.0838 
 
(0.161) (0.161) (0.161) 
North 0.134 0.134 0.172 
 
(0.303) (0.303) (0.306) 
Constant 1.020*** 0.284 1.769* 
 
(0.354) (0.625) (0.925) 
    N 471 471 471 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Those receiving Bolsa Família during the survey year reported supporting the president in the 
earlier election. However, low education recipients did not report supporting Lula in 2002, and 
the overall effect of program participation is lower. Interpreting the other independent variables in 
the model shows that respondents who indicated supporting Lula in the 2002 election were lower-
income, less well-educated, male, and younger, though these were not significant predictors of 
support. Respondents from the Central-West and South opposed, while respondents from the 
poorer North and Northeast were supporters of Lula.  
6.1.1.2 Comparing Marginal Effects 
Investigating the substantive effect of recipient status on the probability of Lula support in 2002 
for one unit increases in levels of income and education in Model 1 reveals that across all levels 
of income and education, the probability of supporting Lula is greater for recipients across all 
plausible (low) values. This is shown in Figure 20.  
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Figure 20. Model 1: Probability of Voting for Lula by Income & Education, 2002 
 
The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases slightly from 
10 to 13 percent over the income values. At lowest levels of income, the probability of supporting 
Lula among recipients is 88 percent, and the value declines modestly over levels of income to 66 
percent. At highest levels of income, non-recipients have a 78 percent probability of supporting 
Lula, a value that decreases over income levels to 79 percent at the highest level.  
The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases only slightly 
from 11 to 12 percent over the education values. At lowest levels of education, the probability of 
supporting Lula among recipients is 86 percent, and the value declines slightly over increasing 
levels of education to 84 percent. At lowest levels of education, non-recipients have a 75 percent 
 213 
 probability of supporting Lula, a value that declines slightly to 72 percent over the range of 
education levels.  
While the boost to Lula of those who report receiving the program is not statistically 
significant, being a recipient does account for low-income status. The substantive difference 
between recipients and non-recipients is greater than 10 percent in both estimates.  
Marginal effects analysis of Models 2 and 3 provides a second test of the relationship 
between participation and vote choice, examining the interaction effects of income and education 
with recipients compared against non-recipients. This provides as a baseline for the effect of 
income and education on electoral support, as the interaction shows income and education 
measures for only those that did and did not participate in the program, providing conditional 
analysis of each effect.  
The marginal effects plots below reveal similar low-income support for Lula but not low 
education. The difference between the recipient and baseline low-income support is a continued 
trend in the income model: low-income recipients support Lula at higher rates than do non-
recipients, and in general both recipients and non-recipients favor Lula at lower income levels 
than at higher ones. Low education recipients support Lula at lower rates than do non-recipients, 
but both recipients and non-recipients favor Lula at higher education levels than lower ones. The 
marginal effects are displayed in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21. Models 2&3: Probability of Voting for Lula by Income & Education, 2002 
 
In Model 2, across levels of income, the probability of supporting Lula is greater among 
program recipients. The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases 
from 9 to 26 percent over the income values. These report a 93 percent probability of supporting 
Lula, decreasing to 78 percent over increasing levels of income. Non-recipients report an 84 
percent probability of supporting Lula, decreasing to 52 percent over increasing levels of income. 
The key values here- low-income recipients and non-recipients. These values decline over 
increasing levels of income, though they are implausible past the scaled value of 2 (greater than or 
equal to 1 minimum wage).  In Model 3, across levels of education, the difference in probability 
between recipients and non-recipients decreases from 34 to 16 percent over the education values. 
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 The probability of supporting Lula is greater among non-recipients. These report a 42 percent 
probability of supporting Lula, increasing to 91 percent over increasing levels of education. 
Recipients report an 8 percent probability of supporting Lula, increasing to 75 percent over 
increasing levels of education. Comparing the overall model and the interaction models shows the 
strength of the income effect on the probability of support for Lula among respondents when 
compared to education. Low-income recipients show greater for support for Lula, though the 
magnitude of Bolsa Família’s effect on vote choice is smaller at lower levels of income because 
while not all the poor receive aid, many support Lula. Results from the 2006 vote model, which 
bears many similarities to the 2002 model, are shown below.  
6.1.1.3 Lula’s 2006 Election 
Models 4-6 in Table 26 display the results of probit analyses on 2007 LAPOP respondents who 
reported voting in the 2006 election. These models show a positive effect for Bolsa Família 
recipients on the probability of voting for Lula, particularly when the relationship is modeled on 
income. The effect is shown to be positive and significant in Model 4 (at the p < .05 level) on the 
probability of voting for Lula. This effect is positive for the interaction of income and program 
participation, shown in Model 5, but not for the interaction of education and program 
participation, shown in Model 6. Like the models for the 2002 election, these models show a 
significant probability of support for Lula among low-income recipients. 
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 Table 26. Probit of Being a Bolsa Família Recipient on Lula's Vote in 2006 
 
Model 4: 
Lula's Vote 
Lula's Vote 
Model 5:  
Lula's 
Vote: 
Income 
Interaction 
Model 6:  
Lula's 
Vote: 
Education 
Interaction 
  2006 2006 2006 
Bolsa Família Recipient 0.367** 0.511 -0.442 
 (0.182) (0.369) (0.608) BF-Income Interaction -0.114 
   
(0.253) 
 BF-Education Interaction 
 
0.367 
   
(0.268) 
Gender 0.218** 0.220** 0.216** 
 
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) 
Age -0.0846** -0.0855** -0.0864** 
 
(0.0371) (0.0371) (0.0372) 
Income -0.249*** -0.127 -0.245*** 
 
(0.0714) (0.280) (0.0716) 
Education -0.246*** -0.248*** -0.641** 
 
(0.0770) (0.0771) (0.297) 
South -0.130 -0.131 -0.138 
 
(0.137) (0.137) (0.138) 
Center-West 0.231 0.230 0.214 
 
(0.182) (0.182) (0.182) 
Northeast 0.359*** 0.361*** 0.356*** 
 
(0.127) (0.127) (0.127) 
North 0.498** 0.498** 0.505** 
 
(0.243) (0.243) (0.242) 
Constant 1.609*** 1.093** 2.128*** 
 
(0.270) (0.489) (0.730) 
    N 795 795 795 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 The models show that the effect of income is negative and significant at the p < .001 level and 
education is negative and significant at the p < .01 level, suggesting that lower income, less well-
educated supporters voted in favor of Lula in the 2006 election. The effect of gender (male) is 
positive and significant at the p < .05 level in the 2006 election. The effect of the regional 
dummies in the second model are significant in the Northeast and North (p < .01 and p <.05, 
respectively) revealing significant success for Lula in poorer regions of the country in the 2006 
election. In this election, younger, less well-educated and poorer voters had a higher probability 
of supporting Lula, at statistically significant levels. 
6.1.1.4 Comparing Marginal Effects 
Investigating the substantive effect of recipient status on the probability of Lula support in 2006 
for one unit increases in levels of income and education in Model 4 reveals that across levels of 
income and education, the probability of supporting Lula is greater for recipients across all 
plausible (low) values. This is shown in Figure 22.  
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Figure 22. Model 4: Probability of Voting for Lula by Income & Education, 2006 
 
The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases from 9 to 15 
over the income values. At lowest levels of income, the probability of supporting Lula among 
recipients is 88 percent, and the value declines modestly over levels of income to 57 percent. At 
lowest levels of income, non-recipients have a 79 percent probability of supporting Lula, a value 
that decreases over income levels to 42 percent at the highest level.  
The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases from 6 to 14 
over the education values. At lowest levels of education, non-recipients have a 92 percent 
probability of supporting Lula, a value which declines to 68 percent over the range of education 
levels. At lowest levels of education, the probability of supporting Lula among recipients is 86 
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 percent, and the value declines over increasing levels of education to 54 percent. Given the 
already probability of low-income and low-education support for Lula among non-recipients, it is 
difficult for the program to dramatically increase the probability among recipients.   
Marginal effects analysis of Models 5 and 6 provides a second test of the relationship 
between participation in the program and vote choice, examining the interaction effects of income 
and education with recipients compared against non-recipients. Non-recipients serve as a baseline 
for the effect of income and education on electoral support compared to the interacted recipient 
values. In the marginal effects plots below, they reveal low-income support for Lula but not low 
education. Like the 2002 data, the difference between the recipient and baseline low-income 
support is small: low-income recipients support Lula at higher rates than do non-recipients, but 
both recipients and non-recipients favor Lula at lower income levels than at higher ones. Low 
education recipients support Lula at lower rates than do non-recipients, but both recipients and 
non-recipients favor Lula at higher education levels than lower ones. Given that plausible values 
for recipient status are low-income categories, this suggests that income is a better predictor of 
Lula support than education. The marginal effects are displayed in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23. Models 5 & 6: Probability of Voting for Lula by Income & Education, 2006 
 
In Model 5, across levels of income, the probability of supporting Lula is greater among 
program recipients. These report an 87 percent probability of supporting Lula, decreasing to 74 
percent over increasing levels of income. Non-recipients report a 73 percent probability of 
supporting Lula, decreasing to 56 percent over increasing levels of income. The difference in 
probability between recipients and non-recipients increases from 14 to 18 percent over the income 
values. These values decline over increasing levels of income, though they are implausible past 
the scaled value of 2 (greater than or equal to 1 minimum wage).  In Model 6, across levels of 
education, the probability of supporting Lula is greater among non-recipients. These report a 31 
percent probability of supporting Lula, increasing to 83 percent over increasing levels of 
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 education. Recipients report a 17 percent probability of supporting Lula, increasing to 70 percent 
over increasing levels of education. The difference in probability between recipients and non-
recipients decreases from 14 to 13 percent over the education values. 
As with the 2002 model, comparing Model 4 with Models 5 and 6 shows the strength of 
the income effect on the probability of support for Lula among respondents when compared to 
education. Low-income recipients show greater for support for Lula, though the magnitude of 
Bolsa Família’s effect on vote choice is smaller at lower levels of income.  
6.1.1.5 Bolsa Família and Vote Choice in Brazil 
This section compares the difference in the probability of Lula support between low-income 
recipients and non-recipients between the 2002 and 2006 presidential election models, comparing 
Models 1 with 4 and models 2 with 5 to examine the effect of low-income respondents to non-
respondents. Comparing the results from respondents who voted in the 2002 and 2006 elections, 
the overall effect of Bolsa Família results indicate that low-income recipients reported supporting 
Lula at similar rates. Recipients significantly supported Lula, but at a rate no greater than the 
same voters supported him before program introduction.  
The magnitude of the effect of low-income Bolsa Família recipients between Models 1 
and 4 – from 10 to 9 percent among recipients in the 2002 and 2006 contests – shows little 
variation in the level of overall program effect on support for Lula across income groups. A 
similarity in magnitude for multiplicative Models 2 and 5 – from 9 to 14 percent among low-
income recipients – shows a small increase in the overall effect between 2002 and 2006. This 
means that after the program was fully implemented in 2004, respondents showed a similar 
probability of support for Lula, despite the sizable increase in vote share between his first and 
second victories (Hunter and Power 2008; Zucco and Power 2012). The overall effect of 
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 participation, roughly an added 10 and 14 percent support for Lula depending on how the 
relationship is modeled, is much lower than the Misión effect shown below. 
6.1.2 Voter Support for Chávez in Subsequent Elections 
Models 7-18 in Tables 13-16 below display the results of probit analyses on LAPOP respondents 
who voted for Chavez-aligned parties in the 2005 Assembly and the 2006 presidential elections 
for Misión and education Misión participants. The main models are evaluated, then separate 
models for multiplicative interactions of program participation and income and participation and 
education are examined.  Marginal effects analysis is then conducted for each model. 
6.1.2.1 2005 Legislative Election  - Misión Model 
Models 7-9 in Table 27 display the results of probit analyses on LAPOP respondents who voted 
for Chávez-aligned parties in 2005 according to the characteristics identified above. These models 
show a positive effect for recipients of any Misión on the probability of voting for Chávez-aligned 
parties, particularly when the relationship is modeled on income. Controlling for other factors, 
Misión recipients have a higher probability of supporting Chávez-aligned parties even when 
accounting for income. These values are much higher than were found in Brazil.  
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 Table 27. Probit of Being a Misión Recipient on Legislative Vote in 2005 
  
Model 7: 
Legislative Vote: 
Chávez Friendly-
Vote 
Model 8: 
Legislative 
Vote: Chávez 
Friendly-Vote 
Income 
Interaction 
Model 9: 
Legislative Vote: 
Chávez Friendly-
Vote Education 
Interaction 
 
  2005 2005 2005 
 
Misión 
Recipient 1.145*** 3.058** 0.576 
 
(0.278) (1.227) (0.982) 
Misión-Income  
Interaction -0.570 
 
   
(0.352) 
 
 
Misión-Education  
Interaction 0.247 
    
(0.408) 
Gender 0.0532 0.0227 0.0396 
 
(0.191) (0.192) (0.192) 
Age 0.0408 0.0349 0.0400 
 
(0.0830) (0.0839) (0.0830) 
Income -0.0978 0.982 -0.101 
 
(0.106) (0.677) (0.106) 
Education -0.134 -0.129 -0.596 
 
(0.142) (0.143) (0.779) 
Zuliana -0.610** -0.697** -0.627** 
 
(0.298) (0.309) (0.300) 
West -0.521 -0.611 -0.526 
 
(0.365) (0.375) (0.366) 
Central-West 0.633 0.569 0.621 
 
(0.407) (0.413) (0.407) 
East 0.121 0.0512 0.103 
 
(0.363) (0.371) (0.365) 
Los Llanos 0.576 0.542 0.558 
 
(0.523) (0.535) (0.523) 
Constant 0.579 -4.131* 0.533 
 
(0.638) (2.378) (1.993) 
    N 335 335 335 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 The effect of the Misiones is positive and significant in Model 4 (at the p < .001 level) on 
the probability of voting for Chávez-aligned parties. This effect is also positive and nearly 
significant for the interaction term for income and program participation (p-value of .105), shown 
in Model 8, and remains positive though not significant for education and program participation, 
shown in Model 9. These models show the expected significant probability of support for Chávez 
among low-income recipients. 
Interpreting the other independent variables in the model shows that respondents who 
indicated supporting Chávez-aligned parties in the 2005 election were low-income, less well-
educated, male, and older, though these were not significant predictors of support. Respondents 
from Zulia had a higher probability of opposing Chávez-aligned parties at a statistically 
significant level (p < .05).    
6.1.2.2 Comparing Marginal Effects 
Investigating the substantive effect of recipient status on the probability of Chávez-aligned party 
support in 2005 for one unit increases in levels of income and education in Model 7 reveals that 
across levels of income and education, the probability of supporting Chávez-aligned party is 
greater for recipients across all plausible (low) values. This is shown in Figure 24.  
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Figure 24. Probability of Voting for Chávez-aligned Parties by Income & Education, 2005 
 
The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases from 27 to 
36 over the income values. At lowest levels of income, the probability of supporting Chávez-
aligned parties among recipients is 94 percent, and the value declines modestly over levels of 
income to 88 percent. At lowest levels of income, non-recipients have a 67 percent probability of 
supporting Chávez-aligned parties, a value which decreases over income levels to 52 percent at 
the highest level.  
The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients widens from 27 to 36 
percent over the education values. At lowest levels of education, the probability of support among 
recipients is 94 percent, and the value declines over increasing levels of education to 88 percent. 
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 At lowest levels of education, non-recipients have a 67 percent probability of support, a value that 
declines to 52 percent over the range of education levels.  
Marginal effects analysis of Models 8 and 9 provides a way to examine the interaction 
effects of income and education with recipients compared against non-recipients. Non-recipients 
serve as a baseline for the effect of income and education on electoral support. In the marginal 
effects plots below, they reveal low-income and low education support for Chávez. The difference 
between the recipient and baseline low-income support is sizable: low-income and low-education 
recipients support Chávez at higher rates than do non-recipients. Both recipients and non-
recipients favor Chávez at lower income levels than at higher ones, and the differences expand 
over increased levels of income. The significant relationship shown for the income interaction in 
Model 5 suggests that income is a better predictor of Chávez support than education. Marginal 
effects for both models are shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25. Models 8 & 9: Probability of Voting for Chávez-aligned Parties by Income & 
Education, 2005 
 
 
The effect widens in Model 8 across levels of income, though in Model 9 it remains 
relatively steady across the education interaction. The probability of supporting Chávez-aligned 
parties is greater among program recipients. The difference in probability between recipients and 
non-recipients widens from 54 to 74 percent over the income interaction values, a staggering 
difference. These report a 99 percent probability of support, remaining steady at that level over 
increasing levels of income. Non-recipients report a 92 percent probability of support, decreasing 
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 to 20 percent over increasing levels of income.  In Model 9, the difference in probability between 
recipients and non-recipients widens from 23 to 27 percent over the education interaction values. 
Across levels of education, the probability of supporting Chávez-aligned parties is again greater 
among recipients. These report a 62 percent probability of support, increasing to 85 percent over 
increasing levels of education. Non-recipients report a 39 percent probability of support, 
increasing to 68 percent over greater levels of education.  
Comparing the overall model and the interaction models for the effect of participation in 
the Misiones on the 2005 Assembly elections shows the significance of the income effect on the 
probability of support for Chávez among respondents when compared to education. Low-income 
recipients show greater for support for Chávez, though the magnitude of the effect increases in 
size over levels of income. Results from the education Misiones are shown below.  
6.1.2.3 2005 Legislative Election  - Education Misión Model 
Models 10-12 in Table 28 display the results of probit analyses on LAPOP respondents who voted 
for Chávez-aligned parties in 2005 according to the characteristics identified above. As with the 
overall measure for the Misiones, these models show a positive effect for Misión recipients on the 
probability of voting for Chávez-aligned parties, particularly when the relationship is modeled on 
income. Controlling for other factors, Misión recipients have a higher probability of supporting 
Chávez-aligned parties. 
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 Table 28. Probit of Being an Education Misión Recipient on Legislative Vote in 2005 
 
Model 10: 
Legislative 
Vote: Chávez 
Friendly-Vote 
Model 11: 
Legislative 
Vote: 
Chávez 
Friendly-
Vote 
Income 
Interaction 
Model 12: 
Legislative 
Vote: 
Chávez 
Friendly-
Vote 
Education 
Interaction 
  2005 2005 2005 
Education Misión Recipient 1.264*** 3.247** 1.841 
 
(0.360) (1.629) (1.626) 
Education Misión-Income Interaction -0.658 
   
(0.479) 
 Education Misión-Education Interaction -0.244 
   
(0.658) 
Gender 0.208 0.217 0.216 
 
(0.195) (0.196) (0.196) 
Age 0.0855 0.0949 0.0852 
 
(0.0846) (0.0850) (0.0847) 
Income -0.133 0.563 -0.134 
 
(0.106) (0.511) (0.106) 
Education -0.191 -0.197 0.0655 
 
(0.146) (0.148) (0.706) 
Zuliana -0.606** -0.635** -0.608** 
 
(0.296) (0.296) (0.297) 
West -0.544 -0.527 -0.535 
 
(0.363) (0.363) (0.364) 
Central-West 0.859** 0.879** 0.860** 
 
(0.426) (0.423) (0.426) 
East 0.322 0.314 0.315 
 
(0.372) (0.372) (0.373) 
Los Llanos 0.696 0.705 0.701 
 
(0.538) (0.538) (0.539) 
Constant 1.357** -2.010 -0.511 
 
(0.581) (1.788) (1.792) 
    N 330 330 330 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 The effect of education Misión participation is positive and significant in Model 10 (at the p < 
.001 level) on the probability of voting for Chávez-aligned parties. This effect is positive and the 
interaction term for income and program participation, shown in Model 11, and remains positive 
for education and program participation, shown in Model 12. While the additive term is 
significant (and remains so in the income model), neither interaction measure is statistically 
significant. 
Interpreting the other independent variables in the model shows that respondents who 
indicated supporting Chávez-aligned parties in the 2005 election were low-income, less well-
educated, male, and older, though these were not significant predictors of support. Respondents 
from Zulia had a higher probability of opposing Chávez-aligned parties, and respondents from the 
Central-West region had a higher probability of supporting the parties at a statistically significant 
level (p < .05).    
6.1.2.4 Comparing Marginal Effects 
Investigating the substantive effect of recipient status on the probability of Chávez-aligned party 
support in 2005 for one unit increases in levels of income and education in Model 10 reveals that 
across levels of income and education, the probability of supporting Chávez-aligned party is 
greater for recipients across all plausible (low) values, and the effect widens across increasing 
values in both models. This is shown in Figure 26.  
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Figure 26. Probability of Voting for Chávez-aligned Parties by Income & Education, 2005 
 
 
The difference in probability between recipients and widens from 7 to 10 percent over the 
income values. At lowest levels of income, the probability of supporting Chávez-aligned parties 
among recipients is 99 percent, and the value declines modestly over levels of income to 98 
percent. At lowest levels of income, non-recipients have a 91 percent probability of supporting 
Chávez-aligned parties, a value which decreases over income levels to 78 percent at the highest 
level. The difference in probability between recipients and widens from 2 to 12 percent over the 
education values. At lowest levels of education, the probability of support among recipients is 99 
percent, and the value declines slightly over increasing levels of education to 97 percent. At 
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 lowest levels of education, non-recipients have a 90 percent probability of support, a value that 
declines to 78 percent over the range of education levels.  
Marginal effects analysis of Models 11 and 12 provides a way to examine the interaction 
effects of income and education with recipients compared against non-recipients. Non-recipients 
serve as a baseline for the effect of income and education on electoral support. In the marginal 
effects plots below, they reveal low-income and low education support for Chávez. The difference 
between the recipient and baseline low-income support is large, but smaller than the overall 
Misión effect shown in the models above: low-income and low-education recipients support 
Chávez at higher rates than do non-recipients. Both recipients and non-recipients favor Chávez at 
lower income levels than at higher ones, and the differences expand over increased levels of 
income. The significant relationship shown for the income interaction in Model 11 suggests that 
income is a better predictor of Chávez support than education. Marginal effects for both models 
are shown in Figure 27. 
  
 233 
  
Figure 27. Probability of Voting for Chávez-aligned Parties by Income & Education, 2005 
 
 
In Model 11, across levels of income, the difference in probability between recipients and 
non-recipients widens from 1 to 45 percent over the income interaction values, a great difference, 
but one that may be affected by a low level of high-income recipients. The probability of 
supporting Chávez-aligned parties is again greater among recipients. These report a 100 percent 
probability of support, which declines slightly to 99 percent over increasing levels of income. 
Non-recipients report a 99 percent probability of support, decreasing to 54 percent over greater 
levels of education. In Model 12, across levels of education, the difference in probability between 
recipients and non-recipients widens from 7 to 23 percent over the education interaction values. 
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 The probability of supporting Chávez-aligned parties is greater among recipients. Recipients 
report a 99 percent probability of support, which remains constant over greater levels of 
education. Non-recipients report a 92 percent probability of support, decreasing to 76 percent over 
increasing levels of education.  
Comparing the overall model and the interaction models for the effect of participation in 
the education Misiones on the 2005 Assembly elections shows the significance of the income 
effect on the probability of support for Chávez among respondents when compared to education. 
Low-income recipients show greater for support for Chávez, though the magnitude of the effect 
increases in size over levels of income. The effect is weaker than for the overall Misión 
participation level, generating a lower probability of electoral success for Chávez. Results from 
the 2006 vote models, which show a similar effect to the 2005 models, are shown below.  
6.1.2.5 2006 Presidential Election  - Misión Model 
Models 13-15 in Table 29 display the results of probit analyses on LAPOP respondents 
who voted for Chávez in the 2006 presidential election according to the characteristics identified 
above. These models echo the 2005 data, showing a positive effect for Misión recipients on the 
probability of voting for Chávez, when the relationship is modeled on education and income. 
Controlling for other factors, Misión recipients have a higher probability of supporting Chávez.  
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 Table 29. Probit of Being a Misión Recipient on Chávez Vote in 2006 
 
Model 13: 
Chávez 
Vote 
Model 14: 
Chávez 
Vote: 
Income 
Interaction 
Model 15: 
Chávez 
Vote: 
Education 
Interaction 
  2006 2006 2006 
Misión Recipient 1.342*** 1.130*** 1.105*** 
 
(0.128) (0.371) (0.384) 
Misión-Income Interaction 0.0765 
   
(0.126) 
 Misión-Education Interaction 0.110 
   
(0.168) 
Gender 0.0895 0.0877 0.0866 
 
(0.102) (0.102) (0.103) 
Age -0.0288 -0.0283 -0.0289 
 
(0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0451) 
Income -0.0200 -0.157 -0.0192 
 
(0.0546) (0.232) (0.0547) 
Education -0.134* -0.132* -0.329 
 
(0.0768) (0.0769) (0.309) 
Zuliana -0.593*** -0.592*** -0.595*** 
 
(0.168) (0.168) (0.168) 
West -0.587*** -0.590*** -0.592*** 
 
(0.202) (0.202) (0.202) 
Central-West -0.136 -0.144 -0.140 
 
(0.165) (0.165) (0.165) 
East -0.126 -0.129 -0.130 
 
(0.182) (0.182) (0.182) 
Los Llanos 0.191 0.190 0.183 
 
(0.221) (0.221) (0.221) 
Constant 0.201 -0.757 -0.712 
 
(0.303) (0.730) (0.753) 
    N 851 851 851 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 236 
 The effect of Misión participation is positive and significant in Model 4 (at the p < .001 level) on 
the probability of voting for Chávez-aligned parties. This effect is also positive for the interaction 
term for income and program participation shown in Model 14, and remains positive for 
education and program participation, shown in Model 15. While the additive term is significant 
(and remains so in both models), neither interaction measure is statistically significant. 
Interpreting the other independent variables in the model shows that Chávez received 
significant support among low education respondents where the parties did not. Less well-
educated respondents had a significantly higher probability of supporting Chávez in the overall 
and income interaction models (at the p < .1 level), though not in the education interaction model. 
Respondents who indicated supporting Chávez-aligned parties in the 2005 election were low-
income, male, and - unlike the party support - younger, though these were not significant 
predictors of support. In the election, respondents from Zulia and the West had a higher 
probability of opposing Chávez-aligned parties at a statistically significant level (p < .001).    
6.1.2.6 Comparing Marginal Effects 
Investigating the substantive effect of recipient status on the probability of Chávez support 
in 2006 for one unit increases in levels of income and education in Model 13 reveals that across 
levels of income and education, the probability of supporting Chávez is greater for recipients 
across all plausible (low) values. This is shown in Figure 28.  
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Figure 28. Model 13: Probability of Voting for Chávez by Income & Education, 2006 
 
 
The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases slightly from 
43 to 44 percent over the income values. At lowest levels of income, the probability of supporting 
Chávez among recipients is 89 percent, and the value declines modestly over levels of income to 
87 percent. At lowest levels of income, non-recipients have a 46 percent probability of supporting 
Chávez, a value that decreases over income levels to 43 percent at the highest level. The 
difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases from 38 to 47 percent 
over the education values. At lowest levels of education, the probability of support among 
recipients is 92 percent, and the value declines over increasing levels of education to 85 percent. 
 238 
 At lowest levels of education, non-recipients have a 54 percent probability of support, a value that 
declines to 38 percent over the range of education levels.  
Marginal effects analysis of Models 14 and 15 provides a way to examine the interaction 
effects of income and education with recipients compared against non-recipients. Non-recipients 
serve as a baseline for the effect of income and education on electoral support. In the marginal 
effects plots below, they reveal low-income and low education support for Chávez. The difference 
between the recipient and baseline low-income support is sizable: low-income and low-education 
recipients support Chávez at higher rates than do non-recipients. Both recipients and non-
recipients favor Chávez at lower income levels than at higher ones, and the differences expand 
over increased levels of income. The significant relationship shown for the income interaction in 
Model 14 suggests that income is a better predictor of Chávez support across the levels of the 
variable than education. Marginal effects for both models are shown in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29. Models 14 & 15: Probability of Voting for Chávez by Income & Education, 2006 
 
 
In Model 14, the difference in probability between recipients increases from 42 to 38 
percent over the education values. Across levels of income, the probability of supporting Chávez 
is greater among recipients. These report a 79 percent probability of support, increasing to 87 
percent over increasing levels of education. Non-recipients report a 37 percent probability of 
support, increasing to 49 percent over greater levels of education. In Model 15, the difference in 
probability between recipients declines from 41 to 37 percent over the education values. Across 
levels of education, the probability of supporting Chávez is greater among recipients. These report 
a 77 percent probability of support, increasing to 86 percent over increasing levels of education. 
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 Non-recipients report a 36 percent probability of support, increasing to 49 percent over greater 
levels of education.  
Comparing the overall model and the interaction models for the effect of participation in 
the Misiones on the 2006 presidential elections shows the significance of the income effect on the 
probability of support for Chávez among respondents when compared to education. Low-income 
recipients show greater for support for Chávez, though the magnitude of the effect increases in 
size over levels of income. Results from the education Misiones are shown below. 
6.1.2.7 2006 Presidential Election  - Education Misión Model 
Models 16-18 in Table 30 display the results of probit analyses on LAPOP respondents who voted 
for Chávez in the 2006 presidential election according to the characteristics identified above. 
These models echo the 2005 data, showing a positive effect for education Misión recipients on the 
probability of voting for Chávez, when the relationship is modeled on education and income. 
Controlling for other factors, education Misión recipients have a higher probability of supporting 
Chávez.  
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 Table 30. Probit of Being an Education Misión Recipient on Chávez Vote in 2006 
 
Model 16: 
Chávez Vote 
Model 17: 
Chávez 
Vote: 
Income 
Interaction 
Model 18: 
Chávez 
Vote: 
Education 
Interaction 
  2006 2006 2006 
Education Misión 
Recipient 0.964*** 0.838* 0.819 
 
(0.163) (0.444) (0.553) 
Education Misión-Income Interaction 0.0527 
   
(0.174) 
 Education Misión-Education Interaction 0.0675 
   
(0.247) 
Gender 0.106 0.105 0.105 
 
(0.0999) (0.100) (0.0999) 
Age -0.0122 -0.0116 -0.0121 
 
(0.0442) (0.0443) (0.0442) 
Income -0.0454 -0.103 -0.0449 
 
(0.0523) (0.196) (0.0523) 
Education -0.215*** -0.214*** -0.288 
 
(0.0751) (0.0752) (0.279) 
Zuliana -0.492*** -0.492*** -0.491*** 
 
(0.160) (0.160) (0.160) 
West -0.565*** -0.567*** -0.566*** 
 
(0.193) (0.193) (0.193) 
Central-West -0.0156 -0.0174 -0.0148 
 
(0.158) (0.159) (0.158) 
East -0.0701 -0.0682 -0.0669 
 
(0.175) (0.175) (0.176) 
Los Llanos 0.111 0.112 0.110 
 
(0.210) (0.210) (0.209) 
Constant 1.253*** 0.426 0.444 
 
(0.273) (0.556) (0.656) 
    N 844 844 844 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 The effect is shown to be positive and significant in Model 4 (at the p < .001 level) on the 
probability of voting for Chávez-aligned parties. This effect is positive for the interaction term for 
income and program participation shown in Model 17, and remains positive for education and 
program participation, shown in Model 18. While the additive term is significant (and remains so 
in the income model), neither interaction measure is statistically significant. 
Interpreting the other independent variables in the model shows that Chávez received 
significant support among low education respondents in general, where the parties did not. Less 
well-educated respondents had a significantly higher probability of supporting Chávez in all the 
models (at the p < .01 level). Chávez drew significant support from these individuals with lower 
socioeconomic status in the Misión and education Misión models, suggesting a lower level of 
importance for the programs, as low-educated non-recipients would also support the president. 
Respondents who indicated supporting Chávez-aligned parties in the 2005 election were 
low-income, male, and - unlike the party support - younger, though these were not significant 
predictors of support. Respondents from Zulia and the West had a higher probability of opposing 
Chávez-aligned parties at a statistically significant level (p < .001 and p < .01, respectively).    
6.1.2.8 Comparing Marginal Effects 
Investigating the substantive effect of recipient status on the probability of Chávez support in 
2006 for one unit increases in levels of income and education in Model 16 reveals that across 
levels of income and education, the probability of supporting Chávez is greater for recipients 
across all plausible (low) values. This is shown in Figure 30.  
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Figure 30. Model 16: Probability of Voting for Chávez by Income & Education, 2006 
 
 
The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases from 16 to 
21 percent over the income values. At lowest levels of income, the probability of supporting 
Chávez among recipients is 96 percent, and the value declines slightly over levels of income to 95 
percent. At lowest levels of income, non-recipients have an 80 percent probability of supporting 
Chávez, a value that decreases over income levels to 74 percent at the highest level. The 
difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases from 8 to 26 percent 
over the education values. At lowest levels of education, the probability of support among 
recipients is 98 percent, and the value declines over increasing levels of education to 90 percent. 
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 At lowest levels of education, non-recipients have an 88 percent probability of support, a value 
that declines to 62 percent over the range of education levels.  
Marginal effects analysis of Models 17 and 18 provides a way to examine the interaction 
effects of income and education with recipients compared against non-recipients. Non-recipients 
serve as a baseline for the effect of income and education on electoral support. In the marginal 
effects plots below, they reveal low-income and low education support for Chávez. The difference 
between the recipient and baseline low-income support is large, but smaller than the overall 
Misión effect shown in the models above: low-income and low-education recipients support 
Chávez at higher rates than do non-recipients. Both recipients and non-recipients favor Chávez at 
lower income levels than at higher ones, and the differences expand over increased levels of 
income. The figures show increasing slopes for the probability of electoral support for Chávez, 
meaning that recipients and non-recipients were likelier to support the leader at greater income 
levels.  
The significant relationship shown for the income interaction in Model 17 suggests that 
income is a better predictor of Chávez support across values of the variable than education. 
Marginal effects for both models are shown in Figure 31. 
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Figure 31. Model 17 & 18: Probability of Voting for Chávez by Income & Education, 2006 
 
 
In Model 17, the difference in probability between recipients decreases from 20 to 17 
percent over the income values.  Across levels of income, the probability of supporting Chávez is 
greater among program recipients. These report a 92 percent probability of support, increasing to 
95 percent over greater levels of income. Non-recipients report a 72 percent probability of 
support, increasing to 78 percent over greater levels of income. In Model 18, the difference in 
probability between recipients decreases from 20 to 15 percent over the education values. Across 
levels of education, the probability of supporting Chávez is greater among recipients. These report 
a 92 percent probability of support, increasing modestly to 95 percent over increasing levels of 
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 education. Non-recipients report a 72 percent probability of support, increasing to 80 percent over 
greater levels of education.  
Comparing the overall model and the interaction models for the effect of participation in 
the education Misiones on the 2006 presidential elections shows the significance of the income 
effect on the probability of support for Chávez among respondents when compared to education. 
Low-income recipients show slightly less support for Chávez, with the magnitude of the effect of 
receiving the program narrows between recipients and non-recipients over levels of income and 
education. The effect is weaker than for the overall Misión participation level, generating a lower 
probability of electoral success for Chávez. Below, the overall effect of the Misiones on vote 
choice is analyzed.  
6.1.2.9 The Misiones and Vote Choice in Venezuela 
This section compares the difference in the probability of Chávez support between low-income 
recipients and non-recipients between the 2005 Assembly and 2006 presidential election models. 
For the overall Misión measure, it compares Models 7 and 13, and the interaction models 8 and 
14. For the education Misión measure, it compares models 10 and 16 and the interaction models 
11 and 17. For the overall Misión measure, low-income recipients reported supporting Chávez at 
sizable rates, while for the education Misión measure, low-income recipients support Chávez at 
lower levels.  
The magnitude of the effect of the Misiones increases between 2005 and 2006 in models 7 
and 13 – from 27 to 43 percent among low-income recipients – showing a sizable increase in the 
level of overall program effect on support for Chávez. Differences in the income-participant 
interaction in models 8 and 14 – from 54 to 42 percent among low-income recipients – show a 
slight decline in education Misión effect, though the magnitude is still quite great. 
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 The magnitude of the effect of the education Misiones increases between 2005 and 2006 
in Models 10 and 16 – from 7 to 16 percent among low-income recipients – showing a increase in 
the level of education program effect on support for Chávez. Differences in the income-
participant interaction in Models 11 and 17 – from 1 to 16 percent among low-income recipients – 
show a similar level of effect for the education Misiones, though the magnitude is still sizable. 
Compared to Brazil, the probability of support among poor non-recipients is low. This 
suggests a note of caution about the magnitude of the electoral effect: given the partisan divide 
described in Chapter 5, it is likely that Misión participation is saturated among Chávez supporters 
With roughly 80 percent of the sample participating in the Misiones, these poor non-recipients are 
likely opposition holdouts that avoid participation in Misiones because they do not support 
Chávez. The electoral effect of these programs would be lower in a case where the politics were 
less polarized. 
In Venezuela, the relevance of the Misiones persists over time as the relatively strong 
effect of program participation on a Chávez or Chávez-aligned vote occurs in both the legislative 
and presidential elections. Comparing the two elections, respondents showed a sizable probability 
of support, as low-income recipients significantly supported Chávez at levels that increased over 
time in nearly all models. The overall effect was much higher than the Bolsa Família effect 
described above.  
6.2 DISCUSSION 
The models presented in this chapter reveal the significance of program participation to vote 
choice, showing a positive and mostly significant relationship between recipients and the 
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 probability of support for Lula and Chávez.  Bolsa Família and the Misiones both helped Lula and 
Chávez win electoral support. In isolation and across key variables, the magnitude of the effect of 
program participation on the probability of voting for the leaders persists. The effect of receiving 
them led to more support than among non-recipients. 
While both programs benefited the presidents, the Misiones had a much stronger effect on 
the probability of Chávez support than Bolsa Família did for Lula. The electoral effect for Bolsa 
Família was relatively similar in 2002 and 2006, after the program was introduced. The Misiones 
showed substantial effects for the overall program measure and still sizable effects for the 
education program measure. This suggests that Bolsa Família did not substantively build electoral 
support in the way that the Misiones did. 
For Bolsa Família, marginal effects analysis reveals that among low-income respondents, 
the magnitude of program effect was similar in 2002 as it was in 2006. Bohn’s claim — that 
participation was not a significant predictor of the probability of support in 2006 since the 
program already reached Lula’s constituency — is not confirmed; nor is Zucco and Powers’ claim 
that the program effect was stronger as more members of the lower income constituency 
participated in the program. Rather, the recipient category shows about a 10 percent increase in 
support over non-recipients in both the 2002 and 2006 election. This shows the value of the 
marginal effects analysis to the debate over the Bolsa Família effect on vote choice.  
The difference in the level of the effect suggests further analysis into how program design 
affected the probability of support. While Hawkins and Penfold-Becerra offer evidence of 
targeting of the Misiones toward certain groups, this examination of the electoral effect over time 
demonstrates that the programs were indeed responsible for delivering votes. Comparing the 
targeting of the education programs, which yielded a significant probability of support among 
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 Venezuelan program participants, to Bolsa Família will show important differences in program 
design – particularly for oversight.  
Examining the effect also raises questions about the policy process: how political 
institutions permit leaders to design programs that produce the electoral effect revealed in the 
analysis. Subsequent chapters will examine these institutions, program design, and outcomes 
among expenditures and program distribution that contribute to such differences among recipients 
and non-recipients in these two countries.  
6.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents models for vote choice and predicted probabilities for recipients and non-
recipients of Bolsa Família, the Misiones, and the education-specific Misiones. The key result 
revealed is that both programs aided their leaders, but the effect was stronger – and significantly 
so – for the Misiones than for Bolsa Família. Chapter 7 will conclude the dissertation with a 
discussion on the outcomes of programs identified by programmatic and parochial strategies, 
hypothesis review, and policy and theoretical implications. 
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 7.0  CONCLUSION: GOOD POLITICS, BAD POLITICS, AND POLICY 
Political institutions determine how social programs redistribute to constituents, in manners both 
programmatic in parochial. This chapter describes the effects of each, and what can be learned 
about the policy process that yields insight into theory and future programs. It includes a 
hypothesis review, discussion of policy outcomes, and theoretical and policy implications in light 
of the relationships described in the theory and demonstrated in the empirical chapters above.  
The chapter begins by discussing the results of the empirical chapters in light of the 
hypotheses proposed in Chapter Two. The variation in horizontal accountability determines how 
executives design programs and generate electoral effects by redistributing resources according to 
rule-based or clientelist priorities. This section discusses evidence for the effect of opposition and 
party system influence on program characteristics and distributional outcomes that reveal 
strategy. 
It continues with a review of secondary accounts of program outcomes and government 
participation data to contrast the effects of programmatic and parochial redistributive strategies, 
showing the importance of the income transfers to each program’s impact. This serves as a first 
cut at the chief implication of the study: programmatic policy yields better outcomes for 
participants than do parochial ones. This is shown through a discussion of the evidence of 
program impact in both Brazil and Venezuela.  
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 The chapter concludes with theoretical and policy implications. Drawing from literature on 
constitutional and partisan powers to present model of executive-legislative relations that result in 
horizontal accountability effects on antipoverty policy, it integrates recent perspectives on party 
system collapse to compare policy outcomes of collapse and consolidation. When leaders’ 
partisan powers are moderated, the design of targeted programs results in programs that 
incorporate rules that determine inclusion. Governments seeking to implement targeted 
antipoverty policies can learn from the integration of rule-based elements into program design. 
These still yield electoral results – constituents respond when politicians deliver to them – but 
they protect against distributing limited resources to the non-poor. Additionally, the variation in 
quality shows that through the development of clear criteria for inclusion in targeted programs, 
compared to those that lack them, politicians can do a better job of reaching the poor. Since 
redistribution is an important element of leftist ideology, this should not be overlooked. The 
chapter begins below by examining the hypotheses and evidence presented in the study. 
7.1 HYPOTHESIS REVIEW 
This section reviews the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 2, finding support for the main 
hypothesis of the study and for several of the expectations it generates. Below the guiding 
hypothesis is introduced and evidence for each claim is discussed: 
H1) greater (less) partisan powers result in parochial (programmatic) program design. 
The evidence introduced in Chapters 4 and 5 shows that the partisan powers – the 
president’s control over the political agenda – are demonstrated to determine the degree of 
latitude in the design of antipoverty policy. In instances of weak (Venezuela) and strong (Brazil) 
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 constitutional power, the partisan powers determined the degree to which the executive could 
craft programs that distributed in a manner that reflected their political preferences. By comparing 
the political preferences of government and opposition actors, the limitations of weak partisan 
powers in Brazil were shown to influence the extent to which the PT could successfully translate 
Bolsa Família into a guaranteed income program: the PT was forced to compromise on these 
matters. The strength of Chávez’s partisan powers influenced the extent to which the program 
reflected his – and his supporters’ – policy preferences over those of the opposition. Unlike in 
Brazil where Lula obtained a basic program, the Chávez government did not need to compromise 
on these matters.  
Expectations regarding the components of partisan powers analyzed in the study, 
including: executive popularity, party composition, and the institutionalization of the party system 
are discussed. 
7.1.1 Executive Popularity 
This study produces limited evidence in support of expectations that executive popularity results 
in programs with fewer constraints to distribute to political supporters. Both the Brazil and 
Venezuela cases show a high level of electoral support for the respective executives. With an 
absence in variation, the evidence for executive influence on policy design requires an 
examination of evidence presented in the shadow cases illustrated in Chapter 2. Both the 
Argentinean and Mexican cases had greater constraints on the distribution to political supporters 
relying on eligibility criteria. A related matter is how executive popularity encourages delegation 
in the policymaking model. Both the Brazil and Venezuela cases have high executive popularity 
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 that makes delegation more likely. The legislatures in both cases permitted the executive to 
develop policy proposals, and then acted on them.  
However in both of the above instances, the absence of variation means that it is 
impossible to determine whether the evidence supports the hypothesis. Executive popularity is 
one element of the partisan powers model that is not supported through the case study analysis.  
7.1.2 Legislative Composition 
With an executive positioned to deliver excludable goods to selectively benefit populations, the 
importance of the legislature to provide checks as they determine final passage of proposals is 
great. Their ability to do so impacts the integration of reform elements into programs, though as 
shown in Chapter 5, this depends on the composition of the legislature. Of the elements of 
partisan power introduced in this study, legislative and party system aspects – those that establish 
horizontal accountability on the executive – are shown to matter most in both the Brazil and 
Venezuela cases: the process of design required careful legislative oversight to produce serious 
program oversight.  
Legislative oversight constrained executive policymaking in Brazil, resulting in the 
introduction of reform elements into program design, and ensuring that they remained present 
during a period of debate about Bolsa Família’s role in social policy. These reform elements 
excluded certain populations on the basis of whether they met program conditions, not on political 
status. In Venezuela, opposition members could not provide legislative oversight during the 
periods of program introduction and later approval, which reduced their ability to influence 
program design. This meant that the kinds of program elements introduced excluded certain 
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 populations on the basis of whether they met political criteria instead of program conditions. The 
mechanics of horizontal accountability are detailed in the hypotheses below. 
Program design varied according to legislative composition. The Brazilian case illustrated 
how passing the program through the legislature required the integration of reform elements 
common to municipal-level programs. The size of Lula’s coalition was smaller than necessary to 
pass legislature on its own, meaning that the opposition had a strong effect in permitting passage. 
Incorporating these elements into program design provided a way to ensure passage. This was 
also evident during the debate over whether to continue to incorporate these elements into 
program design: these actions occurred during the period where the PT was in a minority 
coalition. The continuation of conditionalities was subject to a change of opposition preferences 
to provide legislative support, which did not occur. As the PT considered eliminating conditions, 
the opposition protested and the program remained a CCT. 
The Venezuelan case illustrated how implementing the Misiones occurred under little 
legislative oversight, resulting in few (and when present, not enforced) reform elements. The size 
of the opposition coalition was small at the period of introduction, though Chávez skirted their 
influence by utilizing informal decree powers to initiate the programs. After securing a larger 
legislative coalition in following Assembly elections, Chávez utilized constitutional decree 
powers provided to him by the legislature to formalize the programs. The legislature was not a 
gatekeeper in the implementation of the Misiones, meaning that the programs were not subject to 
the implementation of reform elements that were expressed by opposition policy organizations.  
In both cases, the numbers mattered. The extent to which the opposition was able to shape 
the programs determined how they were designed: the incorporation of policy preferences from 
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 opposition actors that held significant seats in the legislature resulted in programs that took those 
preferences into account.  
7.1.3 Party System Institutionalization 
Party system institutionalization affected the degree to which executives sought credible policy 
change, through expectations of party competition, stable organizational identities and horizontal 
accountability among actors. During program design in Brazil, the President took into account 
opposition preferences to develop credible policies. The consolidation of the party system 
generated stable expectations about the policy preferences of opposition and government actors, 
leading to the integration of both into the Bolsa Família. This led the program to redistribute 
beyond the narrow constituency of supporters and reach beyond now-or-never redistributive 
strategies. 
During program design in Venezuela, Chávez did not take opposition preferences into 
account. During the party system collapse, expectations about the policy preferences of 
opposition and government actors became subject to the political polarization that characterized 
their relationship. The Misiones reflected government preferences, but the perspectives of the 
opposition were excluded from influence on program design. This led to programs, which did not 
redistribute beyond a narrow constituency of supporters, and with transfers that reflected now-or-
never expenditure patterns. In a future with a more dominant opposition, many of the policy 
preferences established into law with the Misiones would change. This was much less likely in 
Brazil.  
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 The next subsection reviews the basic expectations that relate the partisan powers 
described in Chapter 5 to the distributive strategies examined in Chapter 4. The relationships are 
supported in the study. 
7.1.4 Expectations about Oversight, Expenditures and Program Distribution 
Combining the components above, the relationship between partisan powers and program 
characteristics is shown through comparative analysis of constraints on program design. The 
elements of oversight employed in Brazil resulted from the constraints placed on the executives as 
they designed and implemented policy by checking plans and moderating policy design to include 
reforms. The absence of these oversight elements in Venezuela resulted from the lack of similar 
constraints. As described above, the legislature generated the constraints and the party system 
affected how two popular executives designed and carried out their policies. Further analysis of 
executive popularity, introduced in the Mexico and Argentina shadow cases in Chapter 2, would 
detail how this third element contributes to the process of program design and implementation.  
As the strength of partisan powers affects oversight, it also affects how executives devote 
resources to their antipoverty programs. In Brazil, the developed system of opposition parties 
resulted in systemic interactions that made it more difficult to introduce radical changes in 
spending. This consolidation required that Lula take a credible approach to distribute to 
constituents. The steady expansion of program benefits occurred according to program criteria 
credibly increased the likelihood that Bolsa Família would continue as a program during times 
when the PT was in the opposition. This differed from Venezuela, where the disintegration of 
opposition parties allowed Chávez to take a now-or-never approach to distribute to constituents. 
This was most evident in Misión Robinson, but expenditures for both Ribas and Sucre flagged as 
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 institutional priorities shifted. The slow recovery of the opposition could not influence how the 
leader distributed resources. Chávez proceeded without concern about whether the opposition as 
electoral challengers could affect or even do away with the pattern of expenditures. 
Linking partisan powers and distribution strategy reveals how executives constrained by 
legislatures and institutionalized party systems practice “selective distributive politics”: the rules 
they implement and the spending priorities they undertake are influenced by the elements of 
horizontal accountability that influence policy. The checks that resulted in oversight and spending 
choices determined the distributive strategies implemented in the programs. This affected how 
leaders build political support through redistribution.  
In Brazil, models examining the determinants of Bolsa Família targeting revealed that 
poverty, the chief program criteria for participation, was shown to be a chief determinant. 
Political factors were revealed to have minimal statistically significant and substantive effect, 
with a limited amount of core voter targeting in 2006. With program factors consistently 
determining distribution, a programmatic strategy emerges in the way Bolsa Família distributes to 
constituents.  
In Venezuela, models examining the determinants of Misión Sucre becas and Aldeas, and 
Misión Ribas becas targeting revealed that poverty was not a chief determinant of geographic 
distribution. Political factors were revealed to have statistically significant effects (in the case of 
Sucre becas) and among all three programs, substantive effects, mainly resulting in core voter 
targeting. With program factors having little effect on distribution and either-or spending 
occurring to political effects, a parochial strategy emerges in the way the education Misiones 
distributes to constituents.  
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 Partisan powers affect how executives redistribute, determining the ways they generate 
political support as they reach constituents with new forms of spending. The strategies introduced 
in the theoretical chapter and revealed in detailed analysis in Chapter 5 show how constraints on 
these powers enable leaders to develop parochial programs or force them to develop 
programmatic ones.  
7.1.5 Expectations about Electoral Payoffs of Targeted Social Programs 
The evidence introduced in Chapter 6 shows that recipients had greater probabilities of electoral 
support of candidates that introduced social programs, regardless of whether programs were 
programmatic or parochial in distribution strategy. In Brazil, the differences in the probability of 
support for Lula between recipients and non-recipients offered support for the effect of targeting 
on the probability of political support. These differences existed between recipients and non-
recipients for both Misión and education Misión programs as well. In reaching certain 
constituencies, regardless of how the programs were distributed, these programs achieved 
political effects.  
The difference in the probability of support between the programmatic Bolsa Família and 
the parochial Misiones on support for the respective leaders is revealed in the degree of electoral 
effect produced among the recipients. The programs that were designed and administered to 
selectively distribute benefits according to political criteria had a greater effect on the probability 
of electoral support than did the program that prioritized program criteria to distribute benefits. 
Evidence for the institutional determinants that lead to the programmatic and parochial 
distributional strategies that generate these effects is identified in discussion of the hypotheses 
below.  
 259 
 7.1.6 Summing Up 
The hypothesis review shows support for the relationship between partisan powers and program 
design. Limitations to the analysis include evidence for one aspect of partisan powers: the 
influence of executive popularity requires additional analysis from the other cases elaborated in 
Chapter 2. Future analysis can develop this further, and relate it to the evidence for the external 
effect shown here.   
Below, a discussion of program outcomes shows the impact of programmatic and 
parochial distribution. This is then followed by theoretical and policy implications. 
7.2 OUTCOMES OF PROGRAMMATIC AND PAROCHIAL SOCIAL PROGRAMS 
This section introduces the outcomes of Bolsa Família and the education Misiones, showing the 
effects of the programs over the course of the decade. The contrast shows how programs oriented 
toward programmatic and parochial redistributive strategies deliver benefits to constituents: 
programmatic policies yield better results, with more consistent participation and antipoverty 
outcomes, according to secondary perspectives. Bolsa Família is first described, followed by the 
education Misiones.  
7.2.1 Bolsa Família 
As program participation steadily increased over the decade, Bolsa Família had an impact on the 
levels of income inequality and poverty in Brazil. While it was not the only cause – other social 
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 transfers exist and the economy grew as time passed from the economic crisis – the program had 
an important effect on income and poverty, and a limited effect on educational participation.  
7.2.1.1 Participation 
Examining enrollment shows a steady increase over time in program participation, shown in 
Figure 32. This mirrors the steady increase in program expenditure trends described in Chapter 6. 
Data are from the Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social Matriz da Informação Social (MDS  
Various Years). 
 
Figure 32. ` Recipient Families 
 
A doubling in enrollment of recipient families occurs from the point of program change in 2004 
to 2011: over the decade the number of recipient families increases from greater than 6.5 million 
to greater than 13.3 million participants. The steady increase in program participation yields 
inequality- and poverty- reducing effects, and has a modest impact on improving schooling rates. 
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 7.2.1.2 Income Effects 
Inequality, poverty, and schooling outcomes are described below, with the strongest results shown 
in in the program’s effect on extreme poverty.  Bolsa Família had in important effect on reducing 
income inequality, but is not the only reason that this has declined. Comparing household survey 
data from 2001, 2004, and 2006 the program alone reduced 0.6 Gini coefficient points between 
2001-4, and between 2004-6 it reduced inequality by another 0.2 points (Soares, 2012, 21-2). 
Studies estimating its effect show that over the early part of the decade, Bolsa Família was 
responsible for 21-30 percent of the decline in Brazil’s Gini coefficient and over the later part of 
the decade, was responsible for16-21 percent (Soares, 2012, 22). 
Between 2002-10 poverty was reduced in Brazil from 25 to 14 percent, and extreme 
poverty fell from 10.4 percent to 4.8 percent. By estimating a counterfactual based on if Bolsa 
Família transfers did not exist, Soares shows that between 2005-9 the program lowered extreme 
poverty by between 1.6-1.9 percentage points, accounting for about one third of the decline in 
extreme poverty (S. Soares et al. 2010). The program was estimated to have greater impacts other 
measures; Bolsa Família was shown to reduce poverty gap by 9.4 percent and the severity of 
poverty by 5.9 percent (S. Soares and Sátyro 2009; S. Soares 2012). 
7.2.1.3 Education Effects 
The impact of Bolsa Família on schooling reveals a modest effect, partly because attendance and 
enrollment were nearly universal (97 percent) before the program increased in scale (S. Soares 
2012). Silveira Neto (2010) shows that the program results in a 2-3 percentage point increase in 
these outcomes. Glewwe and Kassouf (2012) show a 5.5 percent increase in grades 1-4 and a 6.5 
percent increase in grades 5-8. They also show a decrease in dropout rates of 0.5 percent in grades 
1-4 and 0.4 percent in grades 5-8. These effects are more moderate than the income effects above, 
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 but they show that the program conditionalities resulted in changes in addition to the income 
transfer effects.  
7.2.1.4 Evaluating the Results 
According to secondary evaluations, Bolsa Família had a stronger effect on income than it did on 
education, partly because education rates were high to begin with. However, even this 
conditionality element showed a degree of improvement as a result of implementation. Steady 
program enrollment increases were consistent with the expenditure record over the course of the 
decade. Bolsa Família had demonstrable effects on inequality, poverty and other measures of 
income. Participants were incentivized to improve educational enrollment and attendance, and 
decrease dropout rates. These outcomes revealed a program with clear antipoverty guidelines. The 
program’s narrow effect on income – particularly extreme poverty – was the result of its design to 
reach the poorest. Income effects are also revealed below as the Education Misiones are 
examined. 
 
7.2.2 Education Misiones 
The participation and outcome record in the education Misiones revealed in this section 
demonstrates problems associated with the parochial nature of the programs. Even as the 
programs were made official in 2008, they encountered a record of irregular funding and constant 
organizational change. Though no impact assessments of the Misiones have been conducted, a 
comparison of enrollment with graduation rates and estimates from the Instituto Nacional de 
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 Estadistica (INE) 2011 National Household Survey provide ways to evaluate program outcomes 
through secondary sources. 
7.2.2.1 Participation 
 
Participation in the education Misiones varies for each program over the course of the decade. 
Data for the participation and the following section on graduation is compiled from Mundo 
(2009) and Bravo Jáuregui (2012)  and the annual reports of the Ministerio de Educación Cultura 
y Deportes, Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educación, Ministerio del Poder Popular Para 
la Educación Universitaria, Fundación Misión Sucre and the Ministerio del Poder Popular para 
Planificación y Desarollo.  
Figure 33 shows registration in the education Misiones. It reveals a steep decline in 
participation in Robinson programs between 2006-7 and Ribas participation between 2007-8. A 
decline, though much less steep is visible in Misión Sucre as well, between 2006-7.  
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Figure 33. Registration in Education Misiónes 
 
Participation in Misión Robinson reflected the administration’s massive push to eradicate 
illiteracy among the population and the follow-up basic education program activities described in 
Ortega and Rodriguez and Mundo (Mundo 2009; Ortega and Rodríguez n.d.). Registration began 
at 1,371,595 participants, and peaked with 1,548,511 participants in 2006. In the years following, 
the number of registrants in Misión Robinson I dwindled both as participants presumably 
proceeded to Robinson II, Robinson III, and Ribas, and as the facilitation of Robinson learning 
shifted to volunteer households.  
Participation in secondary and post-secondary programs Misiones Ribas and Sucre 
encountered peaks and declines in service, much like the counterpart in Misión Robinson. In 
2004, the government reported 672,405 registrants in Misión Ribas, and by 2006, registration the 
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 program had expanded to 1,207,046 (Mundo 2009). Participation then declined by roughly half to 
517,585, and Ribas registration continued at a reduced level through 2011, when it reached 
429,875. (Bravo Jáuregui 2012) 
Misión Sucre encountered a similar early increase in participation only to witness a 
setback in registration, followed by an eventual increase at the end of the decade. In 2004, the 
government reported 286,915 bachilleres studying in the program. Of these, over 72,068 of the 
students had chosen majors. The program had over 3,323 facilitators with 5,270 sections in 987 
locations (D’Elia, 2006, 111). Over the course of the decade, the number of registrants peaked at 
517,174 participants in 2006, then declined nearly by half to 302,023 in 2007. By 2010, the 
program reached 462,199 registrants. (Bravo Jáuregui 2012) 
7.2.2.2 Education Effects  
 
Evaluating graduation as a schooling outcome shows that outside of the early years of Robinson, 
the programs does not consistently graduate the large number of participants. As described below, 
Robinson outcomes are shown to be suspect, further weakening the educational outcomes of the 
programs.  
Graduation data is presented below in Table 30. Annual figures are not consistently 
available over the course of the decade for the programs. 
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 Table 31. Registration and Graduation, Education Misiónes 
  
Robinson 
I Graduates 
Robinson 
II Graduates 
Robinson 
III Ribas Graduates Sucre  Graduates 
2003   697,192  432,886     
2004 1,371,595 1,314,790 1,261,793   672,405  286,915  
2005 1,493,211 1,482,543 1,452,542   763,177  362,786  
2006 1,548,511 1,534,267 1,542,931 327,390  1,041,114  517,174  
2007 69,748 28,360 167,109 64,299 72,496 1,207,046  302,023  
2008 95,485 48,021 403,732 73,500 48,021 517,585 97,000 318,920 30,993 
2009 43,069 26,334 325,406 56,453 26,133 432,902 85,120 410,877 10,015 
2010 14,829  297,833  19,985 425,875  462,199 95,627 
2011 8,763  326,851  16,927 429,875    
 
 
From available data, Misión Robinson became far less successful at graduating students, 
though in comparison, the graduation rates for Misión Sucre students were lower. In 2004-2006 
the graduation rate of Misión Robinson hovered between 95-99 percent. By 2009, the rates of 
registered students graduating from Misiones Robinson I, II, and Ribas were 61 percent, 17 
percent, and 19 percent, respectively (Bravo Jáuregui, 2011, 35).  
As the authors above note, Robinson I contains a peculiarity. By 2005 the National 
Assembly together with UNESCO declared Venezuela of a “nation free of illiteracy” announcing 
a literacy success of nearly 1.5 million people through Misión Robinson after six months of the 
program, all but eliminating the count of illiterates in the country (D’Elia, 2006, 83; Ortega & 
Rodríguez, n.d.). This is puzzling, particularly in light of UNESCO reports that note that nearly 
one million illiterate citizens remained within the country through 2006, two years after the 
declaration (Mundo 2009; Ortega and Rodríguez n.d.). Researchers note that post-Misión 
Robinson household survey data does not corroborate a steep decline in illiteracy either in terms 
of change in illiteracy over time or over the illiteracy trend in a time-series analysis (Mundo 2009; 
Ortega and Rodríguez n.d.). According to the 2001 government census, adult illiteracy stood at 
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 1,154,000 in 2001 (Sanjuán Martinez & Gonzalez Plessman, 2010). UNESCO adult literacy 
figures show an adult illiterate population of 1,318,000 for 2006 and a marginal decline to 
931,000 in 2007 (UNESCO 2009, 2010). The evidence refutes the government’s claim that 
Venezuela became a “nation free of illiteracy” through Misión Robinson. Yet matriculation into 
higher levels of the social program continued through 2007, particularly into Misión Ribas.  
Data for the upper-level programs is limited, however. The rate of students graduating 
from Misión Ribas shows 18.7 percent in 2008 and 19.6 percent in 2009. For Sucre the rate varies 
from 9.7 percent in 2008, to 2.4 percent in 2009, and is followed by an increase to 20 percent in 
2010 (D’Elia, 2011, 4). With limited reporting, it is difficult to make conclusions over the decade. 
However available data reveal weak educational outcomes for program participants.  
Each of the programs witnessed an interruption in growth over the course of the decade, 
and by its end, each shows a declining graduation rate among registered participants. Graduation 
rates are particularly low compared to the earliest reported rates of Misión Robinson. Had the 
program generated the success claimed by the government, exit from the program would be 
evidence of success. Similarly, while the Misión Sucre program required a lengthier timeframe for 
completion of coursework, the ratio of enrolled students to graduates were low when compared to 
any year of program registration reported. With such low success rates in producing graduates, 
questions are evident about the instructional quality and purpose of participation within the 
programs.  
 
7.2.2.3 Income Effects 
Evaluating the program effect on income, The Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE) provides 
estimates in the 2011 National Household Survey of the effect of the Misiones on income and 
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 inequality. The study reveals modest effects on income for the programs, with the largest share of 
redistributive transfers coming from the education Misiones. When taken together, this suggests a 
weak overall effect on income for the programs. 
Estimating the value of overall Misión transfers, the study shows a reduction in inequality 
of 0.02 Gini points, from 0.4257 to 0.4072, a 4 percent decline in the Gini coefficient (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica, 2011, 107). Estimates of Misión transfer effects on the level of 
individuals living under the poverty line show a decline as the result of transfers from 15.3 
percent to 14.8, a 3 percent decline. Proportionally, the effect on extreme poverty is greater, with 
the transfers reducing the share of individuals in this income category from 5.5 percent to 4.8, a 
15 percent decline (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, 2011, 106). 
These effects should be considered modest in comparison with overall declines in 
inequality and poverty occurred over the course of the decade. The Gini coefficient declined from 
0.477 in 2000 to 0.39 in 2011. Individuals living in poverty decreased from 48.3 to 31.9 percent. 
Those living in extreme poverty decreased from 19.5 to 8.6 percent over the same period 
(Weisbrot and Johnston 2012). 
The INE reports redistribution from education as the largest component of social 
investment among the Misiones. Education transfers stood at 70.9 percent of overall investment 
with nutrition and health reflecting 19.6 and 9.5 percent respectively (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica, 2011, 103). This resulted in education programs having the largest redistributive 
effect among expenditure categories for government transfers, particularly among the poor. 
Transfers for education increased resources to the lowest income quartile from 1 percent to 11.7, a 
10 percent improvement. A 4.6 percent increase occurred in the overall effect, from 2.8 to 7.4 
percent (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, 2011, 99-100). However, given the inefficiency 
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 revealed in the administration of the education programs in Chapter 6, it is unclear whether 
recipients are realizing the results of expenditures.  
7.2.2.4 Evaluating the Results 
Combining secondary evaluations and government releases of graduation data reveals that the 
expenditures (and among these, the transfers) for the Misiones appear to have greater impact than 
the actual delivery of education. This is particularly so for Misión Robinson, which touted a 
reduction in illiteracy that did not reflect reality. Assessing the available data for graduation rates 
of the other programs reveals that the programs did not consistently deliver successful outcomes 
for participants. The participation rates were consistent with expenditures, reflecting the 
interference and problems with oversight shown in Chapter 6. Since the programs were intended 
to produce successful students, the larger effect that income transfer elements had compared to 
the graduation outcomes suggest that the programs did not reach its goal. Bolsa Família and the 
education Misiones are briefly compared below.  
7.2.3 Comparing the Results 
Bolsa Família and the Misiones reveal demonstrable effects on income, particularly extreme 
poverty. The effects should not be confused with program design. Bolsa Família was designed to 
redistribute resources but is conditional on participation in education and health activities. The 
cash transfer element has the most important effect with related conditional effects having a 
secondary effect. The education Misiones were designed to implement remedial literacy through 
university education, with an income transfer element for certain participants. The income 
transfer elements of the education Misiones appear to have a larger impact than the education 
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 element. The transfers comprise a sizable share of all transfers in the Misiones, and having a large 
impact on those in the lowest income quartile.  
The outcomes separate the good programs from the bad. With secondary evidence 
showing that the education Misiones were more effective as income redistributive mechanisms 
than education programs, the political implications of oversight problems shown in Chapter 5 and 
parochial distribution shown in Chapter 6 mean that the program was more successful as a 
delivery mechanism for political than for program outcomes. Unlike Bolsa Família, which was 
shown in Chapter 5 and 6 to have strong oversight, with poverty as the chief determinant of 
distributions, the delivery of resources occurred according to program goals. Political interactions 
that resulted in good policy yielded better program outcomes. This will be explored below in the 
hypothesis review.  
7.3 THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This section presents theoretical and policy implications of the findings of the study. They include 
how the effect of “good policy” is acknowledged in the literature on clientelism and on politician 
incentives to redistribute. They also suggest that the literature on parties and social policy 
accommodate horizontal accountability in models of policymaking. Finally, recommendations are 
made for actors interested in encouraging programmatic policy.  
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 7.3.1 Theoretical Implications 
The following theoretical considerations emerge for the study of politicization of social policy. 
This study offers clarification for the murky relationship between the literature and vote-winning 
aspects of “good policy.” It also presents considerations about how horizontal accountability 
affects existing models of antipoverty policymaking.  
7.3.1.1 Clientelism and “Good Policy” 
The literature on clientelism and the distribution of social policy suggests that winning votes by 
targeting constituents is an unfavorable outcome of social program delivery (Ansell and Mitchell 
2011; De La O Torres 2013; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007).  This is certainly the 
case when the delivery of goods is a function of contingent direct exchange of resources based on 
political criteria such as past allegiance or the probability of future electoral support. Because 
targeted social programs are likely to win votes whether or not contingent direct exchange occurs, 
important consideration is necessary for vote-winning policies that are not contingent on these 
criteria.  
Programmatic policies deliver social benefits to constituencies while delivering votes to 
leaders, and suggest that “good votes” occur when social transfers are “good policy” –when they 
ensure that the poor are those recipients that receive benefits as intended, and make those benefits 
available without strings attached. They contrast with the “bad votes” that occur when social 
transfers are “bad policy” – when they fail to ensure that the poor are the recipients that receive 
intended benefits, and make those benefits available based on political criteria. Policies that 
provide social inclusion should win votes. But whether they do so by being parochial or 
programmatic is determined by the institutional effects of horizontal accountability.  
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 7.3.1.2 Horizontal Accountability and Linkage Strategies 
The literature on social policymaking suggests that factors internal to parties and politicians 
determine linkage strategies between politicians and constituents (Handlin 2012; Herbert 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Pribble 2013; Roberts 2007). The cases compared here do reveal 
the effect of the partisan powers of the executive in determining program politicization. However, 
the cases best provide evidence for the influence of horizontal accountability on the executive’s 
scope of power to set and implement their agenda. The politician-constituent linkage that is built 
with targeted social programs varies depending on how legislatures and parties constrain 
leadership decisions. 
These external influences affect how politicians strategize how to link redistribution to 
political outcomes. Two factors – the balance of parties in the legislature and the 
institutionalization of the party system – constrain leadership ability to politicize programs by 
determining how excludable goods are distributed to populations and by moderating how 
executives consider how programs will survive when they are out of power.  
Legislatures that delegate to executives to carry out antipoverty policymaking can exercise 
a check on the form and content of programs before giving approval. This affects how programs 
integrate rule-based oversight into their administration.  
As they design policy, executives consider whether to undertake a measured one that 
credibly articulates their redistributive goals. An institutionalized system of competing parties 
improves the ability of opposition to reshape their programs after a leader is in office, affecting 
current decisions about mobilizing through redistribution, including whether the program takes on 
a progressive approach to redistribution over a now-or-never manner or articulates national 
preferences over particular ones. 
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 The policy implications below relate the findings described to leadership incentives to 
develop policy and recommendations for organizations interested in influencing program 
characteristics. Of particular relevance is how horizontal accountability can affect the quality of 
program impact in future policy design, but given the electoral impact of programs, leaders 
should have the incentive to develop good policy on their own. 
7.3.2 Policy Implications 
The following policy implications emerge for the study: since the electoral effect of targeted 
social policy is shown to exist for programmatic and parochial distributive strategies, politicians 
seeking an electoral boost from implementing social programs have few incentives to choose 
parochial policies. This is especially the case for leftist politicians, which share redistribution as 
an ideological preference. Additionally, for those who seek to promote programmatic distributive 
strategies, recommendations are made.  
7.3.2.1 Incentives for Programmatic and Parochial Distributive Strategies 
 
The positive electoral effect of choosing programmatic strategies should reduce the need to 
introduce parochial distributive strategies. Targeted programs have a positive electoral effect, 
generating a greater probability of electoral support for leaders that reach constituents with 
programs. Since the Brazil and Venezuela comparison reveals this is to be the case, the incentives 
for parochial strategies should be minimal. The evidence presented in this chapter comparing the 
impact of programmatic Bolsa Família in Brazil and parochial Misiones in Venezuela provides 
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 evidence that the antipoverty effect is stronger when programmatic policies are pursued. If both 
win votes, leaders should be persuaded by the effect of the program on poverty outcomes.  
Leftists and other politicians that endorse redistributive goals should be especially 
interested in choosing programmatic distributive strategy over parochial policy. Considering both 
the electoral effects described above and how the two programs impact poverty, politicians 
interested in redistribution can do so in a programmatic fashion without sacrificing the electoral 
benefits brought by targeting. Drawing electoral benefit from delivering to constituencies that 
benefit from social programs is a regular element of politics.  
This implication exposes contradictions in the goals of the Bolivarian revolution in 
Venezuela. Revisiting the evidence presented in Chapter 6 models, poverty does not have a 
determining effect on beca distribution, despite the sizable impact of the education Misión 
transfers on income. Had poverty determined the direction of beca targeting, the redistributive 
impact could have been stronger and consistent with ideological goals.  
7.3.2.2 Encouraging Programmatic Policy 
The effect of institutionalized competition on moderating redistributive policy suggests that those 
seeking to influence politicians from practicing clientelism, particularly in countries with weakly 
institutionalized political systems, should encourage the consolidation of party systems. 
Developed party systems represent a way of limiting radical changes to policy by ensuring that 
politicians consider their choices in light of how they will proceed when the government is in 
opposition.   
Those interested in reducing clientelism should focus on the development of opposition 
parties that are rooted in society, mobilizing on class or identity in lieu of exchange relationships. 
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 Party development projects to bring these changes about can include foreign assistance, civic 
education, or even as a byproduct of civil society mobilization.  
7.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents a hypothesis review, an examination of outcomes, and policy and theoretical 
implications for the findings of the study. It reveals the following conclusions about how leaders 
politicize social programs in Latin America. 
Leaders politicize targeted social programs by choosing distributional strategies, and are 
constrained in doing so by elements horizontal accountability such as political competition and 
the institutionalization of the party system. The effects of these elements are shown in the cases 
and analysis of program distribution. Both programmatic and parochial distributive strategies 
have electoral effects, but the degree of effect varies. The quality of program outcomes varies too 
by distributive strategy. Better programs are the product of political interactions that affect the 
degree to which leaders can redistribute in a parochial manner. Evidence from Brazil and 
Venezuela shows the variation in the politics, their outputs, the electoral effects, and program 
outcomes. The relationship of “good policy, good votes” is determined by “good politics” 
showing the effect of political institutions that constrain leaders from seeking “bad policy” and 
the votes that follow. 
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